2. A second theory is that, the foreknowledge of con- tingent events being in its own nature impossible, be- cause it implies a contradiction, it does no dishonor to the divine Being to affirm that of such events he has, and can have, no prescience whatever, and thus the prescience of God as to moral actions being wholly de- nied, the difficulty in question is got rid of. To this the same answer must be given as to the former. It does not meet the case so long as the Scriptures are al- lowed to contain prophecies of rewardable and punish- able actions. The great fallacy in the argument that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its con- tingent nature lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, per- haps, unfortunate that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which, consequently, can only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that account, to present itself to different minds under different shades of meaning. If, however, the term contingent in this controversy has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which restdts from the choice of the agent is distinguished from a necessary one in this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, accord- ing to the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this specific quality of a free action that the term contingency is used: it might have been otherwise — in other words, it was not necessitated. Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their free- dom, and is opposed, not to certainty, but to constraint. The very nature of this controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions — that is, whether they will happen or not — but about the nat- ure of them, whether free or constrained, whether they must happen or not. Those who advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions simply considered, that is, whether they will take place or not ; the reason why they object to a certain prescience of moral actions is this: they conclude that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen or not. If contingency meant uncertainly, the sense in which such theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated action may, for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action in the least to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is in no sense a cause of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, un-
PRESCIENCE
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PRESCIENCE
connected with exerted power: for mere knowledge, i h. n i re, an action remains free or necessitated, as the case maj be, A necessitated action is nol made a vol- untary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a necessary one. Free an ion- foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be contingent Bui how stands the case as to t he ir certainty? Precisely ou the same ground. The certainty ol a necessary action foreknown docs nol resull from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause, and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action does nol re- sult from the knowledge of it, which is no cause al all, hiii from the voluntary cause -thai is, the determination ofthewilL It alters nol the case in the leasl to say thai tli" voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would have been otherwise; bul as the will which gives birth to the action is not dependent upon the previous knowl- edge of God, bul the knowledge of the action upon fore- Bighl of the choice of the will, neither the will nor the an i- controlled by the knowledge, ami the action, though foreseen, is .still tin- or contingent. The fore- knowledge of God has then no influence upon either the i the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and nol influence; and actions may be 1 1 1 tainly foreknown without their being rendered nec- essary by thai foreknowledge, lint hero it is said, "If the result of an absolute contingency bo certainly fore- known, it can have no other result, it cannot happen otherwise." This is not the true inference. [twtV/nol happen otherwise ; bul it may be asked, Why can it not happen otherwise? Can is an expression of potential- ity— it denotes power or possibility. The object ion is that it is not possible that the action should otherwise happen. Bul why not? What deprives it of that power? Ifa necessary action wen- in question, it could not otherwise happen than as the necessitating cause Bhould compel; but, then, that would arise from the neces- sitating cause solely, and not from the prescience of the action, which is not causal. Hut if the action be free. and il outers into the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it mighl have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all: the foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this Case i ban in the other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of foreknowledge, which nei- ther adds to its power of happening otherwise nor dimin- ishes it. Bul then we are told that "the prescience of it iii that rase must bo uncertain." Not unless any per- son can prove that the divine prescience is unable to dan through all the workings of the human mind, all it- comparison of tilings in the judgment, all the influ- ences of motives on the affections, all the hesitances and baitings of the will, to its final choice. "Such knowl- edge i> too wonderful for us." but it i> the know ledge of him "who understandeth the thoughts of man afar oil." '• Hut if a contingency will have a given result, to thai result ii must be determined." Not in the least We have seen thai it cannot be determined to a given resull b\ mere precognition, for we have evidence in our own minds thai mere knowledge is nol causal to the actions of another. It is determined to its resull by the will of the agent; bul even in thai case it cannol be said that ii must be determined to that result, because n is