The usual defensive tactics of the Hebrews con- sisted of standing in close order, shield touching shield, with spears carried at the charge, and of awaiting the attack of the enemj'on higher ground and with the front protected by a wfuly or other obstacle. Such probably was tlie array ('^?^;^.? maarakhah) with which they fronted the Philis- tines in the valley of Elah (1 S 17^')- In such a position they were unassailable, and things might well remain at a standstill for forty days (v." [not in LXX B]). Unless the position could be turned by a flank movement, the only resource left to an assailant was to seek to shake the steadiness of the array by enticing the prominent warriors to leave their posts to engage in single combats. This resource the Philistines in the valley of Elah tried in vain. ' The men of Israel [when they saw Goliath] fled from him [back to their places in the array]' (v.^-").
Israel s simple tactics were really adapted only to broken country, such as the liill - country of Judah, with its caves and deep rugged wfidis. The enemy when defeated said, not without truth (IK 20-^), 'Their god is a god of the hills; therefore they were stronger than we.' For more scientific tactics we have to look to Israel's foes. We see such in use at the battle of Gilboa. Saul, like Harold at Hastings, bad formed his army
probably in close order on a hillside up which the enemy must advance to attack. But the Philis- tines, like the Normans towards the close of tha battle of Hastings, prepared the way for the decisive attack by flights of arrows. Saul fell like H.arold, pierced through by the archers (1 S 31"). Then, and not till then, the Philistines could trust their chariots and horsemen to make a successful charge up the slope (2 S 1'), and a de- cisive victory was won.
Another j_'ood though unsuccessful piece of tactical skill was shown by the Syrians at the battle of Ramoth-gilead. The Syrian king massed his chariots (1 K 22^'), and endeavoured to obtain a decisive effect by emploving them at a decisive point, viz. the person of Aliab. Ahab escaped this danger through his disguise, and was thus able to encourage his army by his presence ' until the going down of the sun.' Thus Israel was repulsed but not routed at Ramoth-gilead.
(d) Fortresses played an important part in the wars of Palestine. In the days of the Judges Israel had no fortresses, but had to take refuge from Midianite (Jg 6-) and Philistine oppression (1 S IS"*) in cave districts and among the mountains. But the land is studded with heights suitable for fortified posts, and under the kings these were crowned with walled cities.
Fortresses (cities ' ha\'ing gates and bars,' 1 S 23') were surrounded by walls of stone or of sun-dried bricks, built often close to the precipitous sides of a hill or mound.* If there were no precipice near to defend the wall, then a trench (Vri hel) was added. Samaria had such a trench (1 K 21^ [' wall ' AV, ' rampart ' RV]) ; and Jerusalem, though none was needed on the E., where ran the deep valley of Jehoshaphat, probably had one elsewhere (La 2^).
The walls of Jerusalem were strengthened with towers and furnished with battlements (Jer 5'° 'thy branches' [RV, prob. a poetical term for 'battlements' AV], cf. Zeph 1" and 2 Ch 26'»). On the walls were placed engines for throwing arrows and great stones (2 Ch 26'^).
Of the attack of strong places by the Israelites we have many notic^es. Jericho was captured by coup de main with an ease in which Israel rightly saw the hand of God ; the falling of the walls seems to be a metaphor describing the failing of the hearts of the defenders (Jos 6-°, cf. 2"). Similarly, Judas Maccahajus is said to have cap- tured a strong city by ' rushing wildly against the wall' (ifiaeiaav flij/iiuSuJs ry relxd, 2 Mac 12"). Sometimes fire was applied to burn the gates or to set lire to a wooden defence (Jg y"-'>-) ; this device is also pictured on the As.syriaii reliefs. As early as the time of Da\'id the ' mount' or ' bank' (i^^d solcldh, see below) was employed (2 S 20"). If these means of attack failed, the besiegers were obliged to maintain a wearisome blockade, until surrender was brought about by famine or treachery. The fall of Ralibah was perhaps hastened by threatened water-famine (2 S 12-'). The S\'rians (Arama!ans) probably used engines (1 K 20'- [RVm]) ; and the Assyrians, as masters of the art of war, practised regular siege operations. Great shields or screens were raised against the wall (Is 37**), behind which archers were set to keep under the ' fire ' of the defenders. Under cover of this bombardment a causeway was built (perhaps by captives) from the Assyrian camp to the city to be attacked. Rising gradually in height, it waspushe<l nearer and nearer the city. Such a mound, when it touched the wall, might oe used to facilitate an escalade or to bring the battering-ram on a level with the upper part of the wall. Another instrument of attack used
• Compare Flinders I'ctrie (.Tell el-Ueey, 1891) and F. J. BUM {A Mound 0/ many Cituji, 1891).