'--' 'hing in religion is life. But this life must express
ardlyinin ■* " ' ' ' ~ '
Is of ( of other religions because the life is higher. Christianity, therefore, is neither a series of facts nor a sum of dogmas, but a spiritual life.
We have not space to show the inconsistency of Dreyer's supposed escape from historical criticism, when he falls back on the inner life of Jesus as the ground of the life which constitutes the essence of Christianity ; or to discuss the philosophy which underlies Sabatier's books. We can only stop to indicate briefly that when we have separated Christianity from all external facts and have made its doctrinal content entirely the product of the religious life, we have done away with Christianity, because we have done away with all that distin- guishes it from natural religion. Of course it is true that Christianity is a life hid with Christ in God. It is also true that Christian doctrine can never produce Christian life. St. Paul has taught us this. Man is dead in sin, and the revelation of Divine truth in the Bible will fail to produce spiritual apprehension or life ; for ' the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit' (1 Co 2"). These great truths are emphasized in the Re- formed Theology. But the type of thought we are discussing means that the essence of Christi- anity consists in a life which precedes and is inde- pendent of facts and doctrines, and that doctrine
Glaube u. Dogma replied to Dreyer that instead of an undogmatic Christianity we need a ' new dogma ' which grows out of Christian faith. Dreyer re- joined, in a later edition of his book, that he admitted a ' science of faith' (Glaubenskhre), and so did not differ from Kaftan. Kaftan again replied, saying that Dreyer held that this science of faith contained a symbolic element, and was only of relative validity. This seems to be the most essential point of difference between Dreyer and Kaftan, viz., the latter claims absolute validity for dogmatics as ' the science of faith,' while the former admits a relative element in this ' science of f.aith ' which he refuses to call a dogma. Dreyer's view of the inner life of Christ, as independent of historical criticism, and as the source of Christian life, resembles that of Herrmann in his Verkehr des Cliristrn rait Gott. But Drever is a mystic, while Herrmann is ii"t. s, , ,1,.,, [)rr\,r.Xiiri'utl,«n,:.(:l,iuh,'„sl.[postbum.],190l. / ./■»,,. /'/,//. ./.• /.I ii./:,. ,r,,rr,'x la Psych. etVBis-
' ' '' I '" il 'I Iji-, ir. Is'.i7|, 'Hiis i k includes a lecture,
111' \i.i.:i, 'A (lin^tKiii l)i>^'iii;i^,' jiuliiisht'd separately [also llii- 1 1 I , ,.U, , /„ X ll.li.ji'iiix ,/'.! H(../-,V,' ,■( la Religion de fjisprit.
566
FACT AND THEORY
FACT AND THEORY
is the product of life. Thus to eliminate fact and doctrine from Christianity is to leave nothing but bare natural religious sentiment. And it is a mistake to suppose that Christianity is the product of the religious sentiment (see Warlield, The Right of Syst. TheoL). It is no more the product of this tlian it is of rational reflexion.
Furthermore, there is now left no basis for the affirmation that Christianity is the final religion, and its doctrine absolute truth. For we can never be sure that Christian life may not reach higher levels and embody itself in more elevated doctrinal symbols. AVriters of this type might and do reply to this, that, even apart from fact and doctrine, the Christian life is not the bare religious sentiment, but the product of God's Spirit, and that it i-- therefore the true life, and its doctrinal proilu' t final truth. But when they atfirm this, tlit\ abandon their position. For it cannot be pru\ eil that this life is the true life if the norm of truth be drawn from the life itself. We believe that Christian life is the true life because of a fact and a doctrine Independent of this life, viz. that it proceeds from the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit. But in affirming tliis we have as- serted a great fact as well as a doctrine, each independent of, as well as at the basis of. Christian life. In short, if Christianity is separated from the great supernatural facts of Christ's life and from the great supernatural facts of the action of God's Spirit on men's hearts, as well as from its authoritative doctrinal content, then that which differentiates it from mere religious sentiment is gone. What, then, to sura up, is the attitude of this type of religious thinking to the question of ' fact and theory' in relation, especially, to Christ? This question may be answered by saying that the facts and doctrines of Christianity have been sub- ordinated to a psychological theory that feelint' and sensation precede and condition thought. And as a consequence, we are left >vith a human Christ whose portrait is the product of the religious senti- ment.
At this point we are met ^vith a reaction from the neglect of the historical element in Chris- tianity, and also from the demand for an uiidog- matic Christianity. This has come from members of the Eitschlian school. Thus, e.g., Harnack (cf. his address. Das Christcntum it. die Gcschichtc, 1896) and Herrmann (besides his Vcrkehr and Begriff der Offenbarung, see esp. his Warum bedarf unser Glaube geschivhtUchcr Thatsachen? 1884) have attempted to defend tlie importance of the historical basis of Christianity aj;ainst Lessing anil Kant; and Kaitxin {(ilmihr I'l. Ihiqu},,-. 1889) bus written a ruply tu llreviT. ^ll..^^in.• that the du-iiiatic olcmcntis c.->witiiil to ChnM lanitv, and that what we need is a • ni-w ^mjhi;!,' I'.ut this demand must be judged in tlie liulit ..i i1m iimtive, principles, and results of tlii- tli.,,l,,jir 1 move- ment. The fundamental mcitivi- .,i IdtMlilianism is an apologetir- one. viz., to Inid a ground of certitude in Chii-tiai.ity xvliich shall be indepen- dent of the ri-ult-^ ot hi-torical criticism and of metaphysics, ami so to M.ite the content of the Christian faith that it too shall be independent in both these respects. In order to accomplish this, it is common -with theologians of this school to lay stress on the revelation of God in the ' historic Christ,' and to seek to find in Him the ground, as well as an essential element in the content, of. the Christian faith. This ground of certitude and this dogmatic content are held to be independent of historical criticism and metaphysics, by means of their sharp distinction between religious and theo- retic knowledge, the latter dealing with facts and their explanation, the former with religious values. In regard, then, to the historical clement in Chri.-