therefore, in relation to God there can be no distinction between the actual and the possible. Nothing is possible but the actual ; and all that is possible becomes actual. Strauss ^ says, after Schleierina- cher,^ that by the omnipotence of God is to be understood " not only that all that is has its causaHty in God, but that everything is and occurs for which any causality in God exists." Bruch ^ says, that by the omnipotence of God, is meant nothing more than that He is the original ground and cause of all things. He quotes Nitsch * as saying, that " The idea of omnipotence is the repetition and application of the idea of God as creator of heaven and earth." Nitsch, however, does not understand the passage in the sense put upon it ; for he adds, in his note commenting on the dictum of Abelard, "^eus_non__potest_i"acere aliquid prater ea quae facit," that, if this means that the actual exhausts the resources of God, it is to be rejected. The words of Abelard, nevertheless, correctly express the doctrine of the modern German school of theologians on this subject. Schleiermacher's language on this point is explicit and comprehensive. "Alles ist ganz durch die gottliche Alhnacht und ganz durch den Naturzusamuienhang, nicht aber darf die erstere als Erganzung der letztern angesehen werden. Die Ges- ammtheit des endlichen Seins ist als vollkoramene Darstellung der Allmacht zu denken, so dass alles wirkhch ist und geschieht, wozu eine Productivitat in Gott ist. Damit fallt weg die Differenz des Wirklichen und Moglichen, des absoluten und hypothetischen Wollens oder Konnens Gottes ; denn dies fiihrt auf einen wirksam- en und unwirksamen Willen und letzterer kann bei Gott unniog- lich statt finden ; so wenig als Konnen und Wollen getrennt sein konnen." That is, " Everything is entirely through the divine omnipotence, and everything is through the course of nature. The former, however, must not be regarded as supplementary to the latter. The aggregate of finite things is the complete revelation of God's omnipotence, so that everything is and occurs for which there is a productivity in God. Thus the difference between the actual and the possible, between the absolute and hypothetical willing and power of God, disappears, because this implies an oper- ative and inoperative will, but the latter is impossible in God ; just as little as willing and power can be separated." ^ This passage is quoted by Schweizer,^ who adopts the views which it presents.
1 Dogmaiik, vol. i. p. 587. 2 Glaubenslehre, i. § 54.
8 Die Lekre von den gdltlichen Eigenschafien, p. 154.
* Christliche Lehre, p. 160.
6 Gess, Uebenicht iiber das System Schleiermacher's, p. 88.
6 Glaubenslehre, i. p. 263.
412 PAKT L — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — Divine ATTBiBuxaas.
This Doctrine Destroys our Knowledge of Grod. In reference to this doctrine, it may be remarked, —
1. That it uttei'ly confounds all our ideas of God. It renders all knowledge of Him impossible. If will and power ai'e identical, then those words lose for us their meaning. We cannot know what God is, if this doctrine be true ; and if we know not what He is, we cannot rationally worship, love, or trust Him.
2. The doctrine effectually destroys the personality of God. A person is a self-conscious, self-determining being. But in denying will to God, self-determination, and consequently personality, is denied to Him. This consequence is admitted by the advocates of this doctrine. " If in God," says Strauss, " willing and power are identical, then there can be no freedom of the will in God, in the sense of the Church theologians, who hold that it was possible for God not to create the world, or to have created it other than it is. If there be no ability in God to do what He does not do, there can be no freedom of will or power of choice." " Mit diesem Konnen fjillt audi die Freiheit im Sinne eines Wahlvermogens hinweg." ^ This, however, it is said, is not the doctrine of fate ; for fate sup- poses an ah extra necessity to which God is subject. If it does not teach fate, it at least teaches inexorable necessity. Spinoza says, " Ea res libera dicetur, quas ex sola suas naturte necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum detei-minatur. Necessaria autem, vel potius coacta quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operan- dum certa ac determinata ratione." ^ And again,^ " Deum nullo modo fato subjicio, sed omnia inevitabili necessitate ex Dei natura sequi concipio." In this sense the sun is free in shining. It shines from the necessity of its nature. We think from a like necessity ; but we can think of one thing or another, changing the current of our thoughts at pleasure. And thus we are free in exei'cising the power of thought. This freedom is denied to God. He can think only in one way. And all his thoughts are creative. He does, therefore, what He does, from a necessity of his nature, and does all He is able to do. God, according to this doctrine, is not a per- sonal Being.
3. The Scriptures constantly represent God as able to do what- ever He wills. They recognize the distinction between the actual and the possible ; between ability and act ; between what God
1 Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 587.
2 Ethices, i. def. vii. edit. Jena, 1803 vol. ii. p. 86. • 8 Epistola xxiii. Jbid. vol. i. 51.3.