In England as on the Continent the impulse accom- panying the Keformatiou occasioned a freer and more prolific discussion of tlie freedom of the will among other tlieological and pliilosophical topics. In the em- pirical method of Bacon, and its decided direction of the j attention to physical sciences, we have a line of thought, j the tendency of which was to reduce the phenomena of volition to some law cither anahgous to the law of cause ' and effect observed in ])hysical phenomena, or vlentind with it, and a part of it, giving a physical or materialis- tic necessity. Ilobbes plainly declares that the activ- ity nf the will is from necessary causes, and he does not distinguish this necessity from ordinary physical causa- tion. See LiBEUTV. Locke, in the tirst edition of his Essay, asserts the necessitarianism of Hobbes. " In later editions a power to suspend the determinations of tlie will is accorded." " Tliat which immediately determines tlie will from time to time." he says, " to every volun- tary act is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good." In 171.5 appeared Anthony Collins's argument for necessity. He states his view thus: " First, though j I deny liberty in a certain meaning of the word, yet I j contend for liberty as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases. Secondly, when I affirm neces- sity, I contend only for moral necessity, meaning there- by that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as is in clocks, watches, and such other things, which for want of sen- sation and intelligence are subject to an absolute ph3'si- cal or mechanical necessity." Dr. Samuel Clarke re- plied to Collins, affirming '• that all proper action of the soul is ipso f (id o free action ; that the laws which de- termine the judgment of the understanding next pre- ceding any activity arc diverse from those which per- tain to tlie production of the action itself." Hartley followed Collins in his theory of the will, modifying it, however, by his peculiar doctrine of medullary vibra- tions, and the action of the soul dependent upon them by association. He thus in a measure anticipated the physiological and associational psychology of James Mill, John Stuart ilill, Hain, and Herbert Spencer. The necessitarians found their mi)st effective champion in Priestley, who took up the materialistic theories and de- duced from them their logical consequence, which he called a " philosophical" necessity. According to John Stuart Mill, " the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena." " Correctly conceived," he says, " the doctrine of Philo- sophical Necessity is simply this: that given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred" {System nf Loyic, ii, 405, 40(5). He allows at the same time a power in the mind to co-operate in the formation of its own character, and complains of the ap- plication of the term necessity to the doctrine of cause and effect in human character as improper. But causa- tion with him means ''nothing but invariable, certain, ami unconditicnial senuence," with no "mysterious con- straint or compulsion" in the cause over the effect. Alexander Bain considers the will as "a collective term for all the impulses to motion or action. It is absurd to ask whether such a power is free." Dr. lieid (1710- 1790), in opposition to the various forms of necessity, denies that every action is performed with some view or from some motive. Dugald Stewart, however, con- cedes "that for every action there must be a motive;" but maintains that '• liberty as opposed to necessity means that the connection between motives and actions is not a necessary connection like that between cause and effect." " The question," he says, " is not concern- ing the influence of motives, but concerning the nature of that infiuence." This is most truly the pivotal point
of the whole controversy. For the opinions of Hamil- ton and Mansel, see Libkutv.
4. In this country a fresh theological importance was given to this subject by Jonathan Edwards, who based his theory of voluntary action on the doctrine of moral necessity, taking pains to distinguish it from natural or physical necessity. See Libehtv. His treatise was directed against the doctrine of the self-determining power of tlie will as advocated by Arminian writers, en- deavoring to i)rove at the same time that this necessity was not inconsistent with liberty. This moral neces- sity he defines as " that necessity of connection and con- setpience which arises from such moral causes as the strength of inclinations or motives, and the connection wliicli there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions" {Works, ii, ].'3). One great purpose in his work was to reply to the objection that the Calvinistic notions of God's moral government are contrary to the common-sense of mankind. Free- dom, as involving the self-determining iiower of the Ar- minians, lie argued, would involve contingency and the absence of certainty. This would exclude foreknowl- edge. The views of Edwards have been modified, and controverted even, by Calvinistic theologians. The terra moral necessity is still used to characterize the theories of those who affirm that the will is determined or determines itself under the influence of motives, as distinguished from the theories of those who affirm a "power to the contrary," or "the power or immunity to put forth in the same circumstances either cf several volitions," or such an independence of motives as to make the action of the agent contingent and uncer- tain, and not certainly or necessarily determined by them. It is applied also to the theories of those who hold to Augiistinian and Calvinistic views of the opera- tion of divine grace upon the will. In general they ob- ject, and it is acknowledged with justice in some re- spects, to the term necessity as confusing, and in its as- sociations imjilying ideas which they disown, since they assert the freedom of the will as the condition of moral obligation and moral divine government. Some, as Dr. Hodge, propose and use the term certainty, as distin- guished from necessity on the one hand and contingen- cy on the other. Dr. Hodge teaches that freedom con- sists in the fact that a man's "volitions are truly and properly his own, determined by nothing out of himself, but proceeding from his own views, feelings, and inner- most dispositions, so that they are the real, intelligent, and conscious expression of his character, or of what is in his mind." " We hold," says Dr. M'Cosh, " that the principle of cause and effect reigns in mind as in mat- ter. But there is an iinportant difference between the manner in which this principle operates in body and in spirit. In all proper mental operations the causes and the effects lie both within the mind. !Mind is self- acting substance. We hold that the true determining cause of every given volition is not any mere anterior incitement, but the very soul itself bv its inherent power of will." (II. P. C.)