3. Philo’s theory of the universe.—Notwithstand- ing his depreciation of physics, Philo believed that the invisible could be entered only through the door of the visible cosmos, and he was fairly familiar with the science of his day. In order to understand some of his speculations, it is necessary to know in what sort of universe he conceived himself to be living. The earth, apparently re- garded as spherical, was its fixed centre, and around it extended the heavens in successive spheres. Enclosing all was the vast sphere of the fixed stars, with its daily revolution from east to west. Within this were the seven spheres of the planets, the Sun occupying the centre; above it Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars; below it Mercury, Venus, and the Moon. This arrangement was symbolized by the golden candlestick. Matter was divided into four elements—fire, air, earth, and water, the dpyds re cal duvduers of the cosmos. The air extended from the earth to the lunar sphere, beyond which was the ether, the salutary form of fire, as distinguished from the useful but destruc- tive form with which we are familiar on the earth. The various objects of nature which admit of classification were constituted by a process of rational differentiation. First, things were divided into animate and inanimate. The latter com- prised things which remained unaltered, through the possession of ‘habit’ (és), and things which had the higher property of ‘nature’ (vous), in- volving nutrition, change, and growth. The animated kingdom, divided into rational and irra- tional, was distinguished by the presence of soul (yux7j), which rose above vos by having the attributes of perception, mental representation, and impulse. To these, rational beings add reason and free preferential power. Air, or rvedua, was the element which constituted habit, nature, and soul. The air, the life-giving element, must be full of living beings, and therefore was peopled by invisible and immortal souls. It seemed impious to suppose that the stars were only fiery masses of earth. They were unmixed and Divine souls, ‘manifest and perceptible gods.’
This survey of the phenomenal world led to many important questions, the answers to which must be briefly given. The universe, notwith- standing the multiplicity of its phenomena, was proved both by monotheistic faith and by panthe- istic philosophy to be one, all its parts being mutually related, and each object depending for its perfection upon its place and function in the entire system. The heavenly bodies, besides shed- ding down light upon the earth, gave indications of future events through eclipses and other celes- tial occurrences ; but Philo rejected the Chaldzean astrology, as deifying fate and destroying human responsibility. This unity, which presented the universe to the eye of reason as a well - ordered city, showed that there were powers by which the
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several parts were united, and an everlasting law, stretching from centre to circumference, and form- ing a bond that could not be broken. It was assumed that this universe, being the work of the greatest Creator, must be itself perfect, that is to say, complete in itself, and not depending on any- thing extraneous for the supply of its wants. Its perfection proved that it was the only cosmos; for it could not be perfect unless the whole substance of the elements had been used up in its production, and the Creator, being one, made it resemble him- self in solitude. To the question whether the cosmos was self-existent and eternal a Jew could give but one answer: there was a time when the universe was not. That which is eternal is im- mutable ; and therefore the universe, which is con- stantly changing, must have come into existence. Its genesis, however, did not take place in time; for time began with the interval of days and nights, and the six days of creation denote not a chrono- logical succession, but an order in thought. Never- theless, as the cosmos came into existence, Philo is driven into the expression, ‘there was once a time when it was not’ (Dec. Orac. 12 [ii. 190]). The archetype of time is eternity, in which nothing is either past or future, but only present. The genesis of the world was, according to a philo- sophical maxim, the beginning of its corruption ; but the natural process might be stayed by the providence of the Creator, and thus Philo was able to believe that the entire cosmos endures for ever. But, while he admitted the dependence of the universe on an eternal and transcendent Cause, he was not a monist. The four elements pointed to something prior to themselves, of which they were differentiated forms. This was matter (ovcla or UAn). It was conceived as the necessary sub- stratum of the forms impressed upon it by reason, and as therefore in itself wholly destitute of rational distinctions. It was accordingly described by negative predicates, dzovos, draxros, d&wWuxos, dmoppos, avetdeos, aoxnudrioros, arvmwros, donwos, daretpos, wAnumeNys, dvwuadros, dvicos, vexpos. Matter was thus only the passive condition of the exercise of efficient causality. Its existence was postulated by a necessity of thought; for causality involved four things—the agent, the material, the instru- ment, and the end in view. Matter being thus the condition of the efficient causality of God, was itself uncaused and eternal. Nevertheless, Philo does not seem quite at home with dualism, for he nowhere explicitly asserts the eternity of matter, and he occasionally uses expressions which, on a cursory perusal, seem inconsistent with it, but on more careful consideration appear not to be so. Again, he was not a dualist in the sense of accept- ing an eternal principle of evil. Dead matter could not be an efficient cause of imperfection, or limit the agency of God. Passages are, however, cited which establish Philo’s belief that the created universe limited in some way the flow of Divine power. This limitation was due, not to the oppo- sition of matter but to the very fact of creation, for the phenomenal is necessarily contrasted with that which is not phenomenal, and therefore could not be a full expression of Eternal Being. And, again, the parts of the universe were, in the ictal design of God, arranged in an ascending scale, and so could experience Divine benefits only in proportion to the capacity of their being. These considerations sufficiently explain Philo’s language, without attributing to matter a causality which is expressly denied.