The perfections of God, therefore, are attributes, without which He would cease to be God.
Relation of the Attributes to the Essence of G-od. In attempting to explain the relation in which the attributes of God stand to his essence and to each other, there are two extremes to be avoided. First, wg^JIiust not represent.God as a composite / being, composed of different elements ; and^seconclly, we must not
coniouna ITie attributes, making them all mean the same thing, which is equivalent to denying them all together. The Realists of the Middle Ages tended to the former of these extremes, and the Nominalists to the other. Realists held that general terms ex- press not merely thoughts, or abstract conceptions in our minds, but real or substantive, objective existence. . And hence they were disposed to represent the divine attributes as differing from each other realiter, as one res or thing differs from another. The Nominalists, on the other hand, said general terms are mere words answering to abstractions formed by the mind. And consequently when we speak of different attributes in God, we only use different words for one and the same thing. Occam, Biel, and other Nomi- nalists, therefore, taught that " Attributa divina nee rei, nee ra- tionis distinctione, inter se aut ab essentia divina distingui ; sed omnem distinctionem esse solum in nominibus." The Lutheran and Reformed theologians tended much more to the latter of these extremes than to the former. They generally taught, in the first place, that the unity and simplicity of the divine essence precludes not only all physical composition of constituent elements, or of matter and form, or of subject and accidents ; but also all meta- physical distinction as of act and power, essence and existence, nature and personality ; and even of logical difference, as genus and specific difference.
In the second place, the theologians were accustomed to say that the attributes of God differ from his essence non re, sed ratione. This is explained by saying that things differ ex natura rei, when they are essentially different as soul and body ; while a difference ex ratione is nierely a difference in us, i. e., in our conceptions, i. e.y " quod distincte solum concipitur, cum in re ipsa distinctum non sit." Hence the divine attributes are defined as " conceptus essentiae divi- nae inadequatse, ex parte rei ipsam essentiam involventes, eandemque intrhisice denominantes. Aquinas says, " Deus est unus re et plures ratione, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter apprehendit Deuro, sicuti res multipliciter ipsum representant." The language of the yoL. I. 24
2.
870 PAET I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — Divine Attributes.
Lutheran theologian Quenstedt ^ exhibits the usual mode of repre- senting this subject : " Si proprie et accurate loqui velimus, Deus nullas habet proprietates, sed mera et simplicissima est essentia quae nee realem difFerentiam nee ullam vel rerum vel modorum admittit compositionem. Quia vero simplicissimam Dei essentiam uno adequato conceptu adequate concipere non possumus, ideo inadequatis et distinctis conceptibus, inadequate essentiam divinam repraesentantibus, earn apprehendimus, quos inadequatos conceptus, qui a parte rei essentiae divinse identificantur, et a nobis per modum afFectionum apprehenduntur, attributa vocamus." And again, " Attributa divina a parte rei et in se non multa sunt, sed ut ipsa essentia divina, ita et attributa, quse cum ilia identificantur, simpli- cissima unitas sunt ; multa vero dicuntur (1.) crvyKaTa^artKws, ad nostrum concipiendi modum, .... (2.) e^cpyT^riKws, in ordine ad effecta." ^ The favorite illustration to explain what was meant by this unity of the divine attributes, was drawn from the sun. His ray, by one and the same power (as was then assumed) illuminates, warms, and produces chemical changes, not from any diversity in it, but from diversity in the nature of the objects on which it operates. The force is the same ; the effects are different. The meaning of these theologians is further determined by their denying that the relation of attribute and essence in God is analogous to the relation of intelligence and will to the essence of the soul in man ; and also 'by the frequently recurring declaration, borrowed from the schoolmen, that God is actus purus. Schleiermacher goes still further in the same direction. With him the divine attributes are mere Beziehungen, or relations of God to us. He commonly re- solves them into mere causality. Thus he defines the holiness of God to be that causality in Him which produces conscience in us.
Divine Attributes. A third and less objectionable way of representing the matter is adopted by those who say with Hollazius : " Attributa divina ab essentia divina et a se invicem, distinguuntur non nominahter neque realiter sed formaliter, secundum nostrum concipiendi mo- dum, non sine certo distinctionis fundamento." ^ This is very different from saying that they differ ratione tantum. Turrettin says the attributes are to be distinguished not realiter, but virtuali- ter ; that is, there is a real foundation in the divine nature for 1 ^\e several attributes ascribed to Him.
» Theologia, part i. cap. viii. § 2, edit. Leipzig, 1715, p. 426.
2 Ibid. n. cap. viii. § 2, p. 426.
8 Examen Theologicum, edit. Leipzig, 1763, p. 236.