PROBABILISM
60^
PROBABILISM
minus probabili." The antiprobabilistic extreme, repre- sented by the rigorism of the Jansenists, was met by pope Alexander VIII with the condemnation of the proposition referred to above, a condemnation which is contained in the decree of 1G90.
The first consequence of the papal declarations was a sharper separation of the parties. Probabilism found its most redoubtable adversaries in the Carmelite Hen- ry of St. Ignatius, the two Dominicans Daniel Concina (Delia Storia del Probabilismo) and Vincent Patuzzi, and in Franzoja and Pet. B-allerini. But all these efforts did not annihilate probabilism whether inside or out- side the Order of the Jesuits, though it had to submit to many restrictions. In their fifth general assembly the Jesuits only protested against making probabilism the doctrine of their order. Oliva, the general of the order (in a letter of Feb. 3, 1GG9), speaks plainly enough in favor of probabilism ; and while he declares certainly and truly jn-obable opinions fit to engender a certain conscience (conscientia certa), he asserts, on the other side, that the requirement "sequendi semper in omni- bus probabilioretn partem" would be too heavy a burden upon mankind. It was shown, however, much more clearly how deeply probabilism was rooted in the Jesu- itic Order when the Spaniard Gonzalez, the general of the order, took with great decision, in 1G94, the defence of the opposite system. In his work he dissents from the principle that man, in moral matters, must suffer himself to be guided by a sincere love of truth. Hence he draws the inference that we must always choose what we think to be nearest to truth; if objective truth cannot be obtained, we must at least cling to that which, according to our subjective conviction, is nighest to it. For that reason we can follow even the less sure opin- ion, if we are convinced of its greater probability. The work written from this stand-point, and which the au- thor meant to dedicate to the general of the order, Oli- va, found its way into publicity only after many years. Perhaps Gonzalez would not have ventured, even while general of the order, to publish it if the same work which the casuists of the order wished to suppress had not been greatly approved of by pope Innocent XI. Many of the Jesuits claimed that Gonzalez had, by his disapproval of probabilism, made himself unworthy of his place, and pronounced him self-deposed. Only the protection of the pope saved him (see Wolf, Gesch. der Jesuiten, i, 173). In his Fundamentum Theologice Mo- ralis (Rome, 1G84) Gonzalez put in the background the authority system hitherto so predominant by giving the preference to the ethical province as the more appro- priate judgment-seat of the appellate court. Two other theologians followed in his footsteps, Gisbert and Ca- margo, representing the probabilioristic tendency. Gis- bert, professor at Toulouse, did not in his work attack the principle of probabilism, only its vulgar form. He asserts that we are certain not to sin if we stick to the absolute probability either of law or of liberty; if we judge sensibly that something is allowed, after exam- ining it sufficiently, taking the circumstances into ac- count, and satisfying ourselves of the soundness of our judgment. While Gisbert treated the subject in a more speculative way, Camargo, professor at Salamanca, in his treatise De Regula Honestatis Moralis (Naples, 1702). takes a more historical view of the matter, and shows that modern probabilism has not the testimony of antiquity in its favor, and that since its first appear- ance the most considerable authorities were against it.
While the probabilists continued in their attempts to again turn the scales — we shall only mention the Tractafus Probabilitatis by Gabriel Gualdus (under the assumed name of NicolausPeguletus, Louvain, 1708) and the "Criticisms" of Cardenas (Opp. Garden. Ven. 1710) — and while the party of the probabiliorists grew in strength every day, mediating tendencies appeared. Among the works written in this spirit, the Sententia Media of Alfonzo de Liguori is the best. This distin- guished Romanist developed a system of morals which
may be described as a kind of 'practical probabiliorism, in which, by the use of what are called rerlex principles, an opinion which objectively is but probable is made subjectivi ly the basis of a certain and safe practical judg- ment. Liguori teaches that we are bound to keep our actions, as much as possible, in accordance with truth ; or at least, as in the case of a more probable opinion, as near to truth as possible. If it should appear that of two opinions one is more favorable to liberty, the other to law, the latter being at the same time more proba- ble, it must be admitted without hesitation. Liguori, in the ease where equally strong reasons speak for law and liberty, professes a somewhat different opinion from Gisbert and the rigid probabiliorists — he decides for liberty. Liguori starts in his demonstration from the proposition that a doubtful law is not binding ("lex dubia non obligat"). A dubious law, he further says, is an uncertain law, and a law of this description cannot engender any obligation ("lex incerta non potest cer- tain inducere obligationem") ; for in this case of doubt, of uncertainty, liberty is in possession, and in conse- quence has the right on its side, according to the axiom " In dubio melior est conditio possidentis." This is the strongest point of Liguori's argumentation, but also the point with which it stands and falls; here it has to fight a decisive battle against probabiliorism, or against refined tutiorism. Kassler, in his Norma Recti (Ingold. 1713), takes a similar stand-point between the contend- ing parties, while Charles Emanuel Pallavicini. in his letters on the administration of the sacrament of peni- tence, claims for the confessors the right to choose be- tween probabilism or probabiliorism, both with proper restrictions.