A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

James Hastings • SECTION 1250

Section 1250

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Before leaving this subject one possible strategic line, lying for the most part outside Palestine, must be mentioned, i.e. the sea route from the Egyptian Delta to the coast of Palestine. The possession of this line gave the king of Egypt an advantage ovel the rival power (Assyrian or Babylonian) in the Euphrates Valley, in that it enabled him to threaten his enemy's line of communications by landing troops in his rear. It has been suggested that Pharaoh-neco reached Megiddo partly by the ses route in the reijjn of Josiah (but cf. HGlIL'p. 405, note 2), and it is possible that there is an allusion in Dt 2S'** to the possession of such a route by Egypt (but cf. Driver, in loco).

Ol localities of strategic importance the plain of Esdraelon has already been noticed. A second spot of similar interest is the plain of Gilgal, the S.W. part of the Arabah or ' plains of Jericho.' Here Israel encamped after crossing the Jordan (Jos 4" lu" ; cf. Jg 2'), and here the headquarters remained, until a more central place, either Shiloh (Jos 18' 22" 24> [LXX]), or Shechem (Jos 24' [MT]), was secured to Israel. From Gil^al a pass leads west- wards over the great central ridge by Bethel and the two Ueth-horons down to the maritime plain. Some distance north of Gilgal another pass leads uji the Wady Farah {FArCah), sometimes identified with the Brook Clierith, in a N.W. direction to Shechem. The first of these routes was probably followed by Joshua in his marches on Ai (Jos 8*1 and on Gibeon (Jos 10»- ') ; the second is probablj

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referred to in Jg 1-'", where the conquest of Bethel hy the house of Joseph is recorded.

In this enumeration of routes and localities no reference has been made to Jerusalem. In- deed its strategic importance was not great. Neither Alexander of Macedon {pace Jos. Ant. XI. viii. ; cf. Piepenbring, Histoire, pp. 590-592), nor Napoleon Bonaparte when on the march to Egypt, deigned to turn aside to Jerusalem. To an Assyrian king engaged in a similar expedition, Lachish and Libnah (2 K 19*), both on the edge of the ShephC-lah (see Map), were each of more im- portance than the comparatively remote Jewish capital. It wa.s the political influence of IJezeViah over the Philistine malcontents which caused Sennacherib to detach a strong force (2 K 18") against Jerusalem. Isaiah was right in holding that it was possible for Judah to maintain a policy of isolation in the face of the clash of the great powers of western Asia. These powers seldom desired to encumber themselves with such ' a burdensome stone' (Zee 12 ) as Jenisalem. Shi- shak, king of Egypt, did indeed capture the city in the reign of Itehoboam, but only because Solomon had made it a city worth plundering (1 K H-^- =*). Ilazael, king of Syria, ' set liis face to 'oupagain.st Jerusalem,' but commuted his hostility :or a payment in money (2 K 12"- '"). Similarly was Sennaclierib bought ofl' once at least (2 K IS"-'"). Pharaoh-neco, kin" of Egyjit, slew Josiah at Megiddo and deposed Jehoahaz at Kiblah ' in the land of Haniath,' but does not seem to have turned aside to Jerusalem (2 K 23^'^). Nebuchad- rezzar was at least equally contemptuous. Jelioi- alfim was in a state of rebellion against Babylon for eight years, but the great king contented him- self with sending marauding bands against his vassal. Jerusalem was outside the sphere within which great captains contended with great armies. Samaria, on t!ie otiier hand, was comparatively of gieat strategic importance. It stands on a c<mi'manding hill (well shown in Sir R. Temple's Palestine JllitJitrated, p. 180) where the important road from Jenin meets at right angles the broad, 'fat valley' (Is 28') which slopes westward towards the plain of Sharon and tlie .Mediterranean. East- ward, passes of no great ditlienlty lead to the fords of the Jordan. Tims Samaria was strategically as well as politically ' the head of Ephraim ' (Is "'■'). We have now liad occasion to mention represen- tatives of three classes of fortresses in Palestine. On the south-west, Libnah, Lacliish, Gezer, and Beth-lioron guarded Judah against Kgypt, the Philistines, and tlie inhabitants of the Sinaitic Peninsula. On the edge of tlie jilain of Esdraelon stood Megiddo, Jezreel, and other fortresses closing the dillerent approaches. On tlie central ridge, Jerusalem and Samaria were strongly fortitied. Two classes of fortresses remain to be mentioned. On the border between the northern and southern kingdom (Jeba and Mizpah and other cities were built to stop the passage of possible fugitives and de.serlers and to watch the frimtier (1 K 15'°""'^). Lastly, the great fortresses ea.st of Jordan, of whi(-h perhaps IJamoth-gilead was the most im- portant (1 K 22', 2 K 8=" 9'), must be mentioned ; Dor must the watch-towers, built to protect the uads and watch over tlie pa-stures, bo forgotten (see TovVKR).

The geographical conditions of Palestine were such that the kind of warfare best known to the Hebii;ws must have been the foray. The south of Judah lav oi)en to the Amalekites and other pre- datory tribes (1 S 30). On the east were the Midi.inite freebooters (Jg 6'- ■•). Against these the Jordan was an aTiibiguous defence, for, if the in- vaders could seize one of the fords by surprise, they could held it with a rearguard against

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