Opposed to the utilitarian theory there are two the- ories, which maj' be called the instinctive and the ra- tional. The former refers the moral principle to the sensitive or emotive part of man's nature ; the latter, to the perception of moral good and evil by the intel- lect. To the first class belongs Adam Smith (f 1790), whose Theory of the Moral Sentiments (Glasgow, 1759 ; London, 1790, and often) refers the moral sense to sympathy. His view is thus stated In' Mackintosh (Ethical Philosophy, Philadelphia, 1832, p'. 149): "That mankind arc so constituted as to sympathize with each other's feelings, and to feel pleasure in the ac- cordance of these feelings, are the onh' facts required by Dr. Smith, and thej' certainh- must be granted to him. To adopt the feelings of another is to approve them. Wlien tlie sentiments of another are such as would be excited in us by the same objects, we ap- prove them as morally pnper. To obtain this accord, it becomes necessary for him who enjoj-s or sufi'ers to lower his expression of feeling to the point to which the bj'-stander can raise his fellow-feelings, on which are founded all the high virtues of self-denial and self- command ; and it is equally necessary for the bj'-stand- er to raise his sympathy as near as he can to the level of the original feeling. In all unsocial passions, such as anger, we have a divided sympathy between him who feels them and those who are the objects of them. Hence the propriety of extremely moderating them. Pure malice is alwa3'S to be concealed or di.sguised, because all sympathy is arraj'od against it. In the private passions, wher,' there is only a simple sympathy — that with the original passion — the expression has more liberty. The benevolent affections, where there
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is a double sympathy — with those who feel them and those who are their objects — are the most agreeable, and may be indulged with tlie least apprehension of finding no echo in other breasts. Sympathj'- with the gratitude of those who are benefited by good actions prompts us to consider them as deserving of reward, and forms the sense ofm(-rit ; as fellow-feeling witli the resentment of those who are injured by crimes leads us to look on them as worthy of punislnnent, and consti- tutes the sense of demerit. These sentiments require not onl}' beneficial actions, but lienevolent motives for them ; being compounded, in tlie case of merit, of a di- rect sympathy with the good disposition of the bene- factor, and an indirect synipatliy with the person ben- efited ; in the opposite case witli the preciselj' opposite sympathies. He who does an act of wrong to anotiier to gratify his own passions must not expect that the spectators, who have none of his undue partiality to his own interest, will enter into his feelings. In such a case he knows that they will pity the person wrong- ed, and be full of indignation against him. When he is cooled, he adopts the sentiments of others on his own crime, feels sh'ime at the inipr.prieti) of his former pas- sion, pity for those who have sutFered Ijy him, and a dread of punishment from general and just resent- ment. Such are the constituent parts of remorse. Our moral sentiments respecting ourselves arise from those which others feel concerning us. We feel a self-approbation whenever we believe that the gen- eral feeling of mankind coincides with that state of mind in which we ourselves were at a given time. ' We suppose ourselves tlie spectators of our own b^'- havior, and endeavor to imagine what effect it would in this light produce in us.' We must view our own conduct witli the ej'es of others before we can judge it. Tlie sense of duty arises from putting ourselves in the place of others, and adopting their sentiments respect- ing our own conduct. In utter solitude there could have been no self-approbation. The rides of morality are a summary of those sentiments, and often benefi- cially'stand in their stead when the self-delusion of passion would otherwise hide from us the nonconform- ity of our state of mind with that which, in the circum- stances, can be entered into and approved bj' impartial by-standers. It is hence that we learn to raise our mind above local or temporaiy clamor, and to fix our eyes on the surest indications of the general and last- ing sentiments of human nature. ' When we approve of any character or action, our sentiments are derived from four sources : first, we sj'mpathize with the mo- tives of the agent ; secondly, we enter into the grati- tude of those who have been benefited ijy his actions ; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agree- able to the general rules !)}' which these two sympa- thies generally act ; and, last of all, when we consider such actions as forming part of a system of behavior wliicli tends to promote the happiness either of the in- dividual or of society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine' " {Theory^ ii, 304, Edinb. 1801).
Lord Shaftesbury (f 1713) puhlished in 1699 his In- qnirij concerning Virtue (also London, 1709, and in his Characteristics), which, according to Mackintosh, "is un(iuestionably entitled to a place in the first rank of English tracts on moral philosophy, and contains more Intimations of an original and important nature on the theory of Ethics than perhaps any preceding work of modern times." This praise rests on the fact that Shaftesbury developed the doctrine of a moral sense. The "most original, as well as important of his sug- gestions is, that there are certain affections of the mind which, being contemplated by the mind itself through what he calls a reflux sense, become the ob- jects of love, or the contrary, according to their na- ture. So approved and loved, they constitute virtue or merit as distinguished from mere goodness, of which