THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
tions, one in Silesia organized in 1864, and one in the Rhenish and Westphalian region founded three years later. Its staff includes about 1,500 sisters of mercy and a smaller number of brethren. The Knights of St. George are a Bavarian order founded in 1729 and reorganized in 1871. Non-religious bodies are the Associations for the Care of the Wounded and Sick in War of which the first was founded in Wiirttemberg in 1863, followed within five years by others in all the principal German states. In 1886 a movement was set on foot for the organization of voluntary associations for the care of the sick under the auspices of Johann Wichern, director of the Rauhes Haus, whose exertions resulted in the establishment of branches throughout Germany and the creation of a body of 2,200 trained nurses with a reserve of almost double that number. The organic law conditioning the existence and character of all these associations is the sanitary ordinance of Jan. 10, 1878. For Red Cross Societies
see the article on that subject; see also PEacE
MOVEMENTS. (THEODORE SCHAFER.)
BrsuioGRAPHY: The subject is sometimes treated in discussions on ethics, as in R. Rothe, Hthik, §§ 1159-62, Wittenberg, 1869, and H. L. Martensen, Die christliche Ethik, iii. 280-292, Berlin, 1871, Eng. transl., Edinburgh, 1882. The reverse of this subject with its appropriate bibliography is presented in the article Peace MovEMENTS. Consult further: G. W. MacCree, The Sword and the Olive, London, 1881; J. F. Bethune-Baker, Influence of Christianity on War, Cambridge, 1888; M. Jaehns, Ueber Krieg, Frieden und Kultur, Berlin, 1893; A. F. Hamon, Psychologie du militaire professionnel, Brussels, 1894; Y. A. Novikov, La Guerre et ses prétendus bienfaits, Paris, 1894; M. Anitchkow, Krieg und Arbeit, Berlin, 1900, Eng. transl., War and Labour, Westminster and New York, 1900; J. J. Green, War. Is it Consistent with Christianity ? London, 1901; W. Walsh, The Moral Damage of War, London, 1902, new ed., Boston, 1909; J. Barr, Christianity and War, Glasgow, 1903; K. Blutharsch, Die Ursache der Vilkerkriege und die Grundlage fiir die Weltfrieden, Stuttgart, 1905; T. Kattenbusch, Das sittliche Recht des Krieges, Giessen, 1906; D. L. Dodge, War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ, new ed., Boston, 1910.
WAR, HEBREW.
I. The Army. II. Arms and Weapons. Primitive Conditions (§ 1). Offensive and Defensive Armor The Standing Army (§ 2). Says
The Personnel and Pay (§ 3).
I. The Army: Not till the royal period did the Hebrews possess a standing army, but from a much earlier time every male adult able to fight was liable to call for field service. Bedouins either on a raid
or when attacked expect the help of
1. Primitive every member of the tribe. The state-
Conditions. ment in P (Num. i. 1-2, xxvi. 2) of
twenty years as the age when war
service may be required may express ancient custom and possibly tells the age at which men became members of the tribe with full rights. The Book of Judges describes conditions from this point of view. In case of an expedition for booty or conquest or of necessity for repelling attack the men capable of bearing arms assembled under a recognized head—the boldest of their number (Judges xi. 1 sqq.); in case the danger was great, messengers were sent to friendly tribes for help. An example of this last was Jabesh-gilead, the elders of which sent for help throughout Israel, when Saul made his stirring appeal and called for the people to come to the war (I Sam. xi. 3 sqq.). In case of victory, each man returned home with his booty. This method did not permit great wars and slaughter or great armies, but resembled the conditions under which at the present Bedouin raids occur. The numbers of men engaged were relatively small; Gideon had 300 men (Judges vii. 16), the Danites numbered 600 (Judges xvii. 11). Larger numbers are mentioned in the Song of Deborah (Judges v. 8, cf.iv. 14). But the methods which had sufficed against the Midianites were not adequate when the enemy was a warlike and relatively great and well-armed people like the Philistines. So Saul recognized the need of a standing army, and after the victory over the Ammonites in view of conflicts with the Philistines he retained 3,000 men under arms (I Sam. xiii. 1 sqq.), though it is not said that this was a permanent force. Yet he had a force as a body-guard, of which David was the leader (I Sam. xxii. 14), the
Branches of Service (§ 2). III. Fortresses. IV. The Conduct of War. V. Religious Significance of War.
| members of which were noted warriors, selected by
Saul from all Israel (I Sam. xiv. 52).
A step momentous in its consequences was the king’s assumption of appointment of the leaders, the people’s voice being no longer heard in the matter. While at first naturally the heads of the tribes
and such men were first chosen by
2. The Saul, his own interest led to the placing Standing in responsible positions of those known Army. to be true to him, eventually to mem-
bers of the royal household, as Jonathan (I Sam. xiii. 1 sqq.), and under David near relations like Joab, Abner, and Amasa. Saul sought to bind David to himself by giving him his daughter Michal. The body-guard had a place in history which was noteworthy. Under David it was 400 strong at Adullam (I Sam. xxii. 2), and a little later numbered 600 (I Sam. xxiii. 13); at the time of the Philistine fight (I Sam. xxviii. 1 sqq.) it must have been a formidable force, as the times then went. This force became David’s guard, known as “‘ heroes” and ‘‘ Cherethites and Pelethites” (I Kings i. 8, 38). The last designation has been taken to show that Philistines were in it; this is not certain, but David had a company of 600 under Ittai of Gath who were trustworthy in critical times (II Sam. xv. 19), and Benaiah was their general (II Sam. xxiii. 23). This body-guard was the kernel of David’s army; whether the standing army included more is not known. The Chronicler (I., xxvii. 1 sqq.) divides the whole army into twelve corps of 24,000 each, which served each one month; but the report is untrustworthy. Still, regular organization of the army under David is clear, since Joab’s office as general-in-chief was permanent. Considering the number and length of David’s wars, it is improbable that the entire force available was always under arms—such a condition was often unnecessary, and economic conditions would not permit it. The numbering of the people by David probably had mili-