Christ is probably of least significance in the theology of Biedermann, who held that Jesus is simply the first realization of the idea of Divine Sonship(iJo/;T/wi((/:, ii. §81.'j). Whereas Lipsius, though an opponent of the Ritschlian school, resembles it in the emphasis laid upon Christ. Thus in the essay already cited he says that the Christian rehgion is historical, and that the eternal good which it oflfere is bound up with the pereon of Christ. Christianity, he says, consists not in ideas which Christ illus- trated, but in Christ Himself. But Lipsius distinguishes be- tween kernel and husk, and between some facts and others. Thus he says that * faith has to do not with single historical facts as such, but with their religious value,' and that ' there are facts about whose historicity there is little doubt, and which are of no importance for our religious life, and there are others about which there may be much doubt, and yet, as sensuous representations of religious truths, they are of the greatest value.' Obviously, if facts about whose occurrence there is doubt are of such importance as 'sensuous representations' of religious
Lipsius' treatment of the great Christian facts. Thus the Cross is ' the symbol of the eternal truth that the old man in us must die, in order that man be born of God' (p. 138), though Lipsius does recognize in Christ's death more than a mere symbol (p. 139). At the same time the all-important thing is the idea symbolized. So also the Resurrection of Christ need not be true in its literal Scriptural form, but at the same time it symbolizes the truth of the entrance of Christ into the heavenly world. The * form ' in which we conceive it is expresslv said to be of no importance. This is suHicient to show the complete subordination of Christian fact to philosophic theory in this movement. But not only are the great facts of Christianity put into the category of 'husk.' The dogmatic interpretation of them in the Scripture is also regarded as the external hull or symbol of rational truth. For, unlike the Ritschlian school, who hold that the Greek influence is largely later than the NT writings, the lilieral theology carries this influence, and conse- quently the critical process of separating the kernel of truth from its husk, back into the NT. Tims Pfleiderer (Glaubem- u. SUtenlehre, p. 4) says that it is the business of Dogmatics to 'work over critically' the Scripture as well as the Church dogma m order to reach its abiding truth. The Scripture doctrme is said to contain a 'sensuous' element which is not rational and which must be rationalized.
It is evident that the principle of external authority in religious knowledge having been abandoned by this school also, the historic facts of Christianity as well as the Scripture interpreta- tion are given up. Again, facts are subordinated to a human theory, and we have left a religious philosophy.
The subjection of the Scripture facts and doc- trines to a subjective norm has taken also a more my.stical form. This, indeed, is a natural coiisp
?|Uenci^ of the .-itti'miit to find a permanent Ij^i-i- or reli.^icius know Icilye after the principle of iv ternal .uuliniiiy h;is been given up. For lln- kernel ot riitiunal truth .seems to differ with each
l,t afin
tliat permanency vlii-1, ImiuM rliai.Mlrri/.- ll,.> .■.MMice of Christi- .■iiiii\, rii.v-.- M.-riillril ri(Mii:il iiiiUis are tempor- ;illy (■unilitiiiiii-(l jn-i :i < arc l\\r Scripture dogmas. To hold to tlieiii, therefore, is a species of dogma- tism. Accordingly it is natural that a demand for a truly undogmatic Christianity should arise, seeking to be rid not only of Scripture doctrine, but also of the rational element into which it had been distilled.
This demand was made by Dreyer in his Undogmatisches Clinstentuw, the first edition of which appeared in 1888. Coming from the camp ot the liberals, Dreyer directed his polemic against ' liberalism ' and ' orthodoxy ' alike. The liberal theology fails to satisfy the demands of the 'pious heart,' while orthodox dogma is in conflict with modern culture. We are therefore bidden to turn from dogma to the life of faith. Christianity is a life, not a series of facts or doctrines. Dogma is religious experience put into the form of concepts (p. 77). It is therefore put into a form of relative validity, and one that is continually changing. When these concepts are no longer valid, they no longer serve to express religious life, and must be rejected. The facts of Christia)iity fare no better at Dreyer's hands. He will not allow our idea of liistorv to be governed by any dogmatic supernaturalisni, and consequently, at the de- mand of an equally dogmatic anti-supernaturalism, he tells us the ' myth-forming process ' is seen in the Gospel record of the life of Chi-ist. Although something of e-xternal fact may remain, we can find no religious certitude in any historic fact, and are told to fall back on Christ's holy character, which is exalted above all the changes of theological science and historical criti- cism. This arouses life in us, and this life is the essence of Christianity, which is a life, not fact or doctrine.* A some- what similar position has been taken in Prance by A. Sabatier.t His idea is that religion is life, not doctrine. External autho- ty, whether of Scripture or the Church, kills religion. The