The Reformed theologians protested against the aspersion freely made by Romanists, and afterwards by the Remonstrants, that the Augustinian doctrine led by any fair process of reasoning to the conclusion that God is the cause of sin. They quote from their opponents admissions which involve all that they themselves teach in reference to the agency of God in the wicked acts of men. Thus Bellarmin, who freely brings this objection against the Prot- estants, himself says, ^ " Deus non solum permittit impios agere multa mala, nee solum deserit pios ut cogantur pati quae ab impiis inferuntur ; sed etiam prsesidet ipsis voluntatibus malis, easque regit et gubemat, torquet ac flectit in eis invisibiHter operando, ut licet vitio proprio malae sint, tamen a divina providentia ad unum potius malum, quam ad aliud, non positive sed permissive ordinen- tur." As to this passage, Turrettin says, " Quibus verbis nihil durius apud nostros occurrit." Bellarmin also quotes ^ and adopts the language of Aquinas when he says, " Deum non solum incli- nare voluntates malas ad unum potius, quam ad aliud permittendo, ut ferantur in unum, et non permittendo, ut ferantur in aliud, ut Hugo recte docuit, sed etiam positive inclinando in unum et aver- tendo ab alio." It is of importance, not only as a matter of histor- ical truth, but also for its moral influence, that the fact should be distinctly known and recognized that the Reformed theologians, with all Augustinians before and after tlie Reformation, earnestly re- jected the doctrine that God is the author or the efficient cause of sin. The objection to the doctrine of concursus is not that it inten- tionally or really destroys the free agency of man ; or that it makes God the author of sin, but (1.) That It is founded on an arbitrary and false assumption. It denies that any creature can originate action. Tiiis does not admit of proof It is an inference from the assumed nature of the dependence of the creature upon the creator ; or from the assumed necessity of the principle in question, in order to secure the absolute control of God over cre- ated beings. It however contradicts the consciousness of men. That we are free agents means that we have the power to act freely ; and to act freely implies that we originate our own acts. This does not mean that it is inconsistent with our liberty that we should be moved and induced to exert our ability to act by consid- erations addressed to our reason or inclinations, or by the grace of God ; but it does mean, that we have the power to act. The power of spontaneous action is essential to the nature of a spirit ; and God, in creating us in his own nature as spirits, endowed us
1 De Amissione Gratim et Statu Peccati, ii. xiii. edit. Paris, 1608, p. 132. ^ Jbid,