heute regnen wird)." " By faith is understood any persuasion which is weaker than knowledge, but somewhat stronger than a mere deeming possible or probable, as, e. g., I believe it will rain to-day." This he gives as the commonly accepted meaning of the word, although he utterly repudiates it as a definition of re- ligious faith.
It is urged in support of this definition of faith that with re- gard to everything of which we are not absolutely sure, and yet are persuaded or convinced of its truth, we say we believe. Thus with respect to things remembered ; if the recollection is indis- tinct and uncertain, we say we think, e. #., we think we saw a certain person at a given time and place ; we are not sure, but such is our impression. If our persuasion of the fact be stronger, we say we believe it. If we have, and can have, no doubt about it, we say we know it. In like manner the testimony of our senses may be so weak as to produce only a probability that the thing is as it appears ; if clearer, it produces a belief more or less decided ; if so clear as to preclude all doubt, the effect is knowl- edge. If we see a person at a distance, and we are entirely un- certain who it is, we can only say we think it is some one whom we know. If that persuasion becomes stronger, we say, we be- lieve it is he. If perfectly sure, we say, we know it. In all these cases the only difference between opinion, belief, and knowl- edge, is their relative strength. The objects are the same, their relation to the mind is the same, and the ground or evidence on which they severally rest is of the same kind. It is said that it would be incorrect to say, " We believe that we slept in our house last night ; " if perfectly sure of the fact. If a witness in a court of justice simply says, " I believe I was at a certain place at a given time," his testimony would be of no value. He must be able to say that he is sure of the fact — that he knows it.
Objections to this Definition.
Of this definition of faith, it may be remarked, — 1. That the meaning which it assigns to the word is certainly legitimate, sustained by established usage. The states of mind expressed by the words, I think a thing to be true ; I believe it ; I know it, are distinguished from each other simply by the differ- ent degrees of certainty which enter into them respectively. The probable ground of this use of the word to believe, is, that there is more of the element of trust (or a voluntarily giving to evi- dence a greater influence on the mind than of necessity belongs
48 PART III. Ch. XVI. — FAITH.
to it), manifest in our consciousness, than is expressed by saying, we think, or, we know. However this may be, it cannot be denied that the word belief often expresses a degree of conviction greater than opinion and less than knowledge.
2. But this is not the distinguishing characteristic of faith, or its differentia. There are exercises of faith into which this un- certainty does not enter. Some of the strongest convictions of which the mind is capable are beliefs. Even our assurance of the veracity of consciousness, the foundation of all other convic- tions, is of the nature of faith. So the primary truths which are, and must be assumed in all our researches and arguments, are beliefs. They are taken on trust. They cannot be proved. If any man denies them, there is nothing more to be said. He can- not be convinced. Sir William Hamilton l says, " St. Austin accurately says, * We know what rests upon reason ; we believe what rests upon authority.' But reason itself must at last rest upon authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid pro- priety, beliefs or trusts. Thus it is that, in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud Intellige ut credas of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble Crede ut intelligas of Anselm." i
The same is true in other spheres. The effect on the mind produced by human testimony is universally recognized as faith. If that testimony is inadequate it does not preclude doubt ; but it may be so strong as to make all doubt impossible. No sane man can doubt the existence of such cities as London and Paris. But to most men that existence is not a matter of knowledge either intuitive or discursive. It is something taken on trust, on the authority of others ; which taking on trust is admitted by philos- ophers, theologians, and the mass of men, to be a form of faith. Again, in some moral states of mind a man's conviction of the reality of a future state of reward and punishment is as strong as his belief in his own existence, and much stronger than his confi- dence in the testimony of his senses. And yet a future state of existence is not a matter of knowledge. It is an object of faith, or a thing believed. We accordingly find that the Scriptures teach that there is a full assurance of faith; a faith which pre-
» Reid's Works; edit Edinburgh, 1849, note A, § 5, p. 760 b.