I-op:ic.il. Transcendental.
^Universal. Uuitj'.
I. Quantity -(Particular. Plurality.
(.Singular. Totality.
rAfflrmative. Keality.
II. Quality < Negative. Negation.
(indeterminate. Limitation.
^Categorical. ^ Substance.
III. Relation J. Hypothetical. Cause.
(Disjunctive. Reciprocity.
( Problematical. Possibility.
IV. Modality ^ Assertory. Existence.
(Apodeictlc. Necessity.
All judgments are framed by the mind under the in- fluence of these categories, four of them — one from each class — being inevitably applied in every instance. As, however, things are thus seen, not as they are, but as the intellectual predispositions make them appear to be — knowledge is purely relative to the human mind — ob- jective truth is not attainable, and all oiu: experiences
or knowledge have only a subjective validity. The mind cannot think except so far as it has been ])rovoked by objective stimulation, therefore there is a real objec- tive existence of things. It thinks under the control of the categories of the understanding, therefore knowl- edge is subjective in form, is moulded by the recipient mind, and cannot be known to correspond to the reality of things. The image is reflected from the mirror, but the object represented may be magnified or diminished, or strangely distorted by the character of the mirror, without being altered in itself. The image is aU that constitutes knowledge ; there is, accordingly, no assur- ance of agreement between the image and the object. Thus all knowledge is conditional only — conditioned by the forms of the understanding, which mould it into the form in which it is received. Some principle was re- quired to give coherence, vmity, confidence to the rela- tive knowledge obtained through such mental experi- ences. This was supposed to be given by the conscious- ness of personality which boimded, adunated, and har- monized all the qualified judgments that could be enter ■ tained. It seems a misapprehension on the part of Kant, and at variance with his system, to claim any necessary truth for judgments formed in this manner. There can be nothing more than a relative or contin- gent necessity — an impossibility of thinking otherwise than tlie constitution of the mind necessitates.
In the higliest region of the mind — the reason or the faculty of ideas — there is also subjection of the matter of knowledge to transcendental forms. But the func- tions of the reason pass beyond the limits of experience, and are only regulative. In this branch of the sulyect, which is designed to explain the combination of the judgments of the understanding into ratiocinative con- clusions, Kant introduces three pure ideas, which are deemed to be analogous to the three forms of the syllo- gism— categorical, h j'pothetical, and disj unctive. These ideas are, 1. Absolute unity, or simple being, the soul, which gives origin to Rational Psychology ; 2. Absolute totality, the aggregate of phenomena in space and time, the world, which'is the basis of Cosmology ; and, 3. Ab- solute reality, supreme existence, the First Cause, which is the subject of Theology. From this point the later German schools diverge by ascribing a real and not simply a subjective validity to the forms of the abso- lute. With Kant they are merely postulates of reason, having no assured objective existence. Rational psy- chology only exhibits the phenomena of mental con- sciousness without guaranteeing anything in regard to the essential nature of the mind or to the immortality of the soul. Itational cosmology is equally unable to at- tain to any positive knowledge in regard to the creation. It lands us finally in four pairs of transcendental ideas, each pair producing twin contradictions. These are Kant's celcljrated antinomies : 1. In cpiantity, it may be proved that the world is both limited and unlimited ; 2. In quality, that its elements are ultimately simple and infinitely divisible ; 3. In relation, tliat it is caused by free action, and by an infinite series of mechanical causes ; 4. In modalit}-, that it has an independent cause, and that it is composed of interdependent members. Which- ever of these alternatives be asserted, it cannot be ex- clusively maintained, for it results in hopeless paralo- gisms: Both must be in some sense true, yet both can- not be simultaneously entertained, because they are con- tradictory. Hence no certainty, no complete compre- hensive knowledge can be attained. Metaphysics is simply inquisitive, speculative, critical, showing the lim- itations of the human mind, and the impossibility of knowing the reality of things, but at the same time fur- nishing glimpses of a reality which the mind can not compass — of existence and truth beyond the range of finite comprehension. It is the confession, if not the demonstration of the intellectual weakness of man. The same negative result is reached in rational theology. The ontological argument for the being of (iod — that of Anselm and Des Cartes, derived from the notion of per-
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feet and indopendcnt existence — the cosmological argu- ment of Clarke, which proceeds from tlie eonceijlion of contingent to that of necessary being — and the pliysico- teleological argument of the natural theologians, wliich infers a supreme intelligent Designer from the evidences of design in the creation, are all equally inconclusive. " Thus the soul, the world, and God are left by Kant's speculative philosophy as problems not only unsolved, but demonstrably unsolvable." To fiirnisli a positive support for convictions on this subject indispensable for human guidance, and to give an authoritative rule for action, Kant constructed his ethical systems.