The Argument from Consciousness. A third argnnieiit on this subject is derived from consciousness. It is conceded tliat every man is conscious of hberty in his volun- tary acts. It is conceded further that this consciousness proves the fact of free agency. Tiie validity of this argument uT'ged by tiie advocates of contingency against the doctrine of necessity in any such form as involves a denial of this fact of consciousness, we fully admit. The doctrine opposed by Reid and Stewart, as well as by many continental writers, was really a doctrine which denied both the liberty and responsibility of man. This is not the Augustiniaii or Edwardean doctrine, although unhappily both are expressed by the same terms. The one is the doctrine of physical or mechanical necessity ; the other that of certainty. As between the advocates of the latter theory and the defenders of contingency, it is agreed that man is a free agent ; it is further agreed that it is included in the consciousness of free agency, that we are efficient and respon- sible authors of our own acts, that we had the power to perform or not to perform any voluntary act of which we were the authors. But we maintain that we are none the less conscious that this in- timate conviction that we had power not to perform an act, is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might have been otherwise had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been allowed their due weight. No man is conscious of a power to will against his will ; that is, the will, in the narrow sense of the word, cannot be against the will in the wide sense of the term. This is only saying, that a man cannot prefer against his preference or choose against his choice. A volition is a prefer- ence resulting in a decision. A man may have one preference at one time and another at another. He may have various conflicting ieelings or principles in action at the same time ; biat he cannot have coexisting opposite preferences. What consciousness teaches on this subject seems to be simply this : that in every voluntary act we had some reason for acting as we did ; that in the absence of that reason, or in the presence of others, which others we may feel ono-ht to have been present, we should or could have acted differ- ently. Under the reasons for an act are included all that is meant by the word motives, in the subjective sense of the term ; i. e.y principles, inclinations, feelings, etc. We cannot conceive that a man can be conscious that, with liis principles, feelings, and in- clinations being one way, his will may be another way. A man filled with the fear of God, or with the love of Christ, cannot will
304 PART II. Ch. IX. — free agency.
to blaspheme his God or Saviour. That fear or love constitute? for the time being tlie man. He is a man existing in that state, and if his acts do not express that state they are not liis.
Argument from the Moral Character of Volitions.
This suogests a fourth argument on this subject. Unless the will bo dotermined by the previous state of the mind, in opposition to beina; seU'-determined, there can be no morality in our acts. A man is responsible for his external acts, because they are decided by his will ; he is responsible for his volitions, because they are determined by his principles and feelings ; he is resjwnsible for his principles and feelings, because of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own, and constitute his character. If yon detach the outward act from the will it ceases to have any moral character. If I kill a man, unless the act was intentional, i. e., the result of a vohtion to kill or injure, there is no morality in the act. If I willed to kill, then the character of the act depends on the motives which determined the volition. If those motives were a regard to the authority of God, or of the demands of justice legally expressed, the volition was right. If the motive was malice or cupidity, the volition and consequent act were wrong. It is obvious that if the will be self-determined, independent of the previous state of the mind, it has no more character than tlie out- ward act detached from the volition, — it does not reveal or express anything in the mind. If a man when filled with pious feeling can will the most impious acts; or, when filled with enmity to God, have the volitions of a saint, then his volitions and acts have nothing to do with the man himself. They do not express his character, and he cannot be responsible for them.
Argument from the Rational Nature of Man.
The doctrine that the will is determined and not self-determined, is moreover involved in the rational character of our acts. A rational act is not merely an act performed by a rational being, but one performed for a reason, whether good or bad. An act performed without a reason, without intention or object, for which no reason t-an be assigned beyond the mere power of acting, is as irrational as the actions of a brute or of an idiot. If the will therefore ever acts independently of the understanding and of the feelings, its volitions ai-e not the acts of a rational being any further than they would be if reason were entirely dethroned. The only true idea of liberty is that of a being acting in accordance with the laws of
§3.] CERTAINTY CONSISTENT WITH LIBERTY. 30o
its nature. So long as an animal is allowed to act under tlie control of its own nature, determined in all it does by what is within itself, it has all the liberty of which it is capable. And so long as a niarv is determined in his volitions and acts by his own reason and feelings he has all the liberty of which he is capable. But if you detach the acts of an animal from its inward state its liberty is gone. It becomes possessed. And if the acts of a man are not determined by his reason and feelings he is a puppet or a maniac.
The doctrine that the will acts independently of the previous state of the mind supposes that our volitions are isolated atoms, springing up from the abyss of the capricious self-determination of the will, from a source beyond the control or ken of reason. They are purely casual, arbitrary, or capricious. They have no connection with the past, and give no promise of the future. On this hypothesis there can be no such thing as character. It is, however, a fjxct of experience universally admitted, that there are such things as prin- ciples or dispositions which control the will. We feel assured that an honest man will act honestly, and that a benevolent man will act benevolently. We are moreover assured that these principles may be so strong and fixed as to render the volitions absolutely certain. "Rational beings,'' says Reid, "in proportion as they are wise and good, will act according to the best motives ; and every rational being who does otherwise, abuses his liberty. The most perfect being, in everything where there is a right and a wrong, a better and a worse, always infallibly acts according to the best motives. This, indeed, is little else than an identical proposition ; for it is a contradiction to say, that a perfect being does what is wrong or unreasonable. But to say that he does not act freely, because he always does what is best, is to say, that the proper use of liberty destroys liberty, and that liberty consists only in its abuse." ^ That is, the character determines the act; and to say that the infallible certainty of acts destroys their freedom is to make " liberty destroy liberty." Though Reid and Stewart wrote ao;ainst Leibnitz and Edwards as well as against Hobbes and Belsham, the sentences above quoted contain the whole doctrine of the two former distinguished men, and of their innumerable predecessors, associates, and followers. It is the doctrine that infallible certainty is consistent with liberty. This conviction is so wrought into the minds of men that they uniformly, unconsciously as well as consciously, act upon it. They assume that a man's volitions are determined by motives. They take for granted that
1 Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 4i Works, p. 609. VOL. II. 20
306 PART 11. Cn. IX. — FREE AGE]SCY.
there is sucli a thing as character ; and tlierefore they endeavour to moukl the character of those under their influence, assured that if they make the tree good the fruit will be good. They do not act on the principle that the acts of men are capricious, that the will is self-determined, acting without or against motives as well as with them ; so that it must always and forever remain uncertain how it will decide.
Argument from the Doctrine of a Sufficient Cause.