An examination of the analysis usually prefixed to the " Essay" will show how small a portion of the work really belongs to the regular exposition of a metajihys- ical system ; how much is occupied with the anticipa- tion of objections, or the simplification of apprehended difficulties. The treatise is di\-ided into four books. The first repudiates the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas, and is therefore controversial and negative. It does not seem to have been verj^ highly regarded by Locke himself. The second is an inquiry into the ori- gin and limits of human knowledge, and is the charac- teristic portion of Locke's philosophy. The third is given to the consideration of words, and is in many re- spects the most valuable part of the book, affording use- ful suggestions for guarding against the multitudinous seductions of the hlola Fori. It is dialectical rather than philosophical, though it affords frequent opportuni- ties of confhrming or expounding his cardinal tenet, and many of exhibiting its inadequacj'. The fourth book is on the nature of knowledge in general, and does little more than apply the conclusion already reached to the determination of the degree, extent, and quality of hu- man knowledge, which is reduced by him not merely
to relativity, but to a beggarly and unsatisfactory rela- tivity.
The circumstances which provoked the composition of Locke's celebrated treatise account in a most instruc- tive manner for the character of his doctrine. His ad- diction to the writings of Des Cartes in his college days — his rejection of his postulates and conclusions — his fondness for the physical and natural sciences — his ut- ter defect of poetic sensibility — his association with the great and with the beau monde — his political and prac- tical proclivities, confined his attention to observed phe- nomena, cramped and discouraged the criticism of those phenomena, and withdrew his thoughts from what lay beyond, and was required for the intelligent observation and interpretation of the phenomena supposed to be ob- served. Hence he was led to ignore the spirit of hu- man thought — to exaggerate the importance of the words which served for the counters of metaphysical speculation — to make much of his philosophy turn upon the precision and determinateness of terms, and to con- sider that a scrupulous recognition of their import in their acceptance and employment constituted the main part of philosophy. Hence, when he undertook ■' to ex- amine our own abilities, and see what objects our under- standings were or were not fitted to deal with," the ex- amination scarcely reached to that primary and essen- tial problem of metaphysics, but revolved tediously and with needless prolixity around the limits of the mean- ings of words. He thus necessarily arrived at an ex- cessive, though far from rigorous nominalism.
Locke's point of departure was that of all the philoso- phers of the latter part of the 17th and the first quarter of the 18th ccnturj' — Cartesianism. The influence of the suspected doctrine was manifested at the outset of his labors by his proposition to substitute the phrase determinate ideas for clear and distinct ideas — though a mere change of name, and such a change, could effect little in producing a complete reform of system. It is a startling commentary on the insufficiency of this sub- stitution that no writer has been more capricious and vacillating in his employment of terms than Locke him- self, and that the very term idea, which he elaborately defines, is used by him without determinate meaning, and in almost every possible. sense except its true one. He, however, furnished neither the first nor the solitary example of the abuse of this fine Platonic invention. Locke's popularity may be due to the ease, and vigor, the vivacity, and homeliness of his style; but the style is rugged, ambiguous, conversational, and as far removed from philosophical propriety as it is from literary ele- gance.
The influence of Des Cartes, educing antagonism, tempted Locke to commence his investigations by an assault on the hypothesis of innate ideas, which ini- questionably formed the latent substratum of the Car- tesian delusions. Certainly the clear and distinct ideas of Des Cartes had no title to be accepted as innate. Locke had thus an easy task in refuting the Cartesian positions. He failed to recognise that the incriminated doctrine was not thereby refuted. The " tabula 7asu" of Locke was just as much an assumption and as much a fallacy as the innate truths of his opponent — unless by the tabula 7-asa is understood, what Locke woidd not have understood, the sensitive and sympathetic tablet ready to restore in the sunlight of life all images pre- sented to it. It is perfectly true that distinct concep- tions and formulated maxims are not innate, or anterior to all excitation. This admission does not disprove the reality of congenital and constitutional preadaptations of the intellectual faculties for the acceptance of such conceptions and propositions when suitably presented to the mind and apprehended by it. Locke's doctrine on this point has consequently been surrendered, and the doctrine opposed by him has been accepted, imder juster limitations, by many who continue to entertain the pro- foundest reverence for his general procedure. The Car- tesian postulate compelled the assertion of a divme in-
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flux to explain the operations of the mind, and suggest- ed Malebraiic'he's celebrated thesis of "seeing all things in God." Locke, who had assailed the heresiarch, felt the necessity of controverting the hazardous moditica- tion proposed by the fervent acolyte. But the tenet to which Locke was himself driven by the compulsion of his own erroneous principles was equally hazardous and still more fallacious — that our idea of God is obtained by sensation and reflection.