he made predestination to depend on prescience (De Fide , lib. v, § 83). In other places, however, hislanguage approaches more nearly to that of Augustine (see Hase, Dogmatik, § 102; Gieseler, Dogmengesch. § 39; Neander, History of Dogmas, i, 343, 344). To quote Neander again : " Although the freedom of the divine election and the creative agency of grace are made particularly prominent in these passages, still they do not imply any necessary exclusion of the state of recipiency in the in- dividual as a condition, and accordingly this assertion of Ambrose admits of being easily reconciled with the " assertion first quoted. In another place, at least (De Fide, lib. v, § 83), he expressly supposes that predesti- nation is conditioned by foreknowledge (ibid, ii, 504)." The substantial doctrines of the fathers as to the extent of grace before Augustine was that Christ died, not for an elect portion of mankind, but for all men, and that if men are not saved the guilt and the fault are their own (Gieseler, Dogmevgeschichtc, § 72).
Thus we see that for more than four hundred years not a single voice was heard, either in the Eastern or Western Church, in advocacy of the notion of an uncon- ditional divine predestination. At this point Augustine, already in very advanced old age, and under controver- sial pressure, took the first step towards Calvinism by pronouncing the decree of election unconditional. In ex- plaining the relation between man's activity and deci- sive influence, Pelagius had denied human depravity, and maintained that, although God gives man the power to do good, the will and the act are man's. He denied that there was any divine energy in grace that could impair the operations of free will. Augustine, on the other hand, maintained that grace is an internal opera- tion of God upon those whom he designs to save, im- parting not only the power, but also the will to do good. The fact that some are saved and others lost he attrib- uted to the will of God. Hence his doctrines of uncon- ditional predestination, of particular redemption, and of special and irresistible grace. Reprobation, he granted, was based upon foreseen guilt, but apparently uncon- scious of the inconsistency, he denied the applicability of the same principle to election. In 529 the system of Augustine was established as Church doctrine by the Council of Arausio (Orange), but the reaction against the strictly logical yet essentially immoral nature of his dogma has been perpetually manifested. See Augus-
TINE.
Four hundred years more passed away before a man could be found bold enough to complete Augustine's theory by declaring that, as God has sovereignly and immutably elected whomsoever he has pleased unto life, without any foresight of faith and obedience, so he has of his own good pleasure freely and unchangeably predestinated whomsoever he has pleased unto ever- lasting misery, without any reference to foreknown sin and guilt on their part. This anticipator of Calvin was a Saxon monk named Gottschalk (Godeschalcus). His novel view brought down upon him not merely ecclesi- astical censure, but even persecution. His doctrine was condemned by a council which archbishop Babanus Maurus had called at Mayence, A.D. 848 (Mansi, Concil. xiv, 914), and Gottschalk, who was then travelling, was sent to his metropolitan, archbishop Hincmar of Bheims, who called another council at Quiercy in 849. Here he was defended by Batramnus, the opponent of Paschasius Badbertus in the Eucharistic controversy, and also by Bemigius, afterwards archbishop of Lyons; but not- withstanding these powerful supporters, he was con- demned a second time, and ordered to undergo the pen- alty of flogging, which the rule of St. Benedict imposed upon monks who troubled the Church. After this con- demnation he was imprisoned in the monastery of Haut- villers, where he died, without having recanted his opin- ions, about the year 868. See Gottschalk.
While the friends of Gottschalk were endeavoring to obtain his absolution and release, Hincmar put forward Johannes Scotus Erigena (q. v.) to answer his predesti-
PREDESTINATION
500
PREDESTINATION
nation theory, which Erigena * 1 i ■ 1 in 851, in his treatise De Pratdeslinatione, in which he raised up a cloud of adversaries by the freedom with which he contradicted the established doctrines of the Church as to the nat- ure of good and evil. Further controversy being thus aroused, Hincmar summoned a second council at Quier- cv iii 853, which confirmed the decision as to the real
doctri f the Church arrived at by the previous
council (Mansi, Condi. -\iv. 995). A rival council was called by the opposite party from the provinces oi Lynns. Vienne, and Aries, which mel at Valence in 855. lint instead of fully confirming the opinion of Gotts- chalk, this council considerably modified it by declaring that although sin is foreknown by God, it is not so pre- destined as to make it inevitably necessary thai it should be committed (ibid. xv. 1). Hincmar now wrote two works on the subject, one of which is not extant : the other is entitled De Pratdeslinationi 1 1< i it I. Ultra Arbi- trio adversus Gottschalcum ei cceteros Pradestinatianos. Having thus explained his views at length, they were substantially accepted, in the form of six doctrinal can- ons, by the Synod of Langres. and li\ I hat of Told | A.l >. 859), held at Savonieres a few days afterwards (Mansi, Concil. xv. 525 27), and thus the controversy termi- nated. See Manguin, Collect, auctor. <!■ /'/">/<.</. ,/ Gratia (1650); dasher, Gotteschalci et Prcedest. Conlrov. Hist.; Cellot, Hist. Gotteschalci Prosiest. (1655).