"After (as above) 'instruments of right notion,' and 'the objects of inquiry,' the Nyaya proceeds to the in- vestigation of the following topics. 3. Doubt (samsaya^. It arises from unsteadiness in the recognition or non- recognition of some mark, which, if we were sure of its presence or absence, would determine the subject to be so or so, or not to be so or so ; but it may also arise from conflicting testimony. 4. Motive {j»-ayojana'), or that by which a person is moved to action. 5. ,4 familiar case (drishtanta), or that in regard to which a man of an ordinary and a man of a superior intellect entertain the same opinion. 6. Tenet or dogma (siddhanta). It is cither ' a tenet of all schools,' i. e. universally ac- knowledged, or 'a tenet peculiar to some school,' i. e. partially acknowledged ; or ' a hypothetical dogma,' i. e. one which rests on the supposed truth of another dog- ma ; or ' an implied dogma,' i. e. one the correctness of which is not expressly proved, but tacitly admitted by the Nyaya. 7. The different members (avayara) of a regular argument or syllogism {nydy(i). 8. Confutation or reduction to absurdity {tarka"). It consists in direct- ing a person who does not apprehend the force of the argument as first presented to him, to look at it from an opposite point of view. 9. Ascertainment {nirnaya). It is the determination of a question by hearing both what is to be said for and against it, after having been in doubt. The next tliree topics relate to the topic of controversy, viz. 10. Discussion (vdd<i), Avhicli is defined as consisting in defending by proofs on the part of
the one disputant, and controverting by objections on the part of the other, without discordance with re- spect to the principles on which the conclusion is to depend; it is, in short, an honest sort of discussion, such, for instance, as takes place between a preceptor and his i>upil, and where the debate is conducted with- out ambition of victory. 11. Wrangling (jalpa'), con- sisting in the defence or attack of a proposition by means of tricks, futilities, and such like means; it is therefore a kind of discussion where the disputants are merely desirous of victory, instead of being desirous of truth. 12. Cavilling (vitandd), when a man does not attempt to establish the opposite side of the question, but con- fines himself to carping disingenuously at the argu- ments of the other party. 13. Fallacies, or semblances of reasons (Jietvabhdsa), five sorts of which are distin- guished, viz. the erratic, the contradictory, the equally available on both sides ; that which, standing itself in the need of proof, does not differ from that which is to be proved, and that which is adduced when the time is not that when it might have availed. 14. Tricks, or unfairness in disputation (chalu), or the opposing of a proposition by means of assuming a different sense from that which the objector well knows the propounder in- tended to convey by his terms. It is distinguished as verbal misconstruing of what is ambiguous, as pervert- ing, in a literal sense, what is said in a metaphorical one, and as generalizing what is particular. 15. Futile ob- jections (jdti), of which twenty-four sorts are enumer- ated; and, 10, failure in argument or reason of defeat (iiigraha-sthdna), of which twenty-two distinctions are specified.
" The great prominence given by the Nyaya to the method, by means of which truth might be ascertained, has sometimes misled European writers into the belief that it is merelj' a system of formal logic, not engaged in metaphysical investigations. But though the foregoing enumeration of the topics treated by it could only touch upon the main points which form the subject-matter of the Nyaj'a, it will sufliciently show that the Nyaya is intended to be a complete system of philosophical in- vestigation ; and some questions, such as the nature of intellect, articulated sound, etc., or those of genus, va- riety, and individual, it has dealt with in a masterly manner, well deserving the notice of Western specu- lation. That the atomic theory has been devolved from it will be seen under the article Yatseshika. On account of the prominent position, however, which the method of discussion holds in this system, and the fre- quent allusion made by European writers to a IlindA syllogism, it will be expedient to explain how the Nj'- aya defines the 'different members of a syllogism' under its seventh topic. A regular argument consists, accord- ing to it, of five members, viz. : a, the proposition (pi-a- tijnd), or the declaration of what is to be established ; b, the reason (hetn), or ' the means for the establishing of what is to be established ;' c, the example {udahara- na'), i. 0. some familiar case illustrating the fact to be established, or, inversely, some familiar case illustrating the impossibilitj' of the contrary fact; d, the applica- tion (npanaya), or ' restatement of that with respect to which something is to be established ;' and, c, the con- clusion {nigamana), or ' the restating of the proposition because of the mention of the reason.' An instance of such a syllogism would run accordingly thus: a, This bill is fiery, b. for it smokes, r, as a culinary hearth, or (inversely) not as a lake, from which vapor is seen arising — vapor not being smoke, because a lake is inva- riably devoid of fire ; d, according!}^ the hill is smok- ing; e, therefore, it is fiery.