Section 642 — A Dictionary of the Bible

friendship, and on the other = a bocly of friends (cf. Driver on Am 3'). It is used of a gathering for familiar converse (Jer 6" 15", in the latter of \vliieh the Sept. has (nviSpiOf), of a deliberative council (Job 15», Jer 23", Ps 89', in all these used of the Privy Council of the Almighty), of a secret com- pany of wicked men plotting evil (Ps 6*'), or of the select assembly of the upright (Ps 111', where nin is coupled with nnj, as it is in Gu 49' with Snj).

LiTERATTBB.— Schfirer. BJP II. il. 69 n. ; Driver. LOT lie, Drut. 188, 195, 2:i4 ; Thayer, A'T Lex. and Creiner, Bib.-Theol. Lex. s. ixKXrf"^ and iru»a>«»>-r ; Wellhaiisen, Camp, d- Uex. 206; Hort, diriitian Krdesia (1S97), 1-21 ; Vitrinjca, de Syn. Vet. 77 f. ; Trench, Syn. df AT, 1 i.\ Holzingcr, XA W (188(0. P- 106 If.

J. A. Selbie. CONIAH.— See Jehoiachin.

CONJECTURE. — Only Wis 8» '[Wisdom] C" aright what is to come ' (eiVcifci). KV has 'divineth the things to come,' with ' c'"" ' in marg. But it is probable that in AV c'"' = ' divineth,' as Scot (1584), ' Conjecture unto me by thy familiar spirit.'

J. Hastings.

CONSCIENCE.— The word is not found in OT ; it occurs in Apocr., Wis 17" ' wickedness . . . being pressed with c, always forecasteth grievous things (awclinaii). Sir 14' ' Blessed is he whose c. hath not c.omlemned him' (ficci. KV 'soul'), and 2 Mac 6" ' they made a c. to help themselves ' {evKapCii (x"", 'tV 'scrupled'; cf. Pure has [1625], Pilgrimes, ii. 1276, ' They will . . . make more conscience to brcake a I'ast, than to commit a Murther'). In NT 32 times (KV 30 times, omit- ting Jn 8', and reading cvrijOdif I Co S') always for avydSrtaif, of which it is the invariable and a|)pro- riate tr. But mod. usage would prefer ' conscious- ness' in 1 Co 8' 'some with c. of the idol unto lliit hour eat it as a thing olVercd unto an idol' (KV with edd. reads ari-riOtlgi, hence ' hi'ing n.^ed until now to the idol ') ; and in He 10' ' no more c. of sins.' Cf. Milton, Par. Lost, viii. 502 —

* Uer virtue and the conscience of her worth.'

See Sanday-Headlara on Uo 2"> ; P. Ewald, De Vorui 2i/>'«i5i)irecjs apud Script. NT ('» nc potrstatl (1883) ; and the next article. J. Hastings.

468

CONSCIENCE

CONSCIENCE—

A. Historical Sketch.

B. Christian Doctrine.

i. The Nature of Conscience, ii. The Competence of Conscience. uL Tile Education of Conscience.

1. Social.

2. Imiividual.

Iv. The Witness of Conscience.

A. Historical SKETCn.—yfhen man begins to reflect on his experience as a moral agent, two questions emerge. (1) Wliat is the highest good for man ? What is the ' chief end ' in attain- ment of which man finds satisfaction ? (2) What is the source of moral obligation? What power commands and regulates human action ? In the history of thought, these two questions occur in the order stated ; and it is not till the second has been asked that a doctrine of conscience is possible.

1. Greek philosophy in its prime is mainly con- cerned with the first of these. The ethics of Plato and Aristotle are largely occupied \vith discussing the nature of the Good ; and practically their doc- trine amounts to this, that man finds his highest welfare in the duties of citizenship. Man is regarded as part of the pnysical and social world in which he finds himself ; and his welfare lies in playing his due part therein. This doctrine was sufficient as long as the Greek State lasted. When this was broken up, however, and there was no longer a life of free and ennobling activity open to men, the moral problem assumed the second form. Man is thrust back on himself. His indiriiuality becomes emphasized over against the world, in which he can now no longer realize himself. Turning in upon himself, he seeks within the guidance he has hitherto found in the life which waited for him without. This type of mind, so char- acteristic of thoughtful and earnest men under the Roman Empire, finds e.xpression in the philo- sophical doctrines of the Stoics and Epicureans. These are as intensely subjective as the systems of Plato and Aristotle "had been comprehensive and objective. Not, therefore, till man has become aware of himself as an individual, and looks out on life from the standpoint of his subjectivity, does the question of the rule of conduct clearly emerge. In discussing this question, the Stoics found the rule in reason, the Epicureans in sense. The Stoics made wide the opposition between reason and sense. Virtue, according to them, is reasonableness, and is exercised in absolute control of sense, utter indillerence to material things, and austere rejection of pleasure. Noble things are said by them in praise of virtue, and eloquent testimony is borne against the views of a corrupt age. But by their own admission the leading principle of their thought and action is sublime but powerless. The moral world needed an active principle which should regenerate character and reconstitute society. This power came with Christianity.