served, is a distinction, not in relation to God, but in relation to man. Moreover, even from the human point of view, the miracle is not wrought for a physical, but for a moral purpose; it is not an interposition to adjust the machinery of the material world, but one to pro- mote the spiritual welfare of mankind. The very con- ception of a repealed, as distinguished from a natural religion, implies a manifestation of God different in kind from that which is exhibited by the ordinar\' course of nature; and tlie question of the probability of a mirac- ulous interposition is simply that of the probability of a revelation being given at all." A list of the principal replies to the pantheistic objectors may be seen in Fa- bricius, Delectus Arf/umentoruni, etc., c. 43, p. 697 (Ham- burg, 1725). A full account of the controversy in Eng- land with the deists during the last century will be found in Leland's View of the Deisticul Writers (reprint- ed at London, 1836). The debate was renewed about the middle of that century by the publication of Hume's celebrated essay, which teaches that "a miracle is a vi- olation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalter- able experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." According to the position taken in the pre- ceding remarks by the dean of Canterbury, it cannot with any accuracy be said that a miracle is "a viola- tion of the laws of nature." It is the effect of a super- natural cause, acting along with and in addition to the natural causes constituting the system of tlie world. It is produced, therefore, by a different combination of causes from that which is at work in the production of natural phenomena. The laws of nature are only gen- eral expressions of that uniform arrangement according to which the same causes invariably produce the same effect. They would be violated by the production, at different times, of different effects from the same cause; but they are not violated when different effects are pro- duced from different causes. Tlie experience which tcstilies to their uniformity tells us only what effects may be expected to follow from a repetition of the same cause ; it cannot tell us what effects will follow from the introduction of a different cause. Tliis, which is in substance the answer given to Hume by Brown, ap- pears the most satisfactory among the various argu- ments by which the sceptical philosopher's position has been assailed. It is questioned by some of the critics of Hume (notably Sir William Hamilton ; comp. Ham- ilton's Keid, p. 129, 444, 457, 489), whether his sceptical arguments are offered in a spirit of hostility to the proc- esses of common-sense and the truths of religion, and not rather in a spirit of hostility to philosophy itself, by representing the results of its analysis as equally proba- ble in favor of and against two opposite directions of thought. The form of dialogue which is adopted by Hume in this discussion favors somewhat this construc- tion; but it cannot be reconciled with the impression left upon the unbiased mind that Hume had no confi- dence in speculation of any kind when applied to super- sensual or spiritual beings and relations (comp. Ueber- wcg. Hint. Philos. ii. .•!79). The ablest replies to Hume's arguments were sent forth by Principal Campbell in his JJisserlutioii on Jliracles; Hey, Norrisian Lectures, i, 127 sq. ; Elrington, Bonellan Lectures (Dublin, 1796) ; Dr. Thomas Brown, On Cause and Effect ; Paley, Evi- dences ofChristianitij (Introduction) ; Archbp. Whately, Lor/ic (Appentlix) ; and Historic Doubts respectinr/ Na- poleon Bonaparte; Dean llyall, Propmdia Prophetica (reprinted, 1854) ; Bp. Douglas, Criterion, or Miracles Examined, etc. (Lond. 1754) ; Farrar, Critical Hist, of Free Thought, p. 150 sq. See Hume. Within the last few years the controversy has been renpcned by the late professor Baden Powell in the /'////// .;/' W'ndds, and some remarks on the study of eviikiicts published in the now-celebrated volume of Essays and Reviews. See Goodwin, in Am. Theol. Rev. July, 18G1; Christian Re- tnenihrancer, July, 1861.
From England the controversy shifted again to the Continent, and finds its ablest representatives against the supernaturalists now not only in the camp of the atheistic and pantheistic, but also among theologians, and dean Trench therefore adopts as his next or fifth class those who regard miracles, as such, only subjec- tively, placing as its standard-bearer the celebrated Schleiermacher, who advanced a doctrine as incompati- . ble with any belief in a real miracle as was that taught by Hume. "A miracle," says Schleiermacher, "has a positive relation, by which it extends to all that is fut- ure, and a negative relation, which in a certain sense af- fects all that is past. In so far as that does not I'ollow which would have followed, according to the natural connection of the aggregate of finite causes, in so far an effect is hindered, not by the influence of other natural counteracting causes belonging to the same series, but notwithstanding the concurrence of all effective causes to the production of the effect. Everything, therefore, which from all past time contributed to this effect is in a certain measure annihilated; and instead of the inter- polation of a single supernatural agent into the course of nature, the whole conception of nature is destroyed. On the positive side, something takes place which is conceived as incapable of following from the aggregate of finite causes. But, inasmuch as this event itself now becomes an actual link in the chain of nature, every future event must be other than it would have been had this one miracle not taken place." On this and other grounds, Schleiermacher is led to maintain that there is no real distinction between the natural and the su- pernatural; the miracles being only miraculous rela- tively to us, through our imperfect knowledge of the hidden causes in nature, by means of which they were wrought. "This objection," says dean Mansel, "pro- ceeds on an assumption which is not merely unwar- ranted, but actually contradicted by experience. It as- sumes that the system of material nature is a rigid, not an elastic system ; that it is one which obstinately re- sists the introduction of new forces, not one wliich is capable of adapting itself to them. We know by expe- rience that the voluntary actions of men can be inter- posed among the phenomena of matter, and exercise an infiuence over them, so that certain results may be pro- duced or not, according to the will of a man, without affecting the stability of the universe, or the coherence of its parts as a system. What the will of man can ef- fect to a small extent, the will of God can surely effect to a greater extent; and this is a sufficient answer to the objection which declares the miracle to be impossi- ble; though we may not be able to say with certainty whether it is actually brought to pass in this or in some other way. There may be many means, unknown to us, by which such an event may be produced; but if it can be produced in any way it is not impossible."