Per'azim [some Pera'zini], Mouxt (Heb. Har Peratsiin, C■'^'^2~'^l^, mountain of cUfis; Sept. iipof aai(5ujv [apparently bj' mistake for C""!^"!] ; Vulg. Mons divisiowim'), a place mentioned by the prophet Isaiah, in warning the Israelites of tlie divine ven- geance about to come upon the nation, with which they did not seem suflicientl}- impressed, referring to
PERCEPTION
935
PERCEPTION
instances of God's wrath exhibited in their past his- tory in these words: "The Lord shall rise up as in Mount Perazim, he shall be wroth as in the vallej' of Gibeon" (Isa. xxviii, 21). The commentators almost unanimously take his reference to be to David's victo- ries at Uaal-perazim and Gibeon (Gesenius, Strachey), or to tlie former of these on the one hand, and Joshua's slaughter of the Canaanites at Gibeon and Beth-horon on the other (Eichhorn, Kosenmiillcr, Michaelis). Hen- dewerk thinks reference is made to "the breach of Uzzah" (riTj? "j'^S, Perez-U-zali) described in 2 Sam. vi, C-8 {Die Beufero-Jcsaiascheii Weissaff. ad loc.'); but that narrative contains no mention of an}' mount. Ewald supposes the prophet may allude to the slaugh- ter of the Canaanites at Gibeon bj' Joshua {Die Pro- pheten, ad loc.) ; though in another place he distinctly states that Mount Perazim is the same place which is called Baal-perazim {Gesckichte des Volkes I.irael, iii, 187, note .3). Isaiaii in this passage doubtless alludes to David's conquest of the Philistines. " And David came to Baal-perazim, and smote them there, and said, The Lord hath broken forth ('/"iS) upon mine enemies before me, as the breach of waters (D'^53 "j'TED). Therefore he called the name of that place Baal-pera- zim" (D'^j:"i5 ^"3, 2 Sam. v, 20). The play upon the word is characteristic. It seems probable, as Ewald states (/. c), that there was a high-place of Baal upon the top of the mount, and hence the name Baal-pera- zim. See Baal. This view is confirmed by the fact that in the second clause of the passage Isaiah men- tions another instance of divine wrath in the valley of Giljeon, and in 1 Chron. xiv the historian connects ■with the victor}' at Baal-perazim a second victory of David over the Philistines, in which it is said "they smote the host of the Philistines from Gibeon even to Gazer" (ver. 16). The exact locality of JMount Pera- zim is unknown, but it must have been some of the heights on the borders of the valley of IJepliaim (1 Chron. xiv, 9 ; 2 Sam. v, 18), and consequently not far distant from Jerusalem. In the account of Josephus {Ant. vii, 4, 1), David's victory assumes much larger proportions than in Samuel and Chronicles. The at- tack is made not by the Philistines only, but by "all Syria and Phoenicia, with many other warlike nations besides." He places the scene of the encounter in the "groves of weeping," as if alluding to the Baca of Psa. Ixxxiv. See Baal-perazim.
Perception. This word refers to our reception of knowledge through the senses, an operation which to the common understanding seems simple enough ; but, viewed philosophically, is attended with much diffi- culty. Perception, considered as a source of knowl- edge, refers exclusively to the outer, or the object world — the world of extended matter and its proper- ties. The names for the act of knowing one's own mind — the feelings and thoughts of the individual — are self- consciousness and self- introspection. The word "consciousness" is sometimes improperly limited to this signification. Locke used the term " reflec- tion" for the same meaning ; but this is amljiguous, and is now disused. All our knowledge is thus said (by those that deny innate ideas) to spring from two sources — perception and self-consciousness.
Sir William Hamilton {Intel. Pow. essay i, ch. i) no- tices the following meanings oi perception, as applied to different faculties, acts, and objects: 1. Percptio, in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to com- prehension, notion, cognition in general. 2. An ap- prehension, a becoming aware of, consciousness. Per- ception the Cartesians really identilied with idea, and allowed them only a logical distinction ; the same rep- resentative act being called idea, inasmuch as we re- gard it as a representation ; and perception, inasmuch as we regard it as a consciousness of such representa-
tion. 3. Perception is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. This limitation was first formally im- posed by Keid, and thereafter by Kant. 4. A still more restricted meaning, through the authority of Keid, is percej)lion (proper), in contrast to sensation (proper). He defines sensitive perception simply as that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body, (m) certain special affections, whereof, as an aiiimated or- ganism, it is contingently susceptible ; and (i) those general relations of extension under which, as a material organism, it necessarily exists. Of these perceptions, tlie former, which is thus conversant about a subject- object, is sensation 2wop)er ; the latter, which is thus coii- versaut about an object-object, is perception proper.