procured his condemnation and his transmission as a
pri- r to llincmar. archbishop of Rbeims, to whose
jurisdiction he properly belonged. On the arrival of ( Sottschalk, llincmar summoned a council at Quiercy, in A.l>. 849, when, although his principles were d< fended by the learned Ratramnus, a- well as by Remigius, arch- bishop of Lyon-, he was deprived of his priestly office, ordered to he whipped, and afterwards to he impris- oned. Worn out with this cruel treatment, and after lan- guishing for some years in the solitude of a prison. this learned and thoughtful man died under excom- munication, hut maintaining his opinions to the last While Gottschalk was shut up within the narrow walls of a prison his doctrines were the subject of a keen and bitter controversy in the Latin Church. Ratramnus and Remigius on the one side, and Scotus Erigena on the other, conducted the argument with threat ability. The contention was every day increasing in violence, and Charles the Laid found it necessary to summon an- other council at Quiercy, in A.D. 853, when, through the influence of llincmar, the decision of the former council was repeated, and Gottschalk again condemned as a heretic. But in A.D. 855 the three provinces of Lyons, Yienne. and Aries met in council at Valence, under the presidency of Remigius, when the opinions of Gottschalk were approved, and the decisions of the two councils of Quiercy were reversed. < >f the twenty- three canons of the Council of Valence, five contain the doctrinal views of the friends and defenders of GottS- chalk. Thus in the third canon they declare, "We confidently profess a predestination of the elect unto life, and a predestination of the wicked unto death, lint in the election of those to be saved, the mi rcy of God precedes their good deserts; and in the condemna- tion of those who are to perish, their ill-deed- precede the righteous judgment of God. In his predestination God only determined what lie himself would do. either in his gratuitous mercy or in his righteous judgment." ••In the wicked he foresaw their wickedness, because it is from themselves; he did not predestine it. 1" cause it is not from him. The punishment, indeed, conse- quent upon their ill-desert he foresaw — being God, he foresees all things — and also predestined, because he is a just God, with whom, as St. Augustine says, there is both a lixed purpose and a certain foreknowledge in re- gard to all things whatever." " Hut that some are pre- destinated to wickedness by a divine power, so that they cannot lie of another character, we not only do not believe, but if there are those who will believe so great a wrong, we, as well as the Council of ( (range, with all detestation, declare them anathema." The live doctri- nal canons of the < louncil oi Valence were adopted with- out alteration by the Council of Toul, in A.D. 859, which last council was composed of the bishops of fourteen provinces. But on the death of Gottschalk, which happened in A.I ".Mis. ihc contention terminate
I'l.i in -i [NATION.
Predestination, a doctrine upon which great di- vision of opinion prevails among Christian-.
I. Definition. The word predestinate properly signi- fies to destim i i.e. to set apart, or d< rote to a particular use, condition, or end) beforehand, Ittl a mere act of the will, and should be carefully distin- guished from that exercise of power by which volitions are actualized or carried into effect. Etymologically it would be proper to say that God before the founda- tion of the world predestinated the sun to be luminous,
the load-tone to attract, the atmosphere to perform its varied ministries. In theological language, however,
( iod would be said to have " foreordained" or "
these things, the term ••predestinate" being restricted
to God's supposed determinations respecting the desti- ne - of n in the future world. The early Lutheran
divines generally distinguished pradestinatio stride dicta, or predestination in its narrower sense, and pra- destinatio hilt dicta, or predestination in its wider sig- nification. The former was God's decree to save all
PREDESTINATION
497
PREDESTINATION
persevering believers in Christ; the latter was that original redemptive volition in which he "will have all men to be saved" (1 Tim. ii, 4). In the Reformed Church the word has sometimes been employed as synonymous with election (q. v.), sometimes as covering both elec- tion and reprobation (q. v.). Arminius, in his \bth Pub. Disputation, seems to prefer the former usage as more scriptural, but he is not followed in this respect by his remonstrant successors. Calvin and most of his follow- ers employ the term as applying to the reprobative de- crees of God as much as to the elective (see this point discussed under Calvinism in vol. ii, p. 43, col. 2).
II. Is Predestination Absolute or Conditional? — The cardinal point of the predestination controversy has al- ways been this question: Are the decrees by which cer- tain individuals are elected to eternal life and other individuals doomed to everlasting misery respective or irrespective — that is, were these decrees based upon God's foreknowledge (q. v.) of the different use individuals would make of their moral agency, or were they not V The Arminian takes the affirmative, the Calvinist the negative. The former reasons in this wise : Divine pre- destination in its widest sense is God's free and perfect foreplanning of creation and providence. It was ante- cedent to the production of the first created thing. So viewed, it must be evident to any rational theist that predestination was objectively absolute but sub- jectively conditioned — absolute objectively because there existed nothing extraneous to the divine mind to limit its action ; conditioned subjectively because the essential perfections of God demand that his will should always act in strict conformity with the dictates of his own in- finite wisdom, justice, and benevolence. But though predestination, regarded as the complete, all-embracing plan of God, was objectively absolute, it is obvious that the various individual decrees which are conceived of as components of that plan must mutually limit and condition each other. Thus the divine determination that "while the earth remaineth seed-time and harvest shall not cease" was not an absolute decree, but one con- ditioned upon the divine determination, antecedent to it in the order of nature, that there should be an earth with planetary motion, etc. Were not each decree ad- justed to every other they could not conspire to the attainment of a common end. Instead of being inte- grating elements of one wise and self-consistent plan, some might be found superfluous, some perhaps in direct collision. Hence no individual decree can be regarded as irrespective or unconditioned; each is conditioned on the one hand by the perfections of God, on the other by the whole system of divine pre-volitions of which it forms a part. Now an absolute, irreversible decree, continues the Arminian, either electing an individual to eternal life or dooming him to everlasting death, fails to answer to either of these essential conditions or char- acteristics of a divine decree. It would be palpably in- consistent with the divine perfections on the one hand, and absolutely irreconcilable with known determina- tions of God on the other. Such an elective decree would be incompatible with God's rationality and im- partiality, while such a reprobative one would directly conflict not only with his benevolence, but even with his justice. Both would be at open war with the known design of the Creator that men should enjoy the endow- ment of moral agency and shape their own eternal des- tinies. Hence an unconditional, irrespective election of some unto life, and an unconditional, irrespective rep- robation of others unto death, cannot be maintained. If any are individually elected or reprobated, they must have been elected or reprobated with reference to the foreseen use they would make of their moral agency, for only on this principle can any theory of predestination be constructed which shall not compromise the divine character or conflict with known determinations respect- ing man.