3. After the varied Christian life of the early- centuries of our era had died away, Christian ethic, like Christian theology, fell under the blight of niediii'val scholasticism. Christiau truth was stilfened into a system of dogma. Christian morality was elaborated into a legal system more cumbrous and wearisome than ever the Mosaic code had been. Under this double burden the souls of men groaned in bondage. Yet even in the darkest ages there were not wanting sjmptoms of revolt. Mysticism claimed the power of holding fellowship with God, without the intervention of ecclesiastical machinery ; but it failed to base its protest on a sound conception of human nature, and so never rose beyond the position of a secret in possession of a few uniijue spirits. Final deliverance came in the epoch of the Reformation. The Reformation was in essence a religious revival. The cumbrous ecclesiastical machinery by which the mediajval Churcli, while professing to unite God and man, had really held them apart, was swept away in a burst of righteous wTath. The relations of God and man came to be re-stated under the inspiration of original Christian ideas. In this process conscience necessarily played an im]>ortant part. Conscience accentuated the an- tagonism between man and God, and showed man guilty in a degree for which indulgences and priestly absolutions brought no sound relief. Con- science, in like manner, in view of the complete atonement wrought by Christ, testified, to him who rested on Christ alone for salvation, perfect peace with God. Conscience, accordingly, occupies large 6]>ace in the writings of the Reformers, as it must do in all Christian teaching. It is not made, how- ever, the subject of special theoretical treatment. Speculative interest in the question of the source of moral judgment has not awakened ; and the necessity of its discussion is not yet felt. The Reformation, in fact, was not an individualistic movement. It is a misrepresentation to describe it as such, or to quote such phrases as ' the right of private judginunt,' as embodying its character- i.-itic ideas. Those philosophical writers who most fully express in the domain of pure thought the I'rotestant spirit — Descartes and Spinoza — are by no means individualists. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the Reformation contained the ])Ossibility of individualism. The external unity of the Church had been broken up. Before a conception of spiritual unity could be formed and wrought out in moral and political life, it was inevitable that an ejioch of indiWdualism should sui)ervene, in which man should seek to find the solution of intellectual and moral problems within bis own subjectivity. This movement predomin- ated most largely in England, and obtained almost exclusive sway, till within the present century it has met a counter current of thought. Ethical tlii'iiy during such a period is largely occupied with the (luestion of the source of moral obligation, and the faculty of moral judgment. British mornlists may be distinguished and classified mainly by their views on this toi)ic. At the head of the long line stands Thomas Ilobbes(l,')88-1079), a writer whose fertile supgestivene.«s, virile force, and daring ]iaradox, made him a paramount in- fluence in the dcvelojiment of ethical doctrine in Britain. His fundamental position is that man's natural tendencies are only and altogether ' self- regarding.' The pood for the individual is simply what he desires for himself. The result of eacii individual seeking the gratification of his own dosireajs, of course, a state of war, whose miseries
llobbes depicts to the life. Reason, accordingly, intervenes to stop this intolerable state of matters, and does so by enjoining submission to a strong government. Hobbes thus pushes individualism to an extreme in which it becomes intolerable, and is replaced by an iron system in which the indi- vidual is practically extinguished. In such a system there is no place for conscience, properly speaking. llobbes uses the word only in con- nexion with the analogous phrase 'conscious.' Conscience is no more than opinion shared by various individuals. Any higher sense is mere metaphor. The moral faculty is no other than reason, calculating how best to secure individual advantage, and deciding upon submission to the State as the best means of securin<r the end aimed at. Such a doctrine was rather tlie projiounding of a problem than its solution. Accordingly, we find that ethical thought in England consists mainly in answers to Hobbes, or ratlier in answers to the moral problem so acutely stated by him : What is the source of moral obligation ? What is the nature of the moral faculty ? These answers follow three rflistinct lines.
( 1 ) Appeal is made to reason. Reason is regarded as the power by which universal truths and principles are perceived and proclaimed. This is, in general, the view of Cudworth (1617-1088), whose Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, not published tQl 1731, is directed against the teaching of Hobbes as destructive of the e.ssential dis- tinctions of good and evil; and of Clarke (IG75- 1729). Both the.se writers claim for man this facidty of recognizing truths, ideas, or relations of things, prior to and apart from the .suggestions of sensation. Here we have a real answer to Hobbes, and a most hopeful line of ethical thought. If man have this power, then we are lifted at once above the degrading view of man as a creature of merwly selfish instincts, and have morality based, not on conventions, but on eternal fact.