Destructioniats. See AsKiHiunons* Detenninlsm, the general name for all tko«^ ories according to which man, in his '•^*^*J*r «. al action, is absolutely determined by e*^*™"** temal motives not belonging to him, »i»d *"*r" deny his freedom or explain it as a "*",22h In opposition to determinism, the wwl ^°y*T ism has been used of a will whidiis "^^^^S termined fh)m abroad, but wholly ^'^^^"""^'[^ Such an absolute indeterminism can ^"^^'^j^^ ted of the absolute being. Abaolute detenaiai* the other hand, can only be attributed to o^^*]^ activity is altogether dependent opw •**** . pulses, as is the case wUh the objecte of wftaVj plying the term to man, every bnnch ^^^^ Church holds to some kind of deternum«H'^JJJ as he is dependent upon the ^^^olotebAiftW*^ his actions are influenced by impair* ^ ■*
DETRACTION
161
DEUS MISEREATUR
at it is common to understand by determinism those iews of man's dependence upon external influences hich destroy his moral responsibility. In this sense irious kinds of determinism are distingnished. It is xtaliatie or predeterministic if it places an irresistible itality above even the divine being or economy, as as done by the Greeks in the doctrine of fate, and Is ill done by the Mohammedans. It is pcaUheUUc if
deduces necessity from the unalterable connection f things, making the individual acts of man, as it ere, a sport of the world-soul with itself^ as was the ise in the cosmic theories of the Indians, in the ethics r the Stoics, in the system of Spinoza, and in certain lodem systems. The astrological determinbm is a ■ansition fh>m the first to the second kind. Deter- linism is materialistic if the want of human fireedom I explained by the life of the human soul being deter- lined by an evil or hostile materia, as was done by iie Parsees, the Gnostics, and the Manichaeans. Dif- irent from these ancient materialists are the modem epresentatives of a materialistic determinism, like La lettrie, who reduce all human actions to an absolute ompulsion by sensuous motives. A subdivision of bis determinism is the phrenological determinism rhich in modem times has found some champions. L subtle fbrm of determinism is found in some ration- listic writers, who explain the self-determination of nan as a coercion by inner representations (Priestly) ir by adequate reasons (Leibnitz). Other writers on his subject have divided determinism into mechani- al, rational, and metaphysical determinism. — ^Herzog, ^ieid-Encyhiop. iii, 331. See Will ; Pkedbstination.
Detraction (Lat. detraction from detr<Aere) means mmarily taking off from a thing; and in morals it is he act of depreciating another's reputation. Barrow [bserves QWorks, N. Y. edition, i, 208 sq.) that it dif- fers from slandeTy which involves an imputation of alsehood ; from rtvilinff, which includes bitter and foul anguage ; and from censuring^ which is of a more gen- eral purport, extending indifferently to all kinds of persons, qualities, and actions ; but detraction especial- ly respects worthy persons, good qualities, and lauda- ble actions, the reputation of which it aimeth to de- stroy. It is a &ult opposed to candor, * *' Nothing can be more incongraons with the spirit of the Gospel, the Bxample of Christ, the command of God, and the love of mankind, than a spirit of detraction; and yet there ire many who never seem happy but when they are employed in this work ; tliey feed and live upon the supposed infirmities of others ; they allow e:foellence to none; they depreciate every thing that is praise- worthy ; and, possessed of no good themselves, they think all others are like them. * O ! my soul, come thou not into their secret ; unto their assembly, mine honour, be not thou united' '* (Buck, Theolog, Diet, 8. v.). "When we consider the motives in which de- traction originates, we stiall find that most of them spring from, or centre in, malevolence. In some per- sons there is a lust of distinction, which cannot en- dure an equal, and bums with a desire to level the pre-eminoice of every superior. In whatever degree this disposition may prevail, it is combined with a de- sire to eclipse the worth, or to deduct from the excel- lence of those above, or those on a level of ability or merit with itself^ Hence, if we would eradicate every propensity to detraction, it is essentially requisite that we cultivate a hnmble spirit, and that, impressed with a consciousness of our own unworthiness, we learn to think and to speak of others more justly as well as more charitably. Some persons of mean talents, slen- der capacity, grovelling desires, or little industry, who are too timid to undertake any thing good or great^ or too feeble or too indolent to execute it, are continually endeavoring to screen themselves from contempt, or to hide their own individual insignificance by deprecia- ting the worth, ratling at the audacity, or ridiculbig the exertions of those who have more ability, more en-
terprise, more intellect, and more activity than them- selves. There is no integrity, however pure, no worth, however genuine, which is not exposed to invidious obscuration, to unjust surmises, and wily misrepresent- ation ; and desigbing and interested men, who abound in the wisdom of this world, well know how to convert these practices to their own advantage, and to the in- juiy of their neighbor. If detraction be found in a greater degree, or of a more mischievous kind, in a court than in a village, it is only because in the former there is a stronger incitement to its exercise, and more ample space for its operations. Detraction tends to reduce the best men to a level with the worst, and thns to bring worth itself into disrepute. It tends to chill the ardor of doing good, and to produce a general be- lief that all the virtue which exists among men is im- aginary and counterfeit It involves in itself a high degree of depravity, and is connected with the viola- tion of every moral tie. Is it not adverse to justice ? Is it not incompatible with charity ? Is it not a plain dereliction of our duty to God ? For is it not princi- pally occupied in lessening the estimation of the good and wise, who are more especially the objects of his fa- vor, and the excellence of his rational creation ? Must not the practice, therefore, bring us under the divine displeasure ? Is there not in the habit so large a mix- ture of malevolence as necessarl^' implies that we are strangers to the love of God ; and, if we will persist in so hateful a practice, can we hope to escape that place of torment in which there are weeping and gnashing of teeth? (FeOowes's Body of Theologg, ii, 862, 867; Warner's System of Divinity and MoraUig, ii, 90)."— Bobinson, Theol, Diet. s. v.