A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

John McClintock & James Strong • SECTION 432

Section 432

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Dean Trench, in his classificafion of the objectors, l)laces the Jewish first, then follows with tlie heathen (Celsus, etc.), and puts as third in the list the panthe- istic ol)jectors led by Spinoza. He evidently regards Cardan {l>e Cmilnidirtione Medicnnini, 2, tract. 2), and those other Italian atheists who referred the Christian miracles to the influence of the stars, as unworthy of notice. If these be omitted, as Treiuh lias done, the oiintrovcrsy in the modem Cliristian world regarding miracles may be said to date back to the 17th centurv,

and to have been ushered in by Spinoza's Tradatus Theulof/ici PoUtici, " which contained the germ of al- most all the infidel theories that have since appeared." Rationalists since the days of S[iinoza have opiioscd the reality and credibility of miracles, while the adherents of the modern (formal) supernaturalism rested belief in revelation especially on that branch of evidence. One of these objections, urged by Spinoza, and repeated in various forms by subsequent writers, is thus stated by dean Mansel : '-The laws of nature are the decrees of (iod, and follow necessarily from the perfection of the divine nature; they must therefore be eternal and im- mutable, and must extend to all possible events. There- fore, to admit an exception to these laws is to suppose that God's order is broken, and that the divine work is but an imperfect expression of the divine will. This objection is perfectly intelligible in the mouth of a pan- theist, with whom God and nature are convertible terms, and a divine supernatural act is a self-contradic- tion; but it is untenable in any system which admits a personal God distinct from nature, and only partially manifested in it. In such a system nature is not infi- nite, as Spinoza makes it, but finite. There is a dis- tinction between the actual and the possible; between the visible world as a limited system, with limited laws, and the whole mind of (iod, embracing all possible sys- tems as well as the present. From this point of view, nature, as actually existing, does express a portion, and a portion only, of the divine purpose ; the miracle ex- presses another portion belonging to a different and more comprehensive system. But in addition to this consideration, even the actual world furnishes us with an answer to the objection. God's order, we have too much reason to know, actually is broken. His will is not carried out. Unless we make God the author of evil, we must admit that sin is a violation of his will, a breach made in his natural order, however imiwssible it may be to give an account of its origin. The pantheist evades the difficulty by denying that evil has any real existence; but to the theist, wlio admits its existence, it is conclusive evidence that, as a fact, however little we may understand how it can be, the world, as it ex- ists, is not a perfect expression of God's law and will. The miracle, as thus viewed, belongs to a spiritual sys- tem appointed to remedy the disorders of the natural system; and against the self-complacent theory which tells us that disorders in the natural system are impos- sible, wo have the witness of a melancholy experience which tells us that they are actually there. Thus viewed, the miracle is in one sense natural, in another supernatural. It is natural as forming a part of the higher or spiritual system; it is supernatural as not forming a part of the lower or material system. Tlie same considerations may serve to obviate another form of the same objection — a form in which it is likewise suggested by Spinoza, though developed by other writ- ers in a form more adapted to the language of theism. We are told that it is more worthy of God to arrange a plan which shall provide by its original laws for all pos- sible contingencies than one which retpiires a special interposition to meet a special emergency. We know so little about the process of creating and governing a world, that it is ditKcult for us to judge what method of doing so is most worthy of (Jod; but this whole objec- tion proceeds on the gratuitous assumption that the plan of the world, as it exists in the counsels of (Jod, must be identical with the i)lan of the world as it is contemplated by man in relation to physical laws. Doubtless the miracle, like any other event, was fore- seen by (iod from the beginning, and formed part of his eternal purpose; but it docs not therefore follow that it is included within that very limited ))ortiun of his pur- pose which is apprehended by man as a system of jiliys- ieal laws. To Omnipotence no one event is more ililfi- cult than another; to Omniscience no one event is more wonderful than another. The distinction between miracles and ordinary events, as has already been ob-

MIRACLES

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MIRACLES

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