Ny^ya (from the Sanscrit ni, " into," and aya, "go- ing," a derivative from in, "to go," hence literally "en- tering," and figuratively "investigating" analytically) is the name of one of the three great systems of ancient Hindu philosophy. See Hinduism, There arc, it is
true, six systems of Hindu philosophy, viz. the Nyaya, Vuiseshika (q. v.), iSankhya (q. v.), Yoga (q. v.), I'e- danta (q. v.), and Mimansa (q. v.) ; but, as we have said in the article Mimansa, the term philosophical system is hardly applicable to all of them, and it should also be stated that the Vaiseshika is in some sort supiilementary to the Nyaya, and the two are fa- miliarly spoken of as one collected system, though we do not so treat them here. Accordingly it is customary to speak of Hindu philosophy as being divisible into the Nyaya, Sankhya, and Vedunta. These three systems, too, if we follow the commentators, differ more in ap- pearance than in reality. Assuming each of them im- plicitly the truth ot the Vedas (q. v.), and proceeding to give on that foundation a comprehensive view of the totality of things, the three sj-stems differ in their point of view of the universe; viz. as it stands in rela- tion severally to sensation, emotion, and intellection.
The adherent of the Nyaya system, starting from the premise that we have various sensations, inquires wliat and how many are the channels through ^vhich such varied knowledge flows in. Finding that there are five very different chaiuiels, he imagines five different ex- ternals adapted to these. Hence his theorj' of the five elements, the aggregate of what the Nyaya regards as the causes of afiliction. The student of the Sankhya, struck with the fact that we have emotions, with an eye to the question whence our impressions come, inquires their quality. Are they pleasing, displeasing, or indif- ferent? These three qualities constitute for him the external ; and to their aggregate he gives the name of Nature. With the former he agrees in wishing that he were well rid of all three; holding that things pleasing and things indifferent are not less incompatible with man's chief end than things positively displeasing. Thus, while the Nj-aya allows to the external a sub- stantial existence, the Sankhya admits its existence only as an aggregate of qualities; while both allow that it really (eternally and necessarily) exists. The Vedanta, rising above the question as to what is pleas- ing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks simplj' what is and what is not. The categories are here reduced to two — the Real and the Unreal. The categories of th(^y- aya and the Sankliya are merely scaffolding to reach this pinnacle of philosophy, or, in other words, the Ny- aya and the Sankhya are simply introductory to the great system of the Yodanta. With this introductory element we must content ourselves at this place, and now enter upon a consideration of the Nyaya (proper) system, which offers, as we have already said, the sen- sational aspect of Hindu philosophy. But in thus la- belling the Nyaya we would not be understood that it confines itself to sensation, excluding emotion and in- tellection, nor that the other two great systems ignore the fact of sensation, but simply that the arrange- ment of the Nyaya has a more pointed regard to the fact of the five senses than either of the others has, and treats the external more frankly as a solid reality. Indeed this system of philosophy bears its very peculiar name because it treats analytically, as it were, of the objects of human knowledge, both material and spirit- ual, distributed by it under different heads or topics; and it is in this particular unlike the Sankhya and the Yedanta, which follow a synthetic method of reasoning. With the other systems of Hindu philosophy, the Ny- aya concurs in making its chief end the consideration of man's destiny, and in promising beatitude, i. e. final deliverance of the soul from re-birth or transmigration, to those who acquire truth, wliich in the case of the Nyaya means a thorough knowledge of the principles taught by this particular system. "The topics treated of by the Nyaya are briefiy the following: 1. the pi'a- mdna, or instruments of right notion. They are: a, knowledge which lias arisen from tlie contact of a sense with its object; h, inference of three sorts {a priori, a posteriori, and from analogy) ; c, comparison ; and, d, knowledge, verbally communicated, which may be
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knowledge of 'that whereof the matter is seen,' and knowledge of ' that whereof tlie matter is unseen' (rev- elation). 2. The objects or matters about which the inquiry is concerned {prameya). These are: a. The Soul {atmwi). It is the seat of knowledge or sentiment, different for each individual coexistent person, infinite, eternal, etc. Souls are therefore numerous, but the su- preme soul is one; it is demonstrated as the creator of all things, b. Body (sarira). It is the seat of action, of the organs of sensation, and of the sentiments of pain or pleasure. It is composed of parts, a framed substance, not inchoative, and not consisting of the three elements, earth, water, and tire, as some say, nor of four, or all the five elements (viz. air and ether, in addition to the for- mer), as others maintain, but merely earthy, c. Organs of sensation {indriya); from the elements, earth, water, light, air, and ether, they are smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing, d. Their objects {ariha). They are the qualities of earth, etc., viz. odor, savor, color, tangibil- ity, and sound, e. Understanding {buddhi), or apprehen- sion (iinpalabdhi), or conception (jndna), terms which are used synonymously. It is not eternal, as the San- khya maintains, but transitory. /. The organ of imag- ination and volition Qnarias). Its property is the not giving rise simultaneously to more notions than one. g. Activity {pravritti), or that which originates the utterances of the voice, the cognitions of the under- standing, and the gestures of the body. It is therefore oral, mental, or corporeal, and the reason of all worldly proceedings, h. Faults or failings (dosha), which cause activity, viz. affection, aversion, and bewilderment, i. Transmigration (pretyabhdva, literally, the becoming born after having died), or the regeneration of the soul, which commences with one's first birth, and ends only with final emancipation. It does not belong to the body, because the latter is different in successive births, but to the soul, because it is eternal. X-. Fruit or reti-i- bution {phala), or that which accrues from activity and fallings. It is the consciousness of pleasure or of pain. /. Pain (duhkha), or that which has the characteristic mark of causing vexation. It is defined as ' the occur- rence of birth,' or the originating of ' body,' since body is associated with various kinds of distress. Pleasure is not denied to exist, but, according to the Nyaya, it de- serves little consideration, since it is ever closely con- nected with pain. m. A bsolute deliverance or emancipa- tion (apavarga). It is annihilation of pain, or absolute cessation of one's troubles once for all.