Louis XIV OP France, grandson of Henry IV, and third of the Bourbons, was born in 1638. The re- gency of his mother, Anne of Austria, controlled by car- dinal Mazarin (q. v.), continued during the minority of the sovereign. So far, indeed, as the policy of Mazarin was concerned, it prevailed until his death in 1661,
LOUIS XIV
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LOUIS XIV
when Louis first really assumed for himself the reins of government, and indicated tlie principles of his admin- istration. During the minority of its youthful sovereign the country had been distracted by civil wars, those of the Fronde, partly through Spanish influences, partly through an unsatisfied and factious element of the French nobility. Perplexing difficulties, moreover, and even ac- tual conflicts of the regent and her minister with the I'arliament and States General, had more than once arisen, usually terminating, however, in the triumph of the former, Louis himself, in his eighteenth year, dis- missing one of these bodies, and forbidding anj' future exercise of some of its most important functions. The internal difficulties, so far as due to the hostile policy of the Spanish court, were disposed of by the marriage of Louis with the infanta Maria Theresa in 1660, through the skilful management of Mazarin. The effect of these troubles, however, was to shape, to some degree, the pol- icy of Louis, and to enable him to carry it out success- fully. That policy was to avoid all conflict of authori- ty by centring all power in the person of the sovereign.
The administration of Louis, extending over a peri- od of great significance in the secular condition and history of Europe, concerns us here in view of its prin- ciples and results religiously and ecclesiastically; for, while it may be said that one of the grand objects of this administration was to supersede Austria as the par- amount Catholic sovereignty of Europe, it sought this end in connection with the destruction and diminution of Protestantism, not onlj' in France, but elsewhere. To enable us to consider his policy as it affected the re- ligious condition of France and Europe, the course of his civil and military administration must, however, be first examined.
Louis's clcil policy — the consolidation of all power in the hands of the sovereign, detaching the crown from its alliance with all the legislative, jucficial, and muni- cipal institutions — he himself has best interpreted for us. " Tlie worst calamity which can befall any one of our rank," is his language to the dauphin, " is to be re- duced to that subjection in which the monarch is obliged to receive the law from his people. ... It is the will of God that every Subject should yield to his sovereign im- plicit obedience. ... I am the state !" These assertions of supreme prerogative are put forth, indeed, in connec- tion with a recognition of accountability to the divine Source from which such powers are derived ; but below him there was no accountability, no limitation to the action of his royal vicegerent. Consistently with this theory was the operation of his internal administration. The first and most effective instrument for the carrying out of such policy was a thorough military organization. This was perfected to a degree hitherto unknown, among its new features the most effective to the end proposed being the emanation of all commissions, promotions, and distinctions from the king; doing away altogether with the possibility of the existence of such a balance of pow- er as had previously been maintained, and rendering impossible all limitation of prerogative. The States General— the great central legislative representation of the clergy, nobles, and commons— ceased to exist. The provincial states, having a more limited function of the same nature, shared the same fate. The Parliaments, from registering, protecting, and partly legislative bod- ies, became simply judicial tribunals to execute, under the forms of law, the decrees of a royal master. That in the thorough working out of thissystem Louis ex- hibited rare administrative ability cannot be denied. Tliat he possessed the peculiar capacity of selecting ef- ficient subordinates is no less manifest. That, more- over, under his rule there was a great evolution of ad- ministrative, military, and literary capacity \s C(iually undoubted. Not so salutary or favoral)le were the re- sults, however. Louis's policy eventually broke down the resources of the country ; and it set in operation cer- tain tendencies, which only worked themselves out in the crash of the French Kevolution.
But this concentration of all power in the person of the sovereign had in view the carrying out of an ex- ternal as well as an internal policy. " Self-aggrandize- ment," to use his own words, " is at once the noblest and most agreeable occupation of kings," and this he did not always pursue under the real requirements of truth and right. " In dispensing with the strict ob- servance of treaties, we do not," said he, " violate them j for the language of such instruments is not understood literally; it is conventional phraseolog}', just as we use complimentary expressions in society." These two sen- tences are the text, of which the internal policy of Lou- is may be regarded as constituting the commentary. His reign, counting from the death of Mazarin, was characterized by four great wars, occupying altogether forty-two years, or seven ninths of its continuance. The first of these was his attack upon Spanish Flanders, and this in violation of the treaty of the Pyrenees, made at his marriage, by which all claim of inheritance, in right of his wife, to Spanish territory was solemnly renounced. Out of this contest, at first opposed, but afterwards (1670) assisted by England, for a long time varj'ing in success- es, but, on the whole, to the advantage qf France, Louis, by the treaty of Nimeguen, 1678, came forth with the possession of a large addition of territory, a part of which was the duchy of Lorraine, and to which he af- terwards added Strasburg, then a free German city — possessions which remained a part of France until re- stored to Germany by the war of 1870. Next, to pro- voke a war of nine or ten years' duration was his claim for his sister, the duchess of Orleans, to a portion of the Palatinate, enforced by an invasion of the territory in question. To repel this movement the League of Augs- burg was formed, consisting of the emperor of Germany, the kings of Spain, Denmark, and Sweden, the duke of Savoy, and eventually of the king of England. Tliis war, characterized by the devastation of the Palatinate and the sack of Heidelberg, terminated with the Peace of Ryswick, 1697, leaving Louis without a navy, his finances embarrassed, his people impoverished, and manj- of them suffering from actual starvation. But by far the great- est contest was provoked by Louis's claim for his family to the succession of the crown of Spain, for which there were three competitors — Louis, the emperor Leopold, and the elector of Bavaria. Through the influence of the pope and of the Spanish nobility, Louis had succeeded in procuring the succession for his grandson, the duke of Anjou. To this Holland, under threat of invasion, had been forced to accede ; and William of England, unable to secure the co-operation of Parliament in the way of resistance, was obliged to pursue the same course. Le- opold, however, began hostilities, and in a short time England, Holland, and Denmark united with him in the Second Alliance, and the conflict only ended in 1713 with the Peace of Utrecht, leaving the duke of Anjou upon the throne of Spain, but at the expense to France of the damage and humiliation of many defeats, and the loss of many colonies, besides a distinct provision against the union of France and Spain imder tlie same monarch. During this last contest, moreover, with ex- ternal enemies, there had been an internal war destroy- ing the national resources, that of the Camisards in the Cevennes, infuriated and maddened by religious perse- cution into rebellion. See Camisards.