The following summary of the doctrines of Aquinas is chiefly condensed from Neander, History of Dogmas, vol. ii. (1) As to the necessity of revelation, Aquinas inferred it from the super-terrestrial destiny of man, which goes beyond the limits of human reason. He denied any contradiction between philosophical and theological truth ; the truths of natural reason cannot be at variance with those given bj' revelation, since God is also the author of reason. What opposes rea- son cannot proceed from God. If we admit such a contradiction, it would follow that something false might be the object of faith, which would be an ab- surdity. In his inquiries respecting the relation of faith to knowledge, he says : A faith of authority resting on human opinion is the weakest of all things ; but it is otherwise with divine revelation. Yet the- ology makes use of human reason, not, indeed, to prove the truths of revelation, but to deduce other truths from it'. As other sciences obtain their principles from other sources, and then draw inferences from them, so theology proceeds from those which are made known by a higher light. But since grace does not nullify nature, but perfects it, and as the natural inclinations of the will serve the divine principle of the Christian life, so also will reason serve the truths of faith. (2) As to the knowledge of God, he asserts that it is, in a certain confused manner, implanted in all men (sttb quadam confusione est nobis natural iter insertuni). Since man is so created that he finds in God his highest good, so, in striving after happiness, striving after God is at the foundation ; but all men do not attain to this con- sciousness. The fool can say in his heart that there is no God. (3) In anthropology, Aquinas held that man was created with pure natural powers, which, from their very destin}', turned toward God, and thus man acquired the grace of justitia originalis. This is the Romish doctrine of superadded grace, as necessary to the original perfection of human nature. As to original sin, he combated the view of the Traducians, according to which sin was transferred by propagation, for this would not explain the participation in guilt. Mankind must be regarded as an ethical person, and so far Adam's sin was the sin of all men. In original sin Aquinas recognized two elements, one privative, the other positive. The first was the loss of the har- mony of original righteousness ; the second consisted in an inordinnta dispositio, a discordance which took place between reason and sensuousness, and in a lan- guor naturce. He maintained, in opposition to the doc- trine of the Immaculate Conception, that the Virgin Mary was not without original sin, inasmuch as she, as well as other mortals, needed redemption and salva- tion through Christ (Summa, p. Ill, q. 27, art. 1). (4) As to redemption, he could see proof of its relative, but not of its absolute necessity. Since redemption proceeded from the free will of God. it suffices to prove that this method was not impossible, and that it was suitable. Supposing that man had been redeemed by an angel, his perfect restoration could not have been effected, for man would have remained dependent on a creature. The visible appearance of God was neces- sary, in order that man might be led from the visible to the knowledge and love of the invisible. Setting out from the contemplation of the divine Omnipotence, other possible modes of redemption might lie imag- ined, but this method must have ever been the most suitable. On the other hand, if regard be had to man's stand-point, no other method was possible than that which was chosen by God, since man by himself alono could render no satisfaction. If the relations to God and man are combined, it must be allowed that
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another method of redemption was possible, but none BO suitable as this. The union of God with man must give man the strongest assurance of attaining the highest happiness, which consists in immediate union with God. But, since redemption has been effected, men have acquired a new consciousness of the dignity of their nature. In these ends Aquinas found the im- portance of the work of redemption. As he here joins his own ideas with those of Anselm, he agrees also with him in the opinion that the satisfaction rendered by Christ furnished what was requisite from its in- trinsic worth. Like Anselm, he proceeds on the prin- ciple that for an injury something must be given which the injured party would value as high as, or higher than what had been lost by the injury. Christ's sat- isfaction is not only sufficiins, but super abundans. Aquinas was perhaps the first to raise the question "afterward so earnestly discussed in the Calvinistic and Arminian controversies of the 17th century — the question, namely, whether Christ did not earn for the believer a title to eternal life, as of freedom from con- demnation to eternal death. Aquinas answers this question in the affirmative, and makes the technical distinction between the satin/action which Christ made by his sufferings to justice, and the merit of his obe- dience to the law, by virtue of which the redeemed are entitled to the rewards of eternity. In other words, we find in the theory of Aquinas an anticipation of the later distinction between the 'active' and 'passive' righteousness of Christ" (Shedd, History of Doctrines, ii, 310). If we find elsewhere the various instrumen- talities of grace scattered, such as the offices of Law- giver, Priest, and King, all these are united in Christ, the fountain of all grace. He is the Mediator between God and men, as far as he communicates what is di- vine to them, intercedes for them, and makes satisfac- tion for their sins. Christ is the mystical head of the members which belong to him, inasmuch as what he has done is for their benefit (iinio mystied). (5) As to justification, the Schoolmen, after Augustin, conceived of it not as objective, but a subjective sanctification, of which faith is the instrument, and which is realized in love. Aquinas thought the infusio gratia? just ijicant is (infusion of justifying grace) necessary for the forgive- ness of sins on the part of God, and allowed successive steps in justification : first of all the communication of grace — then the tendency of the free will to God — then that by which it departs from sin, and upon this the forgiveness of sins. He thus confounds, to a cer- tain extent, justification with sanctification, as all the later Romanists do. In the act of faith is contained the admission that man is made righteous by the re- demption of Christ. As to the relation of faith to justi- fication, he admitted it, but vitiated it by adopting the- scholastic distinction between condiynum and congruum, or merit from desert and merit from fitness. This distinction is thus defined by Aquinas, with his usual acutenesa and clearness : " A meritorious work of man may be considered in two aspects; first, as proceeding from the free will of man, and, secondly, as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it be considered from the first point of view, there can be in it no merit of condignity or absolute desert, because of the inequal- ity between man and God, whereby it is impossible for the creature to bring the Creator under absolute obli- gation. But if ii be considered from the second point of view as proceeding from the influence of the Holy Spirit, the work of man may have the merit of con- gruity or fitness, because it is fitting that God should