Cliypa. See 1 >< Conf. Lin;!, c. 1 I. p. 414), the wisdom
of Cod {Legis Alleg.i, 19, p. 56), the shadow of God, by which, as by an instrument, lie made the world [Legis.
Alleg. iii. 31, p. 106; c p. /', Monarch, ii. 5, p. 225;
De Cherub, c. 35, p. 162): he is tin eternal image of God {De Conf. Ling, c 28, p. 427. The contradiction between this representation and the concrete attributes ascribed to the Logos is pointed out by Hegel, II'. /7,v,
xv, 20), the eldest and most general of created things
{Legis AUeg. iii, 61, p. 121): he is the first-born ol I,
the eldest angel or archangel | Di Conf, Ling. c. 28, p. •127; Quis rer. div. har. c 42, p. 501 '.the high-priest ot the world ( De Scum. i. .'.7. p. 653; comp. I >< Gig. c 1 1, p. 269; /'< Migr. Abr. v. 18, p. 152 i, the interpret* r oi God (Legis AUeg. iii. 73, p. 128), the mediator between
the I i' ai or and his creatures, the suppliant in be-half of mortals, the' ambassador from the- ruler to his subjects (Quis rer.div. Inn. c. 12, p. 50J I. IN- is moreover the Cod in whose likeness man was made; for the- supreme God cannot have any likeness to a mortal nature (Fragm. p. 625) : he' is the angel who appeared to lla- gar (Di Soma, i, 41, p. 656 ; /'. Prof.-c i, p. 547), the God of Jacob's dream and the- angel with whom he- wrestled i /'. Somn. i. ">:». p. 655; 1>< Mut. Norn. e-. 13, p. 59] i, the image ol < iod " bo appeared to Moses ,-u the
bush i Vit. Mos. i. 12. p. 91 : c p. Gfrorer, i, p. 288,284 .
the- guide ol the Israelites in the wilderness I D Abr. c 31, p. 463). This interposition of the Logos thus serves to combine- tin- theology ot contemplation with that of worship and obedience; it endeavors to provide one God for those whose philosophical meditations aspire to an intuition of the absolute, ami another for those whose- religious feelings demand a personal e.bjert; while at the same time- it attempts to preserve the unity
PHILOSOPHY
133
PHILOSOPHY
of God by limiting the attribution of proper and su- preme deity to the first principle only.
In addition to this, which may be regarded as the central point of Philo's system, some have endeavored to elicit from his writings a closer approximation to Christian doctrine, in the recognition of a third divine being, distinct both from the supreme God and from the Logos. (See Allix, Judgment of the Jewish Church, p. 118, ed. 1821 ; Kidder, Demonstration of the Messias, pt. iii, ch. 5.) A remarkable passage sometimes cited for this purpose occurs in his allegorizing commentary on the cherubim and the flaming sword placed in Eden. " With the one truly existent God," he says, '• there are two first and highest powers, goodness and authority : by goodness he has produced everything, and by au- thority he rules over that which he has produced ; and a third, which brings both together as a medium, is reason; for by reason God is both a ruler and good. Of these two powers — authority and goodness — the cherubim are the symbol; and of reason, the flaming sword" (De Cherub, c. 9, p. 143). In like manner he comments on the threefold appearance to Abraham in the plains of Mamre : " The middle appearance repre- sents the Father of the universe, who in the sacred writ- ings is called by his proper name, the Existent (o "Qv), and those on each side are the most ancient powers and nearest to the Existent; one of which is called the creative and the other the kingly power. The creative power is God, for by this power he made and arranged the universe; and the kingly power is Lord, for it is meet that the Creator should rule over and govern the creature" (De Abr. c. 24, p. 19; comp. Be Sacr. Ab. et Cain. c. 15, p. 173). The inference, however, which has been drawn from these and similar passages rests on a very precarious foundation. There is no consistency in Philo's exposition, either as regards the number or the nature of these divine powers. Even granting the disputed opinion that the powers represent distinct per- sonal beings, we find in one of the above passages the three beings all distinguished from the supreme God ; while in the other he seems to be identified with one of them ; and the confusion is increased if we compare other passages in which additional powers are men- tioned with further distinctions. (Comp. De Mut. Nom. c. 4, p. 582, where a depyEriKi) Svvafiig is mentioned as distinct from the (3a<n\uc)) and tzohjtik)), and all three are distinguished from the supreme God.) The truth seems to be that Philo indulged his allegorizing fancy in the invention of divine powers ad libitum, in any number and with any signification which the text on which he was commenting for the moment might hap- pen to suggest; and he has no more difficulty in find- ing six divine powers to be represented by the six cities of refuge (De Prof c. 18, 19, p. 560, 561. In this pas- sage, again, the three higher powers, represented by the three cities beyond Jordan, are clearly distinguished from the supreme God) than he has in finding three, to suit the two cherubim and the flaming sword. In this kind of desultory playing with the language of Scrip- ture it is idle to look for any definite doctrine, philo- sophical or theological.