ihe one hand, and, on the other, his acuteness, depth, iiilbrmation, and power of argument, leave us much at a loss to discover whether the author was in his so- ber senses or not. We give a brief abstract of his views, so far as we have been enabled to comprehend them. He conceives that the source of all human knowledge is in God, and that it is one whole, and in a manner identical witli God himself; and the name which he gives it is ' L' Idea,' or Thought. This di- vine thougiit is communicated to man in proportion as lie is capable of receiving it; and it is 'the light which enlighteneth every man tiiat cometh into the world.' Man receives it bj' means of his reason, which is capable of directly beholding it; and this direct be- holding (or intuition) of the ' Idea' is tlu> origin and first cause of all the knowledge of natural things whicli the mind of man possesses. It is innate, inasmuch as it risas to the mind at the same moment as the thougiit which apprehends it; but it does not rise within the mind, but enters it from without. It is the principle of knowledge to the human mind, from the very first exercise of its powers as a thinking being. The simi- larity of this view to that of Plato, revived and modi- fied by ilalebranche and Leibnitz, is sufficiently evi- dent. But this direct intuition of the divine thought bj' the reason, although the origin of all thoughts in the soul, is bj' itself but inchoate and imperfect. In order to render it available, it requires tliat this intu- ition sliould be reflected on ; and this can be done onh' by means of language, for man cannot reflect on and (so to speak) repeat the original intuition except In' means of language, whicli renders determinate what was before imperfect. For this purpose language was given to man, and by means of language God origin- ally reveals to man that which he has caused him to beliold by internal and direct intuition ; and bj' means of language this same revelation is repeated and car- ried on from generation to generation ; and \)y the same medium, employed analogically, the knowledge of the divine thought is more and more revealed. Yet language is not the cause of human knowledge, nor is ; it, in the case of ordinar}- kno.vledge, the medium of i the cxliiliitiiin of the divine tliought to the mind (for that shines immediately ujion tlie mind), but it is the j occasiou of its being completel}' revealed. For the purposes of ordinary and natural knowledge this com- bination of intuition with language is the method or- dained ; but supernatural knowledge can be conveyed only by means of language ; and divine truths are not seen by intuition, but believed. Yet all knowledge of every kind has its source in the divine thought, and consists of such views of it as the individual is capa'ble of. Besides reason, which is capable of beliolding the divine thought, man has likewise inlernal and spiritual fiielings or emotions, which are modifications of the mind, and preserved by feeling; and, in addition, he possesses material and external feelings, having refer- ence to the properties of bodies, and perceived b}' sen- sation and the outward senses. The ordinary range of modern metaphysics is confined to these internal and external feelings ; and it is a common error to substitute the internal feeling as a first principle, in- stead of that which is apprehended by the reason through direct intuition, and revealed to tlie soul by language and reflection. It is likewise an equallv common error to substitute reflection on these internal and external feelings for reason, as the initiatoiy in- strument of that knowledge which is the basis of phi- losophy. (Here he is evidently alluding to Loclce and his followers.) But it is bj' tiie view or intuition of the divine thought that meaning is given to tliese va- rious feelings, external and internal, and to the vari- ous sensible objects bj' which they arc surrounded. The basis of all knowledge is the knowledi^o of hnng ; yet not of an alistract idea, but of the concrete ])erson- al Being, God himself, acting as a cause and produc- ing existences, who is, in fact, the only being, because
he alone has being in liimself. The knowledge of this being is gained by revelation, by means of the written word, wheiein he declares himself, 'I am that I am;' and the mind beholds him, and lias him made known to it internally, through the reason, independently of all external sensations. God being the onh' being, all other things are onl}' existences ; and man learns from the revealed word that the one being created ex- istences ; not that he extends himself into these va- rious manifestations (as Hegel teaches); not that lie causes these existences to emanate from himself, as other Pantheists teach, but that he creates them. jMan thus learns their proper nature, viz. that they are distinct, individual, real things, having a kind of : personality ; that it is the act of creation whicli gives I them this reality and individualitj' ; and that it is only I by the fact of tiieir being created that tlieir reality is assured to us ; that, in short, nothinjj but the act of creation could assure to us the realitj' of external j things. Gioberti holds, moreover, that all our knowl- edge of philosophy must begin with a knowledge of being and existences, and their relation to each other; and that not of abstract being or abstract existence, but of one concrete Being, and of many concrete indi- vidual existences ; and he thinks that the divine thought gives us a knowledge of the latter by a direct view of them, which gives life and meaning to all our sensations and feelings in connection with them. Ho likewise teaches that principles of knowledge are ob- jective, eternal, and absolute ; that tliey are not the creation of the mind, nor sought out by it, but that they present themselves to the mind unsought, and are first truths — the foundation of other truths. He teaches that the permanent possession of the divine thought depends in a degree on man himself; that he may rebel against it, and thus fail to receive it, and fall into error. He teaches that it is by the participation of it that individuals possess a moral persoiialit}' ; that it is the vital principle, and that if it were entirely withdrawn the consequence would be annihilation ; that inasmuch as the divine thought creates and gov- erns the universe, it is the soul of the world ; inasmuch as it dwells in men's minds, it is knowledge ; inasmuch as it actuates, produces, determines, and classifies the powers of nature, it is the generic and specific essence of things ; that the basis of generality is the Divine Being himself, having in himself the ideas of all pos- sible things, and the power of giving effect to those ideas." He left a number of MSS., which were edited and published bj' G. Massari, under the title C|/)e?-e in- edite di Mncenzo Gioberti (Torino, 185G-60, G vols. 8vo). There is an excellent article on the life and writings of Gioberti in the Christian Examiner, 18G1, p. 237. See also IMassari, Vita e Mortc di Gioberti (Flor. 1848), and Etudes sur Gioberti; Cruger, Esquisses Italiennes; Spaventa, La filosojia di Gioberti (Naples, 186i) ; Ris- orfjimento (Oct. 1851) ; Hoefcr, Noiw. Bing. Gencrale, XX, 585 sq. : New American C'/clopcedia, viii, 251) sq. ; North British Review, vol. xi; Brownson's Review, iv, 409 sq.