modum causae naturalis, cum causis liberis per modum causae li- berae." ^ " Duo sunt causarum genera, alias definitae et generales, quse eodem modo semper agunt, ut ignis qui urit, sol qui lucet ; aliae indefinitse et liberas, quae possunt agere vel non agere, hoc vel illo modo agere : ita Deus naturam earum conservat, et cum illis juxta eam in agendo concurrit ; cum definitis, ut ipse eas deter- minet sine determinatione propria ; cum indefinitis vero et liberis, ut ipsae quoque se determinent proprio rationis judicio, et libera vo- luntatis dispositione, quam Deus non aufert homini, quia sic opus suum destrueret, sed relinquit et confirmat." ^ To the same effect the " Westminster Confession " ^ says : God ordereth events " to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessa- rily, freely, or contingently."
4. From this it follows that the efficiency or agency of God is not the same in relation to all kinds of events. It is one thing in cooperating with material causes, another in cooperating with free agents. It is one thing in relation to good acts, and another in relation to evil actions ; one thing in nature, and another in grace.
5. The divine concur sus is not inconsistent with the liberty of free agents. " Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, id est, a prin- ciple intrlnseco. Sed illud principium iritrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se, non repugnat ei, quod movetur ab alio. — Illud quod movetur ab altero, dicitur cogi, si moveatur contra inclinationem propriam : sed si moveatur ab alio quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi. Sic igitur Deus movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam : quia dat ei ejus pro- priam inclinationem." * This is undoubtedly true. Nothing is more certain from Scripture than that God is the author of faith and repentance. They are his gifts. They* are blessings for which we pray, and which He promises. Yet nothing is more cer- tain from consciousness, than that faith and repentance are our own free acts. Therefore moveri ab alio is not inconsistent with moveri ex se. On this point Turrettin ^ says : " Cum providentia non concurrat cum voluntate humana, vel per coactionem, cogendo vo- luntatem invitam, vel determinando physice, ut rem brutam et •^aecam absque ullo judicio, sed rationaliter, flectendo voluntatem modo ipsi convenienti, ut seipsam determinet, ut causa proxima ac- tionum suarum proprio rationis judicio, et spontanea voluntatis
1 Quenstedt, cap. xiii. i. 15, vol. i. p. 761.
2 Turrettin, locus vi. qusest. vi. 6, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 460. 8 Chap. V. sect. 2.
■• Aquinas, Summa, part i. quaest. cv. art. 4, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 192 » Locus VI. qusestio v . 7.
602 PART I — THEOLOGY. [Ch. XI. — Providence.
electione ; earn libertati nostrae nullam vim inferre, sed illam potius amice fovere."
6. All the advocates of the doctrine of concursus admit that the gi-eat tSifficulty attending it is in reference to sin. The difficulty here is not so much in relation to the responsibility of the sinner. If sin be his own act, and if the divine concursus does not interfere with his freedom, it does not interfere with his responsibility. When God by his grace determines the will of his people to holy acts, the holiness is theirs. It constitutes their character. When God gives a man beauty, he is beautiful. And if his cooperation in the sins of men leaves their freedom in sinning unimpaired, they are as truly sinful as though no such cooperation existed. This is not the difficulty. The real question is, how can God's cooperation in sin be reconciled with his own holiness ? We can easily see how God can cooperate in good acts, and rejoice in the goodness which is his gift ; but how can He so concur in sinful acts as not only to preserve the sinner in the exercise of his ability to act, but also to excite to action, and determine his act to be what it is, and not otherwise ? This difficulty was, as has been remarked, freely ac- knowledged. It was met by defining sin as mere defect. It is a want of conformity to the moral law. As such it requires not an efficient, but only a deficient cause. God is the source immedi- ately or remotely of all efficiency, but is not the source of mere deficiency. In every sinful act, therefore, there was distinguished the act as an act requiring an efficient cause ; and the moi'al qual- ity of that act, or its want of conformity to law, a mere relation, which is not an ens, and therefore is in no way to be referred to God. This is the answer to this objection given by Augustine, and repeated from his day to this. Aquinas ^ says : " Quicquid est entitatis et actionis in actioiie mala, reducitur in Deura sicut in causam : sed quod est ibi defectus non causatur a Deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente." Quenstedt ^ says : " Distinguendura inter effectum et defectum, inter actionem et actionis dra^tav. Ef- fectus et actio est a Deo, non vero defectus et ara^ia siv& inordinatio et exorbitatio actionis. Ad effi?ctum Deus concurrit, vitium non causat, non enim in agendo deficit aut errat, sed causa secunda." Bucan ^ says: " Malorum opera quoque decernit et regit. Tamen non est autor mali, quia mali sic aguntur a Deo, ut sponte, libera et sine coactione et impulsu violento agant. Deinde non infundit
1 Summa, part i. quest, xlix. art. 2, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 95.
2 Tkeologia, cap. xiii. i. 15, vol. i. p. 761.
8 Bucan, Instiluliones Theologici, edit. Geneva, 1625, p. 143.
S 8, E j GOVERNMENT. 603
malitiam sicut bonitatem, nee irapellit aut alHcit ad peccandum." To the same eiFect Turrettin ^ says : " Cum actus qua talis semper bonus sit quoad entita'tem suam, Deus ad ilium concurrit effective, et physice. . . . (quoad malitiam) Deus nee causa physica potest ejus dici, quia nee illam inspirat aut infundit, nee facit ; nee ethica, qui nee imperat, aut approbat et suadet, sed severissime prohibet et punit." As the same solar influence quickens into life all kinds of plants, whether nutritious or poisonous ; as the same current of water may be guided in one channel or another ; as the same vital force animates the limbs of the sound man' and of the cripple ; as the same hand may sweep the keys, of an instrument when in tune and when out of tune : so it is urged that the same divine effi- ciency sustains and animates all free agents. That they act at all is due to the divine efficiency, but the particular nature of their acts (at least when evil) is to be referred, not to that all-pervading efficiency of God, but to the nature or character of each particular agent. That God controls and governs wicked men, determines their wickedness to take one form, and not another, and guides it to manifestations which will pi'omote good rather than evil, is not inconsistent with the holiness of God. He did not infuse envy and hatred into the hearts of Joseph's brethren, but He guided the ex- ercise of those evil passions, so as to secure the preservation of Jacob and the chosen seed from destruction.
Remarks on the Doctrine of Ooncursus. The above statement of the doctrine of ooncursus is designed merely to give the views generally entertained by Augustinians, as to the nature of God's providential government. Whether those views are correct or not, it is important that they should be under- stood. It is very evident that there is a broad distinction between this theory of ooncursus and the theory which resolves all events, whether necessary or free, into the immediate agency of God. The points of difference between the two theories are, (1.) That the one admits and the other denies the reality and efficiency of second causes. (2.) The one makes no distinction between free and necessary events, attributing them equally to the almighty and creative energy of God ; the other admits the validity and un- speakable importance of this distinction. (3.) The one asserts nnd the other denies that the agency of God is the same in sinful acts that it is in good acts. (4.) The one admits that God is the author of sin, the other repudiates that doctrine with abhorrence.
I Locus VI. qusestio vii. 3, 4, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 462.
604 PART L— THEOLOGY. [Ch. XI. — Providence