operations, as when two horses are attached to the same vehicle, which is drawn partly by the one and partly by the other. The efficiency of the first cause is in the second, and not merely with it. Deus " immediate influit in actionem et efFectum creaturse, ita ut idem effectus non a solo Deo, nee a sola creatui-a, nee partim a Deo, partim a creatura, sed una eademque efficientia totali simul a Deo et creatura producatur, a Deo videlicet ut causa universali et prima, a creatura ut particulari et secunda." ^ " Non est re ipsa alia actio influxus Dei, alia operatio creaturse, sed una et indivisi- bihs actio, utrumque respiciens et ab utroque pendens, a Deo ut causa universali, a creatura ut particulari." ^
This concursus is represented, first, as general ; an influence of the omnipresent power of God not only sustaining creatures and .their properties and powers, but exciting each to act according to its nature. It is analogous to the general influence of the sun which affects different objects in different ways. The same solar ray softens wax and hardens clay. It calls the germinating force of all seeds into action, but does not determine the nature of that action. All seeds are thus quickened ; but one develops as wheat, another as barley, not because of the solar force, but because of its own peculiar nature. This is all that the Franciscans and Jesuits among the Romanists, and the Remonstrants among the Protes- tants allow. The Thomists and Dominicans among the former, and the Augustinian theologians generally, insist that, besides this general concursus^ there is also a previous, simultaneous, and deter- mining concourse of the first, in all second causes, both in the cause and in the effect ; that is, not only exciting to action, but sustaining, guiding, and determining the act ; so that its being as it is, and not otherwise, is to be referred to the first, and not to the second cause in every case. .On this point, however, the Reformed theologians are not agreed, as Turrettin admits. " Ex nostris," ho says, " quidam concursum tantum praevium volunt quoad bona opera gratias, sed in aliis omnibus simultaneum sufficere existimant." ^ By previous concursus is meant, he says, " Actio Dei, qua in causas earumque principia influendo, creaturas excitat, et agendum pr?e- movet, et ad hoc potius quam ad illud agendum applicat. Simul- taneus vero est per quam Deus actionem creaturse, quoad suam en- titatem, vel substantiam producit ; quo una cum creaturis in earura actiones et effectus influere ponitur, non vero in creaturas ipsas."
1 Quenstedt, Theohgia, cap. xiii. i. 15, edit. Leipzig, 1715, vol. i. p. 760.
2 Ibid. cap. XIII. ii. 3, vol. i. p. 782. 8 Locus vi. queest. v. 8 * Locus VI. quaest. v. 5.
600 PAKT I. -THEOLOGY. [Ch. XI. — Providenck.
It is admitted that these do not differ really, " quia concursus si- multaneus, nihil aliud est, quam concursus prgevius continuatus." This previous concursus is also called predetermining. " Id ipsum etiam nomine Prsedeterminationis, sen Praemotionis solet designari, qua Deus ciet et applicat causam secundam ad agendum, adeoque antecedenter ad omnem operationem creature, seu prius natura et ratione quam creatura operetur, eam realiter et efficaciter mcj>/et ad agendum in singulis actionibus, adeo ut sine hac praemotione causa secunda operari non possit, ea vero posita impossibile sit in sensu composito causam secundam non illud idem agere ad quod a prima causa pramovetur." ^
Concursus, therefore, assumes, (1.) That God gives to second causes the power of acting. (2.) That He preserves them in being and vigour. (3.) That He excites and determines second causes to act. (4.) That He directs and governs them to the predeter- mined end. All this, however, was so understood that —
1. The effect produced or the act performed is to be referred to the second, and not to the first cause. When the fire burns, it is to the fire, and not to God that the effect is to be attributed. When a man speaks, it is the man, and not God who utters the words. When the moon raises the tidal wave, and the wave dashes a ves- sel on the shore, the effect is to be attributed, not to the moon, but to the momentum of the wave. The force of gravity acts uni- formly on all ponderable matter, and yet that force may be indefi- nitely varied in the effects which are produced by intervening causes, whether necessary or free.
2. The doctrine of concursus does not deny the efficiency of sec- ond causes. They are real causes, having a principium agendi in themselves.
3. The agency of God neither supersedes, nor in any way inter- feres with the efficiency of second causes. " Ad providentiam di- vinam non pertinet, naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare : unde omnia raovet secundum eorum conditionem : ita quod ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam consequuntur effectus ex neces- sitate ; ex causis autem contingentibus sequuntur effectus contin- gentes. Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non deter- minatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus ejus contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur." ^ "Concurrit Deus cum naturalibus ad
1 Turrettin, locus vi. quaest. v. 6.
2 Aquinas, Summa, part n. i. qusest. x. art 4, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 22 of second set.