The value of such ' dianoetic ethics,' to use Martineau's designation, depends obviously on the view taken of reason ; and in the above-mentioned writers, reason is conceived too much as a mere formal power, limited to the recognition of truths submitted to it. Thus, while phrases in Cudworth, for instance, remind one of Kant, there is no approach to the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, still less to its subsviiuent idealist development.
(2) A fuller analysis of human instincts is at- temjited. Hobbes had said man's primary instincts are self-regarding. It was obviously open to reply that they were not, or that they all were not. Ac- cordingly, we have such writers as Shaftesbury (1071-1713) and Hutcheson (1G94-1747) elaborately proving that man possesses social as well as scllish instincts, and placing virtue in the proper balance of the two. 'rtie perception of this balance or pro- portion is due to a moral sense, which, like the 8en.se of beauty in things artistio, ^ides us in things moral. At a first glance it might appear, as no doubt it did to the writers themselves, that they were answering Hobbes, and giving a more dignified conception of human nature. Really, however, they are in substantial agreement with Hobbes, entirely so as to presuppositions, and practically so as to result. They also appeal to instincts as providing motives and impulses. Some of these, indeed, they say are not selfish ; but if we press them we find that the special power of unsiUish instincts is the superior gratification they all'ord, i.e. they are at bottom selfish still. Scllishne.ss, or, to give it a more refined but more misleading title. Utility, is the spring and standard of action. The psychological and even the ethical principles of Hobbes are really continued in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Hume
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(3) Kefercnce is made to a distinct power of human nature, viz. to Conscience, as supreme arbiter in morals. Butler (1092-1752) is dis- tinguished among British moralists for the em- pliasis he lays on this faculty. He sees that Shaftesbury's reply to Hobbcs is defective in this respect, that his ' moral sense ' lacks the quality of supremacjf, which is reciuired to face and quell the imperiousness of sellish instincts. He labours, therefore, to establish the supremacy of conscience, and to vindicate for it mat;istcrial position and authority. Of the inipressiveness and moral strength of Butler's writings it is impo.ssible to speak too highly. As a practical protest against the immorality of his own age, they are deeply interesting ; and as a moral tonic in any age, they are invaluable. As ethical theory, or doctrine of conscience, however, they cannot be said to be final or satisfactory. Butler was, to quote the words of T. H. Green, ' the victim of the current psychology.'* To him, as much as to Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Locke, or Hume, feeling was the source of action, as of knowledge. Objects of desire are given. Then conscience, a power whose origin and nature are unexplained and inexplicable, appears to decide among the com- peting motives. It speaks with authority, but is unable to make its authority felt. Ultimately, Butler is driven to admit practical supremacy to self-love, and takes refuge in the identity of duty and self-interest. A higher principle does indeed appear in Butler, viz. the love of God. But as he never reconsidered his psychology, this rather eontributes additional confusion to his scheme. Human nature remains ' a cross of unreconciled principles,' self-love, benevolence, conscience, the love oi God. Plainly, such a view of man cannot provide a sure basis of ethics. The whole moral problem must be reconsidered. What is implied in moral action ? If it shall appear that the sensationalist psychology is at fault, If feeling cannot present objects of desire, if in the simplest aiction there is implied the presence of a Self, . making itself its own object, then we are led to a view of man as a being who finds his true good in the good of others, and of conscience as not merely authoritative, but also mighty to carry its preceits into effect, being indeed the presence within the individual consciousness of that Reason, Mind, Spirit, or Personality whose revelation is found in all reality and all good.
It is not needful to pursue the line of British moralists any further. Whoever they happen to be, Paley, Bentham, James Mill, J. S. Mill, or Bain, whatever their minor differences or their special excellences, they unite in retain- ing the psychology which reifjned throughout the eighteenth century. In vam for them did Hume carry the conclusions of that psycliology to a scepticism which provoked Kant to a reply, which introduced a new conception of man and the spiritual world. All alike they cling to the conviction that it is possible by dissection to arrive at the living man, and by analyzing his sensations to account for knowledge and morality. They may vary in detail, but they are in suu- stantial agreement as to results. The chief end of man is liaiipiness. The moral faculty is a vari- ously described compound of feelings, whose fiuid- ity 18 stiffened by tlie sanctions and punisliments of society. This psychology has more recently allied itself with the hypothesis of organic evolu- tion, and made drauglits of illimitable time aid in e8ta.blishing its conclusions. Prolonged experi- ence ai pleasure in connexion with actions, which eervo social ends, has resulted in certain physio-