Faith not to be regarded as simply a Christian Grraee.
No less unsatisfactory are those descriptions of faith which regard it only in its character as a Christian and saving grace. Delitzsch, for example,1 describes faith as the most central act of our being ; the return to God, the going out of our inner life to Him. " This longing after God's free, merciful love, as his own Word declares it, — a longing, reaching forth, and grasping it ; this naked, unselfish craving, feeling itself satisfied with nothing else than God's promised grace ; this eagerness, absorbing every ray of light that proceeds from God's reconciled love ; this con- vinced and safety-craving appropriation and clinging to the word of grace ; — this is faith. According to its nature, it is the pure receptive correlative of the word of promise ; a means of approach- ing again to God, which, as the word itself, is appointed through the distance of God in consequence of sin ; for faith has to con- fide in the word, in spite of all want of comprehension, want of sight, want of experience. No experimental actus reflexi belong to the nature of faith. It is, according to its nature, actio directa, to wit, fiducia supplex." All this is doubtless true of the believer. He does thus long after God, and appropriate the assurance of his love, and cling to his promises of grace ; but faith has a wider range than this. There are exercises of faith not included in this description, recorded in Scripture, and especially in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews.
Erdmann2 says that religious faith, the faith on which the Scriptures lay so much stress, is, " Bewusstseyn der Versohnung mit Gott, consciousness of reconciliation with God.'* He insists that faith cannot be separated from its contents. It is not the man who holds this or that to be true, who is a believer ; but the man who is convinced of a specific truth, namely, that he is reconciled with God. Calling faith a consciousness is not a definition of its nature. And limiting it to a consciousness of reconciliation with God is contrary to the usage of Scripture and of theology
Definitions of Faith founded on its Subjective Nature.
The more common and generally received definitions of faith, may perhaps* be reduced to three classes, all of which include the general idea of persuasion of the truth. But some seek the dis-
* Biblical Psychology, p. 174.
2 Vorlesungen tiber Gktuben und Wissen, von Johann Eduard Erdmann, Berlin, 1837, p. 30.
46 PART III. Ch. XVI. — FAITH.
tinguishing character of faith in its subjective nature; others, in the nature of its object ; others, in the nature of the evidence, or ground on which it rests.
Faith as distinguished from Opinion and Knowledge. To the first of these classes belong the following definitions : Faith or belief is said to be a persuasion of the truth stronger than opinion, and weaker than knowledge. Metaphysicians di- vide the objects of our cognitions into the possible, the real, and the necessary. With regard to the merely possible we can form only conjectures, or opinions, more or less plausible or probable. With regard to things which the mind with greater or less confi- dence views as certain, although it cannot justify that confidence to itself or others, i. e., cannot demonstrate the certainty of the object, it is said to believe. What it is perfectly assured of, and can demonstrate to be true so as to coerce conviction, it is said to know. Thus Locke defines faith to be the assent of the mind to propositions which are probably, but not certainly true. Bailey 1 says, "I propose to confine it [belief or faith] first, to the effect on the mind of the premises in what is termed probable reason- ing, or what I have named contingent reasoning — in a word the premises in all reasoning, but that which is demonstrative ; and secondly, to the state of holding true when that state, far from being the effect of any premises discerned by the mind, is disso- ciated from all evidence." To believe is to admit a thing as true, according to Kant, on grounds sufficient subjectively, insuffi- cient objectively. Or, as more fully stated, " Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid) has the three fol- lowing degrees: opinion, belief, and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as object- ively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and ob- jectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all)."2 Erdmann 3 says, " Man versteht unter Glauben eine jede Gewiss- heit, die geringer ist als das Wissen, und etwa starker ist als ein blosses Meinen oder Fiirmoglichhalten (z. B. ich glaube, dass es
1 Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, London, 1855, pp. 75, 76.
2 Meiklejohn's Translation of Critic of Pure Reason, London, 1855, p. 498. 8 Glauben und Wissen, Berlin, 1837, p. 29.