ciding for one's self according to known law, belongs to the essence of the human spirit ;" but in place of the natural operation of the spirit upon or through the body, and of the occasionalism of Des Cartes's disciples, Leibnitz substituted the theory of pre-established harmony, " that God, at the beginning, so created soul and body that, while each follows the law of its internal development with perfect independence, each remains at the same time at every instant in perfect agreement." Kant's doctrine of the activity of the will as presented in his Critique of the Practical Reason, is given by Ueberweg as follows : " Kant defines the word maxim as denoting a subjective principle of willing ; the objective princi- ple, on the contrary, which is founded in the reason itself, is termed by him the practical law ; he includes both together under the conception of the practical principle, i. e. a principle which contains a universal de- termination of the will, involving several practical rules. All the ends to which desire may be directed furnish sensuous and egotistic motives for the will, all reducible to the principle of personal happiness or self-love. But a rational being, on the other hand, in so far as he is rational, conceives his practical universal laws as prin- ciples, which are fitted to direct the will, not by their matter, but only in view of their form. The will which is determined by the mere form of universal law is in- dependent of the law of sensible phenomena, and there- fore free. A free will can only be determined by the mere form of a maxim, or by its fitness to serve as a universal law. Hence his categorical imperative of morals. Self-determination in conformity to the cate- gorical imperative he terms 'autonomy of the will.' The opposite of this is the 'heteronomy of arbitrary choice.' Thus in the moral law, or categorical imper- ative, he finds a law of causality through freedom. The conception of cause is here employed only with practi- cal intent, the determining motive of the will being found in the intelligible order of things. The freedom which man has as a personal being, not sulyect to the universal mechanism of nature, is the faculty of being subject to peculiar practical laws, given by his own reason ; in other words, every person is subject to the conditions of his own personality." Developments, somewhat diverse from these views of Kant, are found in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte, raising self-determina- tion to a creative activity of the Ego ; in that of Schel- ling, who held " that only in God is man capable of frce- dotn, that the freedom of man was exercised in an intel- ligible act done before time, that as an empirical being man is subject to necessity resting on his non-temporal self-determination;" in that of Hegel, in his philosophy of spirit, the development of which " is the gradual ad- vance from natural determinateness to freedom, through the momenta of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit;" in the philosophy and theology of Schleier- macher, who made prominent the feeling of freedom iia connection with the feeling of dependence ; in the phi- losophy of Schopenhauer, in which motives are one of the forms of causality, the action of which is known not only from without, but from within, so that we learn by experience the mystery of the production of effects by causes in its innermost nature; in the philosophy of Herbart (1776-1841), defined by himself as " the elab- oration of conceptions," according to which freedom of the will is the assured supremacy of the strongest masses of ideas over single affections or impressions; and in that of Beneke, who reduced all the phenomena ol' self- consciousness to four fundamental processes, under which certain feelings and judgments arise regarding the com- parative worth of processes, which feelings and judg- ments control the tendencies of the moral agent and determine the will, so that " moral freedom consists in such a decided preponderance, and such a firm establish- ment of the moral nature in man, that his volition and action are determined b}' it alone." These views are necessitarian in general, in the sense that the volitions, or choices, and actions, are regarded as determmed by,
NECESSITY
906
NECESSITY
or in accordance witli, reasons, motives, principles, de- sires, feelings, judgments, or, in general, certain prevo- litional conditions.