a sufficient reason why it is, and is as it is." The efficiency of the agent, therefore, is not a sufficient reason for tlie volition being as it is. It is inconceivable that an undetermined cause sliould act one wav rather than another ; and if it does act thus without a sufficient reason, its action can be neither rational nor moral.
Another common method of answering this argument is to assume that because the advocates of certainty say that the will is determined by motives, and therefore, that the motives are tlie cause why the volition is as it is, they mean that the efficiency to which the volition is due is in the motives, and not in the agent. Thus Stewart says, " The question is not concerning the influence of motives, but concerning the nature of that influence. The ad- vocates for necessity [certainty] re])resent it as the influence of a cause in producing its effect. The advocates for liberty acknowledge that the motive is the occasion for acting, or the reason for acting ; but contend that it is so far from being the efficient cause of it, that it supposes the efficiency to reside elsewhere, namely, in the mind of the agent." ^ This representation has been sufficiently answered above. Motives are not the efficient cause of the volition ; that efficiency resides in the agent ; but what we, " by a necessary mental law," must demand, is a sufficient reason why the agent exerts his efficiency in one way rather than another. To refer us simply to his efficiency, is to leave the demand for a sufficient rea- son entirely unsatisfied ; in other words, it is to assume that there may be an effect without a cause ; which is impossible.
The doctrine of free agency, therefore, which underlies the Bible, which is involved in the consciousness of every rational being, and which is assumed and acted on by all men, is at an equal remove, on the one hand, from the doctrine of physical or mechanical necessity, which precludes the possibility of liberty and responsibility; and, on the other, from the doctrine of contin- gency, which assumes tliat an act in oi'der to be free must be un- certain ; or that the will is self-determined, acting independently of tlie reason, conscience, inclinations and feelings. It teaches that a man is a free and responsible agent, because he is author of his oAvn acts, and because he is determined to act by nothing out of himself, but by his own views, convictions, inclinations, feelings, and dispositions, so that his acts are the true products of the man, and really represent or reveal what he is. The profonndt-st of mod- ern autliors admit that this is the true theory of liberty ; but some
1 Philosophy of the Moral Powers, ii. Appendix (§ 4) ; Works, Hamilton's edition. Edin- burgh, 1855, vol. vj. p. 370.
308 PART n. Ch. Vni. - FREE AGENCY.
of them, as for example Muller, in his elaborate work on " Sin," maintain that in order to render man justly responsible for the acts which are thus determined by their internal state or character, that state must itself be self-produced. This doctrine has already been sufficiently discussed when treating of original sin. It may, however, be here remarked, in conclusion of the present discussion, that the principle assumed is contrary to the common judgment of men. That judgment is that the dispositions and feelings which constitute character derive their morality or immorality from their nature, and not from their origin. Malignity is evil and love is good, whether concreated, innate, acquired, or infused. It may be difficult to reconcile the doctrine of innate evil dispositions Avith the justice and goodness of God, but that is a difficulty which does not pertain to this subject. A malignant being is an evil being, if endowed with reason, whether he was so made or so born. And a benevolent rational being is good in the universal judgment of men, whether he was so created or so born. We admit that it is repugnant to our moral judgments that God should create an evil being ; or that any being should be born in a state of sin, unless his being so born is the consequence of a just judgment. But this has nothing to do with the question whether moral dispositions do not owe their character to their nature. The common judgment of men is that they do. If a man is really humble, benevolent, a.id holy, he is so regarded, irrespective of all inquiry how he became so.
A second remark on the principle above stated, is, that it is not only opposed to the common judgment of men, but that it is also contrary to the faith of the whole Christian Church. We trust that this language will not be attributed to a self-confident or dogmatic spirit. We recognize no higher standard of truth apart from the infallible word of God, than the teachings of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the faith of the people of God. It is beyond dispute the docti-ine of the Church universal, that Adam was created holy ; that his moral character was not self-acquired. It is no less the doctrine of the universal Church, that men, since the fall, are born unholy ; and it is also included in the faith of all Christian Churches, that in regeneration men are made holy, not by their own act, but by the act of God. In other words, the doctrines of original right- eousness, of original sin, and of regeneration by the Spirit of God, are, and ever have been the avowed doctrines of the Greek, Latin, and Protestant Churches: and if these doctrines are, as these Churches all believe, contained in the word of God, then it cannot