Let our adversaries, therefore, dream as they please, that we deter- mine God to be an absolutely necessary agent when he is a most free one, and that his will is so circumscribed, by some kind of justice which we maintain, that he cannot will those things which, setting the consideration of that justice aside, would be free to him; for we acknowledge the Deity to be both a necessary and free agent, — necessary in respect of all his actions internally, or in respect of the persons in the Godhead towards one another. The Father ne- cessarily begets the Son, and loves himself As to these and suck like actions, he is of all necessary agents the most necessary. But in respect of the acts of the divine will which have their operations and effects upon external objects, he is an agent absolutely free, being one " who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will." But of these acts there are two kinds; for some are absolute, and admit no respect to any antecedent condition.
Of this kind is his purpose of creating the world, and in it rational creatures, properly adapted to know and obey the Creator, Benefac- tor, and Lord of all. In works of this kind God hath exercised the greatest liberty. His infinitely wise and infinitely free will is the fountain and origin of all things; neither is there in God any kind of justice, or any other essential attribute, which could prescribe any limits or measure to the divine will. But this decree of creating being supposed, the divine will undergoes a double necessity, so to speak, both in respect of the event and in respect of its manner of acting: for in respect of the event, it is necessary, from the immut- ability of God, that the world should be created ; and in resj)eet of the manner of doing it, that it should be done omnipotent!}'-, because God is essentially omnipotent, and it being once supposed that he wills to do any work without himself, he must do it omnipotontl}'. Yet, notwithstanding these considerations, iu the creation of the Avorld God was entirely a free agent ; he exercised will and under- standing in acting, although the choice of acting or not acting, and
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of acting in one particulai' way or another, is taken away by his im- mutability and omnipotence.
There is another kind of the acts of the divine will which could have no possible existence but upon a condition supposed.
This kind contains the egresses and exercise of those attributes which could not be exercised but upon a supposition of other ante- cedent acts, of which we have treated before. Of this kind are all the acts of the divine will in which justice, mercy, etc., exert their energy. But these attributes of the divine nature are either for the purpose of preserving or continuing to God what belongs to him of right, supposing that state of things which he hath freely appointed, or for bestowing on his creatures some farther good. Of the former kind is vindicatoi^y justice; Avhich, as it cannot be exercised but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being and of its sin, so, these being supposed, the supreme right and dominion of the Deity could not be preserved entire unless it were exercised. Of the latter kind is sparing mercy, by which God bestows an undeserved good on miserable creatures; for, setting aside the consideration of their misery, this attribute cannot be exercised, but that being supposed, if he be inclined to bestow any undeserved good on creatures wretch- ed through their own transgression, he may exercise this mercy if he will. But again ; in the exercise of that justice, although, if it were not to be exercised, according to our former hypothesis, God would cease from his right and dominion, and so would not be God, still he is a free and also an absolutely necessary agent ; for he acts from will and understanding, and not from an impetus of nature only, as fire burns. And he freely willed that state and condition of things; which being supposed, that justice must necessarily be exercised. Therefore, in the exercise of it he is not less free than in speaking; for supposing, as I said before, that his will were to speak any thing, it is necessary that he speak the truth. Those loud outcries, therefore, which the adversaries so unseasonably make against our opinion, as if it determined God to be an absolutely necessary agent, in his ope- rations ad eoctra, entirely vanisli and come to nought. But we will treat more fully of these things when we come to answer objections.
Finally, let it be observed that the nature of mercy and justice are different in respect of their exercise: for between the act of mercy and its object no natural obligation intervenes; for God is not bound to any one to exercise any act of mercy, neither is he bound to reward obedience, for this is a debt due from his natural right, and from the moral dependence of the rational creature, and indispensably thence arising. But between the act of justice and its object a natural obligation intervenes, arising from the indispensable subordination of the creature to God; which, supposing disobedience or sin, could not otherwise be secured than by juiuishment. Nor is