NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. § 1. Definitions of Grod.
The question whether God can be defined, depends for its answer on what is meant by definition. Cicero^ says, "Est defi- nitio, earum rerum, quae sunt ejus rei px'opriEe, quain definire vol- umus, brevis et circumscripta queedam expHcatio." In this sense God cannot be defined. No creature, much less man, can know all that is proper to God ; and, therefore, no creature can give an exhaustive statement of all that God is.
To define, however, is simply to bound, to separate, or distin- guish ; so that the thing defined may be discriminated from all other things. This may be done (1.) By stating its characteris- tics. (2.) By stating its genus and its specific difference. (3.) By analyzing the idea as it lies. in our minds. (4.) By an explanation of the term or name by which it is denoted. All these methods amount to much the same thing. When we say we can define God, all that is meant is, that we can analyze the idea of God as it lies in our mind : or, that we can state the class of beings to which He belongs, and the attributes by which He is distinguished from all otlier beings. Thus, in the simple definition, God is ens perfectissimum, the word ens designates Him as a being, not an idea, but as that which has real, objective existence ; and absolute perfection distinguishes Him from all other beings. The objection to this and most other definitions of God is, that they do not bring out with sufficient fulness the contents of the idea. This objection bears against such definitions as the following: Uns absoluturn, the self-existent, independent being ; and that by Calovius, " Deus est essentia spiritualis infinita ; " and Reinhard's ^ " Deus est, Natura necessaria, a mundo diversa, summas complexa perfectiones et ipsius mundi causa;" or Baumgarten's " Spiritus perfectissimus, rationem sui ipsius rerumque contingentium omnium sen mundi continens ; " or, that of Morus, " Spiritus perfectissimus, conditor, conservator,
1 Be Oratore, i. 42, 189, edit. Leipzig, 1850, p. S4. a Doymatik, p. 92.
§1.] NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. ^Ql
et gubernator raundi." Probably the best definition of God ever penned by man, is that given in the " Westminster Catechism " : " God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." This is a true definition ; for it states the class of beings to which God is to be referred. He is a Spirit ; and He is distinguished from all other spirits in that He is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being and perfections. It is also a complete definition, in so far as it is an exhaustive statement of the contents of our idea of God.
In what sense, however, are these terms used ? What is meant by the words " being," and " perfections," or " attributes " of God ? In what relation do his attributes stand to his essence and to each other ? These are questions on which theologians, espe- cially during the scholastic period, expended much time and labor.
Being of Grod.
By being is here meant that .which has a real, substantive exist- ence. It is ec[uivalent_to substance, or essence. It is opposed to what is merely thought, and to a mere force or power. We get this idea, in the first place, from consciousness. We are conscious of self as the subject of the thoughts, feelings, and volitions, which are its varying states and acts. This consciousness of substance is involved in tjiat of jiersonal identity. In the second place, a law of our reason constrains us to believe that there is something which underlies the phenomena of matter and mind, of which those phe- nomena are the manifestation. It is impossible for us to think of thought and feeling, unless there be something that thinks and feels. It is no less impossible to think of action, unless there be something that acts ; or of motion, unless there be something that moves. To assume, therefore, that mind is only a series of acts and states, and that matter is nothing but force, is to assume that nothing (nonentity) can produce effects.
God, therefore, is in his nature a substance, or essence, which is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable ; the common subject of aU divine perfections, and the common agent of all divine acts. This is as far as we can go, or need to go. We have no definite idea of substance, whether of matter or mind, as distinct from its attributes. The two are inseparable. In knowing the one we know the other. We cannot know hardness except as we know something hard. We have, therefore, the same knowledge of the essence of God, as we have of the substance of the soul. All we have to do in refer- ence to the divine essence, as a Spirit, is to deny of it, as we do
368 PAKT I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. —Divine Attributes.
of our own spiritual essence, what belongs to material substances ; and to affirm of it, that in itself and its attributes it is infinite, eter- nal, and unchangeable. When, therefore, we say there is a God, we do not assert merely that there is in our minds the idea of an infinite Spirit; but that, entirely independent of our idea of Him, such a Being really exists. Augustine ^ says, " Deus est qusedam substantia ; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. Sub stantia ergo aliquid esse est."
If, therefore, a divine essence, infinite, eternal, and unchange- able, exists, this essence existed before and independent of the world. It follows also that the essence of God is distinct from the world. The Scriptural doctrine of God is consequently opposed to the several forms of error already mentioned ; to Hylozoism, which assumes that God, like man, is a composite being, the world being to Him what the body is to us ; to Materialism, which denies the existence of any spiritual substance, and afl&rms that the material alone is real ; to extreme Idealism, whioh denies not only the reality of the internal world, but all real objective existence, and affirms that the subjective alone is real ; to Pantheism, which either makes the world the existence form of God, or, denying the reality of the world, makes God the only real existence. That is, it either makes nature God, or, denying nature, makes God everything.
§ 2. Divine Attributes. To the divine essence, which in itself is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, belong certain perfections revealed to us in the constitution of our nature and in the word of God. These divine perfections are called attributes as essential to the nature of a divine Being, and necessarily involved in our idea of God. The older theologians distinguished the attributes of God, (1.) From predicates which refer to God in the concrete, and indicate his relation to his creatures, as creator, preserver, ruler, etc. (2.) From properties, which are technically the distinguishing characteristics of the several persons of the Trinity. There are certain acts or relations peculiar or proper to the Father, others to the Son, and others to the Spirit. And (3.) From accidents or qualities which may or may not belong to a substance, which may be acquired or lost. Thus holiness was not an attribute of the nature of Adam, but an accident, something which he might lose and still remain a man ; whereas intelligence was an attribute, because the loss of intelligence involves the loss of humanity.
1 Enan-atio in Psalmum, Ixviii. i. 5, edit. Benedictines, vol iv. p. 988 c.