1. There are some attributes of Deity which, in order to their exercise, require no determined object antecedent to their egress; of this kind are wisdom and potuer. These attributes, at least as to their first exercise, must be entirely free, and dependent on the mere good pleasure of God only ; so that antecedent to their acting, the divine will is so indifferent as to every exercise of them, on objects without himself, that he might even will the opposite. But if we suppose that God wills to do any work without himself, he must act omnipotently and wisely.
There are, again, some attributes which can in no wise have an egress or be exercised withovit an object ])redotermined, and, as it were, by some circumstances prepared for them. Among these is punitive justice, for the exercise of which there would be no ground but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being and its having sinned ; but these being supposed, this justice must necessarily act according to its own rule.
2. But tliat rule is not any free act of the divine will, but a supreme, intrinsic, natural right of Deity, conjoined with wisdom, to which the entire exercise of this justice ought to be reduced. Those men entirely trifle, then, who, devising certain absurd conclu- sions of their own, annex them to a supposition of the necessity of punitive justice, as to its exercise: as, for instance, that God ought to
' The largest anchor in a vessel, used only in extreme danger, was so called. — Ed.
DISTINCTIONS RESPECTING JUSTICE. 609
punish sin to the full extent of his power, and that he ought to pimish every sin with eternal punishment; and that, therefore, he must preserve every creature that sins to eternity, and that he can- not do otherwise. I say they trifle, for God does not punish to the utmost extent of his potver, but so far as is just; and all modes and degrees of punishment are determined by the standard of the divine right and wisdom.
Whether that necessarily require that every sin shoidd be punished with eternal punishment, let those inquire who choose. " Nobis non licet esse tarn disertis."
3. But the existence of a rational creature, and the moral depen- dence which it has, and must have, upon God, being supposed, the first egress of this justice is in the constitution of a penal law; not as a law which, as was before observed, originates from the justice of government, but as a penal law.
For if such a law were not made necessarily, it might be possible that God should lose his natural right and dominion over his crea- tures, and thus he would not be God; or, that right being established, that the creature might not be subject to him, which implies a con- tradiction not less than if you were to say that Abraham is the father of Isaac, but that Isaac is not the son of Abraham : for in case of a failure in point of obedience (a circumstance which might happen, and really hath happened), that deiDendence could be continued in no way but through means of a vicarious punishment, and there must have been a penal law constituted necessarily requiring that punishment. Hence arises a secondary rnght of punishing, which extends to every amplification of that penal law, in whatever man- ner made. But it has a second egress, in the infliction of punish- ment.
4. And here it is to be remarked, that this justice necessarily respects j^^'nishment in general, as including in it the nature of punishment, and ordaining such a vindication of the divine honour as God can acquiesce in : not the time or degrees, or such like cir- cumstances of punishment, yea, not this or that species of punish- ment ; for it respects only the preservation of God's natural right and the vindication of his glory, both which may be done by punish- ment in general, however circumstanced. A dispensation, therefore, with punishment (especially temporary punishment), by a delay of time, an increase or diminution of the degree, by no means preju- diceth the necessity of the exercise of this justice, which only intends an infliction of punishment in general.
5. But, again, though we determine the egresses of this justice to be necessary, we do not deny that God exercises it freely; for that necessity doth not exclude a concomitant liberty, but only an ante- cedent indifference. This only we deny, — namely, that supposing a
510 A DISSEllTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PAUT I.
sinful creature, the will of God can be indifferent (by virtue of the punitive justice inherent in it) to inflict or not inflict punishment upon that creature, or to the volition of punishment or its opposite. The whole of Scripture, indeed, loudly testifies against any such in- difference, nor is it consistent with God's supreme right over his creatures; neither do they who espouse a different side contend with a single word brought from the Scriptures. But that God punishes sins with a concomitant liberty, because he is of all agents the most free, we have not a doubt. Thus, his intellectual will is carried to- wards happiness by an essential inclination antecedent to liberty, and notwithstanding it wills happiness ^ith a concomitant liberty: for to act freely is the very nature of the will ; yea, it must neces- sarily act freely.