Dr. M'Cosh (^Ame?-ican Presbyt. Review, Jan. 1868, art. i) classes the modern views on ethics in Great Britain into the two schools of Sensational and Ea- tional (or a priori), "corresponding to the two schools of philosophj' which have divided Europe since Des- cartes ami Locke." Under the latter he classes Cud- worth, Clarke, Coleridge, Eeid, Stewart, and Sir W. Hamilton; "none of them, however, except Cole- ridge, taking up so high a, priori grounds as Des- cartes and Cousin in France, or Kant and Hegel in Germany." The Protestants of England, in the main, at this time, according to the same writer, do not ai/ree with those Roman Catholic writers who deny an inde- pendent morality apart from the authority of the Church ; while, on the other hand, they do not agree with the philosophers who assert not only the inde- pendence, but the siifjiciency of ethnic or natural mo- rality. (See the article cited for a view of the rela- tions of the modern sensational doctrine to theology and religion.)
Among American writers, Jonathan Edwards (| 1758) is first to he named in this field. In his Dissertation concerning the End of true Virtue, and that On the End for which God created the World (Ijoth contained in his IVoi-ks, N. Y. ed. vol. ii), he sets forth an ethical theory marked by the subtlety and originality which charac- terize all his speculations. Mackintosh sums it up as follows: "True virtue, according to him, consists in benevolence, or love to being 'in general,' which he afterwards limits to • intelligent being,' though sentient would have involved a more reasonable limitation. This good will is felt towards a particular being, first, in projyortion to his degi-ee of existence (for, says he, 'that which is great has more existence, and is farther from nothing, than that which is little") ; and, second- ly, in propo7-tion to the degree in which that particular being feels benevolence to others. Thus God, having in- finitelj' more existence and benevolence than man, ought to be infinitely more loved; and for the same reason, God must love himself infinitely more than he does all other Iteings. He can act only from regard to himself, and his end in creation can only be to man- ifest his whole nature, which is called acting for his own glory." ' See also, on his ethical theory-, the ar- ticle Edwards in Appleton's Cyclopedia, vii, 18 ; and the Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1863, p. 402 sq. There are many excellent manuals, prepared for text-books,
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by American -writers, such as those of Adams, Way- land, Alexander, Haven, Aklen, Hopkins, etc., for far- ther mention of which wc have not space. Hickok (^System of Mor-al Science, 1853, 8vo) treats the sub- ject from the a priori point of view, and also in its relations to Christian theologj', in a very masterlj- manner. He makes duty an end in and of itself. The voice of conscience is imperative. " There is an awful sanctuarj' in every immortal spirit, and man needs nothing more than to exclude all else, and stand alone before himself, to be made conscious of an au- thority he can neither dethrone nor delude. From its approbation comes self-respect; from its disapproba- tion comes self-contempt. A stern behest is ever upon him that he do nothing to degrade the real dignity of his spiritual being. He is a law to himself, and has both the judge and executioner within himself, and inseparable from him." " We may call this the im- perative of the reason, the constraint of conscience, or the voice of God within him ; but, hy whatever terms expressed, the real meaning will be that every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that, and that only, which is due to his spiritual excellencj\" " To be thus worth}^ of spiritual approbation is the end of all ends ; and as worthy of happiness, this ma}' now righteously be given and righteously taken, but not righteouslj' paid as price or claimed as wages. The good is to be worthy, not that he is to get something for it. The highest good — the summum bonum — is ■worthiness of spiritual approbation" (^Moral Science, p. 45-49).
Christian ethics, as distinguished from moral phi- losophy' in general, has not received the same atten- tion from English and American writers as from Ger- man. The earlier books on Casuistry (q. v.) and Cases of Conscience, however, belong under this head. Most of the standard English and Amsrican writers com- mingle philosophical morals with Christian ethics. Butler brings out with clearness the relations of ethics to the Christian religion. Wardlaw's Christian Ethics (3d ed. Lond. 1837, Boston ; oth ed. Lond. 1852) asserts that "the science of morals has no province at all in- dependently of theology, and that it cannot be philo- sophically discussed except upon theological principles (Boston ed. p. 367, note). Watson (Theolog. Instit. pt. iii) treats of Christian ethics under the title " The Mor- als of Christianitj'-," and denies the a priori method (see Cocker, in Meth. Quart. Jan. 18G4). Spalding {Phil, of Christian Morals, Lond. 1843, 8vo) has "re- course both to science as derived from an examina- tion of man's moral nature, and to revelation as de- rived from an examination of the Scriptures."
In France, the orthodox Roman Catholic writers have generally confined themselves to the so-called Moral Theology (q. v.). The Cartesian school [see Des Cartes] cultivated Ethics in the new philosoph- ical spirit; its best representative is Malebranche. Virtue he defines to be the love of universal order, as it etcrnall}' existed in the divine reason, where everj' created reason contemplates it. Particular duties are but tlie applications of this love. He abandoned the ancient classification of four cardinal virtues, and for it substituted the modern distinction of duties toward God, men, and ourselves. The French school of Sen- sualism, of which Condillac was the head [see Cox- DiLLAc], regarded all intellectual operations, even judgment and volition, as transformed sensations ; and Helvetius, applying the theorj' to morals, held that self-love or interest is the exclusive motor of ni;.n, denied disinterested motives, made pleasure the only good, and referred to legislative rewards and punish- ments as illustrating the whole system of individual action. La Mettrio maintained an atheistic Epicuri- anism, and Condorcet wished to substitute an empiri- cal education for the ideas and sanctions of religion and morality. The most complete and logical elaboration of the materialism, atheism, and fatalism of the period,