THEOLOGY, NEW ENGLAND 329 THEOLOGY, NEW ENGLAND
the two than their respective views of the final end of (iod in creation and providence. According; to Old Cal- vinism, that end— the end to whicli all minor ones are subordinated — is the manifestation of God's character, particularly his justice and mercy, to intelligent creat- ures; according to Dr. Taylor, of New Haven, as under- stood by many, it is the production of the largest amount of happiness possible, holiness being simply a means thereto; according to Andover, and perhaps the main body of New England Calvinists of the New School, it is the securement of the largest amount of holiness, the highest happiness being simply a natural consequence. (But see a somewhat different representation of Taylor's views by president I'orter in The Ktto-Enylander for 18G0, p. 726-773.)
The controversy respecting the " Doings of the Un- regenerate" has been quite too prominent in the historj' and development of this New Divinity to be passed over in silence. There have been three theories: (1.) That man is under obligation to repent at once, and that all moral choices before repentance are sinful and must be utterly forbidden (Emmons, S()riiig, Park). ('2.) That man is under obligation to repent immediately, but he may perform preliminary acts which are neither sinful nor holy, and hence are not forbidden (Taylor). (3.) (Corresponding with the Old-school theory) That while all acts of choice are sinful before repentance, it is still right to exhort men to the performance of cer- tain acts before repentance, as this is the most probable method of securing their repentance (Dwight).
III. Relation to Original A rmmianism. — Tlie repre- sentatives of old-fashioned Calvinism have often charged that the modifications introduced by the Edwardean di- vines have simply brought about a substitution of the Arminian system for the Calvinistic one of the primi- tive New England churches. The teachings of New England theology with respect to the absolute depend- ence of individual salvation upon individual divine elec- tion, as also with respect to "special" grace and to human ability considered apart from the gracious aids of the Holy Spirit, do not sustain this charge; but in al- most every other principle and doctrine the allegation is, in our vievv, susceptible of the fullest substantiation.
1. Take the ''rive points" of the original Arminian CJntrovers}'. The Calvinists affirmed and the Armin- ians denied (1) that the decrees of God respecting the eternal salvation or damnation of individual men are irrespective of the use they may make of their own freedom; (2) that in the divine purpose and by divine decree the benefits of the atonement are limited to un- conditionally elected individuals; (3) that in conse- quence of original sin all persons naturally engendered from Adam are in such a condition of spiritual death that without that effectual calling and supernatural renovation which is by divine decree limited to the elect they can do absolutely nothing either towards the fulfilment of God's law or towards an effectual ap- propriation of the benefits of redemption ; (4) that those gracious influences of the Holy Spirit which are adapted and sufficient to lead a sinner to true repentance and salvation are restricted to a portion of the race, name- ly, to the unconditionally elect: and (5) that true be- lievers cannot, by any possibility, totally and finally fall from grace. In every one of these memorable issues of the Remonstrant and Contra-Remonstrant parties the re|)resentatives of New England theology stand with the original Arminians.
2. The same metaphysical and ethical principles un- derlie the two systems. We will review them in the order before given : (1.) Certainty as distinguished from necessity. This was a favorite Arminian distinc- tion (see Arminius, i, 280, 281; iii, 402, 411, 416, 423, 425; Epistolm Theolofficce, epist. xix, Ikxii [Arminius]; Curcelteus, p. 774, etc. ). (2.) Active and voluntary nature of sin and holiness, universally maintained by the Arminian divines (see. for instance, Episcopius, ii, 92 b; CurcelliEus, p. 136, 137, 902, 904; Limborch, II,
xxiii, 15; III, iv, 8; V, iii, 2). (3.) Self-determination in view of motives. According to New -school New England theology, the will invariably chooses the greatest apparent good. This may be deemed incom- patible with Arminian principles. Properly explained, however, it does not seem to be so. The theory is not that the will invariably chooses the greatest 7-eal good proffered for chnicc, nor even the greatest aj^parent good as estimated by the cool exercise of judgment, but simply that it chooses that good which appears to the subject, organized, circumstanced, and disposed as he is, as most desirable. It is only saying, in other words, that a man invariably chooses just as under the circumstances at that moment the state of his mind prompts him to choose. But, {a), the Arminian authorities never denied this position. They denied that the mere absence of co- action constituted liberty (Episcopius, 1,356,357 a) ; but New England divines do the same. They denied that mere spontaneity is liberty in its full sense (ibid. p. 198 b; Curcellieus, p. 158, 159) ; but the New England divines do the same. They denied, as did Leibnitz, that the deci- sion of the will is invariably determined " ab ultimo judi- cio rationis practico" (Episcopius, i, 209 b sq. ; Curcelte- us, p. 985 ; Limborch, p. 131, etc.) ; but in the form pro- pounded to them, the divines of New England would in like manner repudiate it. They denied that the will is necessarily determined by motives; but this doctrine is rejected with equal explicitness by champions of New- school New England theology, (t.) The will in all rational clioices invariably acts in view of a good {V.\n- scopius, i, 202 b, et al.). (c.) The will is able to choose the least apparent good. This follows from the Armin- ian doctrine of power to the contrary. It is also illus- trated in choices between objects of equal apparent de- sirableness. "Si paria offerat, quorum alterum tantinn eligendum est, libertas (ilenaria locum habebit" (ibid, p. 207). ((/.) In all deliberate choices men ordinarie follow the decision of the judgment; when not, it is because "alia qutcdam causa impediat" (ibid. De Libera ArUtrio, VIII, ix). (e.) They will never choose evil as evil, or "sub ratione mali" (ibid, i, 215 b, 318 sq.). (_/".) Though the will does not invariably choose the greatest good according to the decision of the judg- ment, it does in all rational choices invariably choose that good which seems the most desirable to the whole man. This doctrine seems to be clearly implied in cap. X of Episcopius, Examen Sententim Cameronis. The apparent contradiction found in cap. viii of his Respon- sio ad Defensioneni Cameronis is easily solved by ob- serving that according to the doctrine of Episcopius, as according to that of the New England divines, the will does not invariably follow the dictate of reason, nor in- variably follow the dictate of the natura appetitiva, both which maintenances are perfectly consistent with the doctrine in question — to wit, that the will invariably chooses the good which to the whole man under the in- ward and outward conditions seems the most desirable. On this point, then, so far is the doctrine of the New- school divines of New England from being incompati- ble with Arminian teachings that, on the contrary, that doctrine finds in Remonstrant literature some of its earliest and most carefidly guarded enunciations. (4.) Obligation cannot transcend ability— an axiom with the Arminians (see Arminius, Declai-atio, passim; Curcel- Iseus, p. 96 b; also VII, ix, passim; Limborch, III, iv, 7, etc.). Here we may remark that the distinc- tion between natural and inoral ability is much older than its emergence in New England theology, being clearly laid down in several of the elder Arminian di- vines (see Episcopius, ii, 94 a; Curcellajus, p. 156, 421). (5.) Intransferableness of moral character and deserts, strongly asserted by Episcopius, ii, 151 b; by Curcel- Iffius, p". 131-137, 424, 470, 896-902; by Limborch, V, Ixxvii, 18; III, iii, 11, etc.