defence of what is, perhaps, infelicitously called the " Philosophy of Common Sense." The principles of that philosophy are : (1.) That what is given in consciousness is undoubtedly true. (2.) That whatever the laws of our nature force us to believe, must be accepted as true. (3.) That this principle appHes to all the elements of our nature, to the senses, the reason, and the con- science. We cannot rationally or consistently with our allegiance to God, deny what our senses, reason, or conscience j^ronounce to be true. (4.) Neither the individual man, nor the cause of truth, however, is to be left to the mercy of what any one may choose to say reason or conscience teaches. Nothing is to be accepted as the authoritative judgment of either reason or conscience, w'hich does not bear the criteria of universality and necessity.
Hamilton has dra\vn from the stores of his erudition, in this de- partment perhaps unexampled, proof that these principles have been recognized by the leading philosophic minds in all ages. He himself sustains them with earnestness as the safeguards of truth. He impressively asserts that if consciousness once be convicted of falsehood, all is lost ; we have then no resting place for either sci- ence or religion ; that absolute scepticism follows, if it be denied that necessity and universality of belief are not decisive proof of the truth of what is thus believed. Even Stuart Mill admits that " whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond pos- sibility of question." ^ Mr. Mansel tells us that it is from con- sciousness we get our idea of substance, of personality, of cause, of right and wrong, in short of everything which lies at the founda- tion of knowledge and religion ; and therefore if consciousness deceive us we have nothing to depend upon. Mansel thus ex- pounds the famous aphorism of Des Cartes, " Cogito ergo sum," i. e., " I, who see, and hear, and think, and feel, am the one con- tinuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists ; relation to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist." ^ " Consciousness," he says, " gives us the knowledge of substance. We are a substantive existence." ^ "I exist as I am conscious of existing ; and conscious self is itself the Ding an sich, the standard by which all representations of person- ality must be judged, and from which our notion of reality, as dis- tinguished from appearance, is originally derived." * Hamilton
1 Logic, Introduction, p. 4, edit. N. T. 1846.
'^ Limits of Reliywus Thought, ^. IQb.
8 Ibid. p. 288. * Ibid. p. 291.
362 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. IV. — Can God be knowk ?
and Mansel therefore teach that the veracity of consciousness is the foundation of all knowledge, and that the denial of that ve- racity inevitably leads to absolute scepticism. Nevertheless they teach that our senses deceive us ; that reason deceives us ; that conscience deceives us ; that is, that our sensuous, rational, and moral consciousness are alike deceptive and unreliable.
Our senses give us the knowledge of the external world. They tciach us that things are, and what they are. It is admitted that the universal and irresistible belief of men, as that belief is deter- mined by their sense and consciousness, is that things really are Avhat to our senses they appear to be. Philosophers tell us this is a delusion. Kant says that they certainly are not what we take them to be. Mansel says this is going rather too far. We cannot know, indeed, what they are, but it is possible that they are in fact what they appear to be. In either case they are to us an unknown quantity, and the senses deceive us. They assume to teach more than they have a right to teach, and we are bound to believe them.
Kant teaches that our reason, that the necessary laws of thought which govern our mental operations, lead to absolute contradic- tions. In this Hamilton and Mansel fully agree with him. They tell us that reason teaches that the Absolute must be all things actual and possible ; that there cannot be an absolute or infinite person, or cause ; that being and not-being are identical ; that the infinite is " potentially all things and actually nothing." These and similar contradictions are said to be inevitable results of all attempts to know God as an Absolute and Infinite Being. " The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a con- tradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others ; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one, and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal ; and there is a con- tradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot without con- tradiction be represented as active ; nor, without equal contra- diction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence ; nor yet can it be conceived of as a part only of that sum." ^ Yet all this we are called upon to believe ; for it is our duty, he says, to believe that God is infinite and abso- lute. That is, we are bound to believe what our rational conscious- ness pronounces to be contradictory and impossible.
1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 85.