tging of ministers, the Bupporl of public wor- ship, and other matters connected with the temporal af- fairs of the Church. Under the name of " parish rec- ords," or -Church records," may also be included the register, containing the minister's account of baptisms, marriages, etc— Stoughton, Kecks. Diet. s. v. See Reg- ister. Rectitude (or Uprightness) is the choice and
pursuit of those things which the mind, alter due in- quiry and attention, clearly perceives to be lit and good, and the eschewing of those that are evil. "Jtectiludt of conduct," says Whately, "is intended to express the term KctropSbXTic,, which Cicero translates recta effectio;
opa he translates r< ctum factum. Now the defi- nition of tcaropSuipa was vopov irpooraypa, 'a thing commanded by law' (i.e. by the law of nature, the uni- versal law). Antoninus, speaking of the r< asoning fac- ulty, how, withouf looking further, i( rests contented in oergies, adds, ' for h hich reason are all actions of tliis species called rectitudes (KaropSutaug, Kara 6p- 3>6g, righl onwards), as denoting the directness of their progression right onwards'" (Harris. Dialogm on Hap- piness, p. 73, note). "Goodness in actions," says Hooker ( / cell •■ Pol. bk. i, § 8), " is like unto straighlness ,- where- fore that which is done well we term right, for, as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travelleth,
because by il he cometh s test to his journey's end,
s<\ in action, that which doth lye the cvenest between us and the end we desire must needs be the fittest for our use." It' a term is to be selected to denote that in action and in disposition of which the moral faculty ap- proves, perhaps the most precise and appropriate is rec- titude.ot Tightness. "There are other phrases," says Dr. lo id i Ictivt Powers, Essay v,ch.vii)," which have been used, w hich I see no reason for adopting, such as. acting contrary to tht relations of things — contrary to the reason of things— to the fitness of things— to the truth of things — These phrases have nol the author- ity of common use. which, in matters of language, is great. They seem to have been invented by some au- thors with a view to explain the nature of vice; but I do nol think they answer that end. If intended as defi- nitions of vice, they are improper: because in the mosl favorable sense they can bear, they extend to every kind of foolish and absurd conduct as well as to that which is vicious." Bui whal is rectitude, or tightness, as the characteristic of an action? According to I 'rice and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea, and cannot be explained, '-It might as well he asked whal is truth, as the characteristic of a proposition? Ii is a capacity of our rational nature to see and acknowl- edge truth: but we cannot define what truth is. We call it the conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things." " It may be doubted how far this explana- tion makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like manner some explain rectitude by Baying thai it consists in a congruity between an action and the rela-
the agent It is the idea we form of an action, when it i- in every way conformable to the relations of ' and the circumstances in which he is placed. On contemplating Buch an action we approve of it, and feel thai il n e were placed in such circtimstanci s and in such relations, we Bhould be under an obligation to per- form it. Now ib" circumstances and relations in which man is placed ari i from his nature and from the nature of things in general; and hence it has been said that is founded in tht nature and fitness of things, i. e. an action is right when it is lit or suitable to all the relations .and circumstances of the agent, and of this lit-
iscience or reason is the judge. Conscience or ' - nol constitute the relation-: these must arise
from the nature of man and the nature of things. But conscience or reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions to these relations; and these rela- tions arising necessarily from the very nature of tilings, the conformity with them, which constitutes is said to l>< i U run/ and immutabU " (Krauth's Fleming, I 'ocab. of I kilos, s. s .).
Rector (Lat. rector, a ruler), the title of several classes of clerical and collegiate officials, some of which are referred to undi r their respective heads.
1. As regards clerical rectors, the title, in it- n dinary English use. is applied to the clergyman who holds complete and independent charge of a parish. This use, however, is a departure from the canonical signification of the title, which meant rather a clergy- man who was appointed to govern a parish where the chief parochial jurisdiction was vested in a religious corporation or in some non-resident dignitary. The office of vicar is an outgrowth of the rectorate, on the appropriation of benefices to monasteries and other re- ligious houses of old; and the distinction between rec- tor and vicar, which is therefore to be noticed here, is as follows: The rector has the righl to all the ecclesi- astical dues in his parish, whereas the vicar has gener- ally an appropriator or impropriator over him. who is entitled to part of the profits, and to whom lie i-. in effect, only perpetual curate, with an appointment of glebe and generally one third of the tithes. See Vicar.