of the present exposition. It is due to a logical neces- sity rather than to a theological presumption that Plo- tinus asserts being to be posterior to the One, for he attaches being inseparably to the three hypostases of divinity which constitutes his three principles. It is an attempt to develop with entire internal consistency the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, and the Platonic thesis of the One and the Many (Enn. vi, vi, 9). The Unwn is Ens and Summum Ens — essential and primor- dial Iking. There is no separation or division between them, but only a theoretical and shadowy antecedence and sequence — out of time, irrespective of time, and be- yond time.
The second principle of Plotinus is Mind— the intel- ligence per se — the Universal Reason (Nof'c). The One, or the Good, projects a perpetual effulgence of it- self, without loss of integrity or diminution of totality (■n-epiXa u^ir i£ avrov)— the image of its archetype (ei- Kova tKtivov Xiyouev elvat tov vovv). This yearns unceasingly for its original (7ro3-ei 6e irciv to yevvrjaav to yivvr)$iv, Kai tovto dyana, Kai pdXiaTa orav Cum jiovoi to ytvinjaav Kai to ytyeinnjuivov). The desire provokes an inclination or conversion of the offspring to its parent, of the similitude to its exemplar; and this reflection or bending back is itself the Divine Mind, Intelligence, Universal Reason, whence all reason and thought are engendered (tij iirasTpopj rrpiic at/To uopa ' t) ct opaaic a'vTr] vovc, Enn. v, i, C, 7 ). The Divine Mind embraces the eternal ideas which consti- tute the intelligible universe, and which it contem- plates in the One. These are not types or shadows of things, but archetypes and perennial truths, whence all things sensible derive their essential constitution, and the broken and imperfect truth which they contain. It is a second cardinal tenet of Plotinus, in which he di- verges from Plato, that ideas are immanent in the Di- vine Mind, and not extrinsic to it (Enn. v, i, 1, 2).
From Mind issues Soul — the universal spirit — the soul of the universe (ipvx>)v ytvva vovc). It dwells in the universal reason, as the universal reason dwells in the One (Enn. v, i, 7). The soul turns partly to the Divine Mind whence it proceeds, and contemplates the ideas presented there. It turns partly towards the sen- sible universe, which it fashions after the ideas. All souls are not contained in the universal soul — a doctrine espoused by Amelius, which amounts to Pantheism. There is a genuine plurality and hierarchy of souls, de- rived from the scul of the universe, not by separation or division, but by deliberate and intelligent production (Enn. iv, ii, 2; ix, 1). These three — the One, the Mind, the Soul — constitute the trinity of Plotinus. These three are one in essence, though distinct in function and in origin, and are all divine. From them, by the in- augurating potency of the first, by the presentations and concurrence of the second, and by the permanent creative energy of the third, all the order and beauty and variety and harmony of the universe are produced. But the universe is twofold : the intelligible, arche- typal and eternal (dkvvaoc ovaa <pvmc, ov piovaa) ; and that which is the image and adumbration of the archetype, the Sensible, factitious and transitory (ov yap fifvu, dXXd p& ?'/ aw^xaTOQ <pi<oic iraaa, Enn. iv. iv, 5 ; vii. 8 : comp. v, i, 6 ; ix, 9). In the intelligible uni- verse are only incorporeal ideas. It is the ideal world. In the sensible universe souls are incorporated in bodies, and distributed through them (Enn. iii, iv, 1). The term souls is used by Plotinus with much greater lati- tude than would now be sanctioned, and is extended to irrational animals and plants, and even to the blind motions, chemical or physical, of organic and inorganic matter. The souls which actuate bodies descend from the realm of the intelligible, first to the sensible heavens, where they assume corporeal vesture, and thence pro- ceed by siucessive declensions to lower and lower in- corporations (Enn. iv, iii, 15). Yet the soul in its sepa- rable state retains its immortal essence and divine char- acter (Zuov to xpijfia avrfjc Kai Sav/iaaTov, Kai twv
PLOTIM'S
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PLOTINUS
virep to. yprifiara tpioeiov, Em. iv, ii. 1 : ill- 22). This demission of souls is nol necessarily a penalty or a ret- ribution—not a banishment from God, as Empedocles Baid was his case; bul il is the fulfilment of the object of crcai inn. that all things might be perfect accord- ing to their perfectibilities, and that the sensible world might be the complete but inadequate reproduction of all things in the intelligible world (Enn. iv, viii, 1).
These arc the leading principles of the philosophy of Plotinus. They arc extensions and sublimations of the tenets of Plato, to whom there is continually an im- plicit, and often an express reference ("Platonem ipsura suli Plotini persona Loquentem," Mar.-. Ficin. ad Audit.). In accordance with them, and with the endeavor to con- ciliate Platonism \\ ith Axistotelism and the elder scl Is,
the several topics discussed in the Enneads arc devel- oped w ii li Buch modifications and expansions of previous doctrine as were deemed requisite. Continual lacuna of course occur both from the incompleteness of the remains and the absence of system in the procedure; but it i> probable that most of these were designed to be supplied by reference to the body of the Platonic teachings. They may be certainly supplied in ihis manner, so far as is necessary to establish a general co- herence between the si vera! positions. With the exe- cution of such a task we have no concern at present, our object being strictly limited to the exhibition of the distinctive characteristics of Plotinus.