Whether, then, we consider the character of the in- vestigations, the form in which they appear, their lim- itation to the highest and most insoluble problems, their incompleteness, or their discontinuity, it is a task of the greatest difficulty to present a (dear, orderly, and Coherent view of the philosophy of Plotinus. Within I he -pace at command, all that can he attempted will he a rapid outline of his most distinctive positions, in
what appear- I.. be their natural depend, inc.
Creuzer condenses his summary of the Plotinian doc- trine into three the-..-:
•• 1. There is a Supreme (hi, whence all things pro- ceed, which cannot he fitly declared by the thought or name of Essence or Being, yet is the fountain and orig- inal of all essences, .and therefore of being itself.
•• 2. What is Out in the ultimate apprehension becomes twofold in Mind | NoSj | and through Mind. For Mm. I. turning towards that Supreme "/» ami regarding it. establishes difference, generates idea.-, .and produces the ci nencements of definite thought.
•■:;. The Soul (of the world) being turned towards the Mind and regarding it, de\ clops the diversity ami mul- tiplicity of things which are discoverable in the sensible universe. The universal aggregate of things M n-ible
PLOTINUS
297
PLOTINUS
cannot, however, be conceived as unity, if the Supreme Mind be excluded, nor can it be thought of as One. Mind cannot form for itself the idea of the absolute One, without the original One and the Good ; that is, without the author and father of Mind itself, and of all things ; that is, without the Supreme" (Prokgom. in Plotin. § 9, p. xxiv-xxv, ed. Paris).
These three propositions correspond in a loose and indistinct way with the three principles of the intelli- gible universe assumed by Plotinus : the Absolute Good, the Supreme Intelligence, and the Soul of the Universe. From these three all other intelligences descend by gradual differentiations, and all sensible things by dis- tinct creation. These three constitute the Neo-Platonic trinity : the Good, which is the father of all, the Mind (Nouf) or absolute Reason (Aciyoc), and the animating Spirit, or universal soul (Enn. ii, ix, 1 ; v, i, 7 ; ii, 1 ; viii, 12). The second and third of these principles, and all other things in their orderly subordination, which pos- sess active potencies in themselves, derive their power of acting and their rule of action from the contempla- tion and imitation of the superior essences in which they participate, and which they apprehend by intu- ition of the Divine, ever indwelling, informing, and in- working (trufiiraSfEQ Ci) Tzdv tovto to 'iv, Enn. iv, iv, 32; vovc avvqfifikvoQ ry airaay ovaia, vi, iv, 14; ia- fiev skcuttoq kovuoc vorjroe, iii, iv, 3). High and chief over all intelligences, intelligibles, and sensibles is the absolute, eternal, unchanging, self-sustaining One (Enn. vi, ix, 3). This is the Absolute Good, and is wholly ineffable, being dimly apprehensible only by the purest and highest efforts of the most depurated intuition (Enn. ii, ix, 1; vi, viii, 8; ix, 3, 4; iinip eiriOTrjfinv cd vpa/ulv). The One and the Good (which are one) is before and above being, and before and above mind, or the intelligence (inrapi3il3))Kbc ti)v tov vov tybaiv ... to 'nzfKiiva vov, Kai tn'tKiiva ovaiac, Em/, v. i. 8). That the One is above the Nof'C is a fundamental doctrine with Plotinus, which he professes to deduce from Plato. This One and Good is the Father of all things, the universal God, existing in all. moving through all, and embracing all (iv Kama ra ijvra, Enn. vi, v, 1 ; v, ii, 1).
This doctrine unquestionably presents the appear- ance of Pantheism, and approximates to it, especially when taken in connection with the ticula Intelligibilis Ascensus ad Unitm, or progress towards the incommu- nicable union with the Universal Good. In Proclus it can scarcely be distinguished from Pantheism (iv tvi Tcavra icai «/<sp/j i'/vwrai dXXijXotg ' Kai (poircl rravra cut TTc'tvTuiv, Inst. Theolog. § clxxxvi). In Plotinus it is different. He carefully preserves the distinction be- tween the One and the Many, between the Supreme Good and all its immediate and derivative products. He does not ascribe personality to the Divine One ex- cept by metaphor; but he avoids attributing to the Divine Being either the evolution or the absorption of the universe, and he accords to man personality, free- will, and responsibility (Enn. iii, iv, 5-7). He distin- guishes between the agent in producing all things, and the all which is produced (Enn. iii, viii, 8, 9). But there is confusion in his utterances, if not contradiction ; though he may be credited with a more earnest anxiety to escape pantheistic extravagances than can be ac- corded to his Christian admirer, translator, and para- phrast, Marsilius Ficinus (q. v.). According to Plato. genuine knowledge is intuitive: according to Plotinus, it is immediate — the union of the knowing and the known ; and the knowledge of the Godhead is only by direct communion (irapovaia, Enn. vi, ix, 47; iii, vi. 18 ; v, v, 1 ; iii, 1-3 ; vi, 2 ; ix, 13). It is no wonder, then, that the meaning of Plotinus should be often ob- scure and ambiguous, and that it should be declared by Marsilius Ficinus to be discoverable, not by sense or human reason, but only by a more sublime capacity of intelligence {Plotini. Opera. Exhort, ad A uditores, etc.). This may afford some palliation for any indistinctness