pursuers while the booty was being safely carried ott' into the desert. The Philistines (I S 13"), the Moabites (2 K 13-"), and the Hebrews themselves (David, 1 S 27'*; Joab, 2 S 3"-; and Gad, Gn 49") were much given to making raids (' roads,' AV).
ii. The Method of War. — (a) The Prelimxn- ari€s. — Wars were regularly begun in the spring, in order that if possible operations might be con- cluded before the beginning of winter (cf. 2S 11'). Yet winter did not always bring relief from the pressure of war (Jer 8™), and sieges were sometimes prolonged over twelve months, e.g. that of Samaria (three years, 2 K 17°) and Jerusalem (eighteen months, 2 K 25>-»}.
Something approaching to a declaration of tear was sometimes given, e.g. by Amaziah of Judah to Jehoash of Israel (2 K 14"), and negotiation was sometimes tried, e.g. by Jephtliah with the king of Amnion (Jg 11'^), in order to avert war; but such instances are not common.
Before beginning a war, eflbrts were generally made to gain religious sanction for the step. Inquiry of God was made before the ark (Jg 20-''- ^ [Heb. and LXX] and 1 S 14'8 [Heb. only]), or before a priest wearing the ephod with Urim and Thummim (1 S 14'8 [LXX only], 1 S 2S» [Heb. and LXX], and 1 S 30' [Heb. and LX.X]), or through a prophet (Micaiah, 1 K 22"), or by means of dreams (Gideon, Jg 7"), or even through a familiar spirit (the witch of Endor, 1 S 2S'). Hence the phrase ' to consecrate ' a war or warriors ; Jl S'-*, Mic 3\ Jer B" ; Is 13», Jer 22' 51'-*'--». Moreover, the ark was sometimes carried by Israel into the field (1 S 4"-", 2S 11"), and, on the other hand, the Philistines took 'their images' with them (2 S 5-'). When there was no ark to go forth, individual Israelites were fovind who carried into battle ' consecrated tokens of the idols of Jamnia' concealed under their garments (2 Mac 12'").
The people in general were warned of the approach of an enemy or summoned to war (1) by the blowing of trumpets (1 S 13», Ezk 33i-«, Am S") ; (2) by putting up ensigns on bare heights to mark rallying places (Is 13-), or by kindling fires on suitable lull summits (Jer 6' [AV]) ; (3) by sending messengers throughout the land (Jg 7-'', 1 S 11'). It was sometimes necessary to rouse a warlike feeling by unwonteil appeals to indigna- tion or to fear ; in Jg 19-'' the Levite sends the pieces of his divided concubine into every part of Israel, and in 1 S 1 1' Saul sends the hewn pieces of a yoke of oxen throughout Israel with the threat of so destroying tlie cattle of any who should be slack to obey his call.
In advancing to attack, a leader gave his troops a watchword ('for Jehovah and for Gideon,' Jg 7" ; cf. 2 Mac 8-' Sous avvdriixa 8(ou fiorjOdas, also 13'° BeoS vkTjv) ; and sometimes a ' pamn' was sung (2 Ch 20", 2 Mac 12" Korapfo^eoos T-iji' /xcfl' C^^uv Kpavyriv).
(b) Strategy as illustrated by campaigns con- dtictid in Palestine. — Strategy is the art of choos- ing the right route by which to attack or await the enemy. For an instance of consummate strategy we may take the Philistines' conduct of the campaign of Gilboa (IS 28-31). Instead of attacking Israel by the direct route tlirough the defensible valleys of the south-wost, where chariots could hardly ]iass, much less mamcuvre, the army of Achish, with its chariots and horsemen, struck northward, aiming at the fertile plain of Esdraelon, and drawing Saul away from his Benjamite strong- liolds. The Israelites failed to close the pa.sses over the eastern end of Mount Cariiul, and the Philistines poured into the plain, where they could victual their large army and use their chariots with effect. Saul's hillmen could not nie<'t the enemy in such a place with huk'Ii hope of success.
Their king was oiitinaiclied and ontmanoeu\Ted. No wonder that liis stout heart trembled when he saw the Philistines in force on this vantage- ground (1 S 28*- '). The battle of Gilboa was from the first only a forlorn hope for Israel. On the other hand, when the Philistines ' came up to seek David' (2 S 5"'-'), their strategy was faulty. Despising the enemy, tliey twice came up the Judu-an (or possibly the Benjamite) valleys into the small plain of Rephaim (between Jerusalem and Bethlehem). Twice did David await his oppor- tunity in the hold (v.") hard by, and twice dui he inflict a severe defeat upon tlie Philistines. They failed because through over-con lidence they chose a route more favourable to the enemy tlian to themselves.
(c) I'aciics. — The tactics of the Israelites in the earliest days were very simple, but often very effective. First a surprise gained by stratagem, and then a sudden rush of men in which personal prowess had its full opportunity. For sucli warfare the strong individuality of the Hebrew race htted them in a very high degree. The stratagems de- scribed in the historical books belong to all periods and are of various kinds.
(1) Nifjht marches and night attacks were fre- quent. Joshua marched all night to the relief of Gibeon, and, it seems, surprised the Amorites at dawn (Jos 10"). Mesha (Moabite Stone, line 15) captured Nebo from Israel by similar tactics. Gideon assailed the Midianite camp ' at the begin- ning of the middle watch ' (Jg 7'"), i.e. about mid- night. Saul attacked the Ammonites in the morning watch, i.e. shortly before dawn (1 S 11"). Joraiu, king of Judah, when surrounded by the Edomites, cut his way through them vrith his chariots by night — a great feat, needing a clear night and able leading (2 K 8-'). (2) An ambush w;is a favourite stratagem. By this Ai was cap- tured (Jos S'o-^*), and Gibeah (Jg 20""-"). The Syrians tried it against Israel without success (2 K 6"- "). With the ambush a pretended (light of the main body was often combined. (3) Similar to the ambush was the device of giving a deserted appearance to a camp, in the hope of taking tlie enemy at a disadvantage when he came to spoil it (2 K 3-', cf. 7'-}. (4) A well-organized force amid be ilicided just before an engagement, and the enemy put at a disadvantage by attack from more than one dii'cction (Gn 14", 2 S 18-, cf. v.*).