(c) There is, then, no contradiction in ascribing attributes to Him whose uncompounded essence is so inscrutable. He is eternal, incorruptible, and immutable, and thus differentiated in the most absolute way from every thing created. Hence He is not only the one only God, but He is the indi- visible, archetypal unity, without parts or mem- bers. He is invisible, except as spiritual light revealing itself to the soul. He is omnipresent, and ‘has filled the cosmos with Himself’ (de Post. Cain. 5 [i. 229]), having stretched his powers through the earth and sky, so as to leave no part empty. Being independent of place, He is at once everywhere and nowhere, and all terms of motion, like up and down, are inapplicable, except figuratively, to God in His essence (7@ kara 76 eva eq ; see especially Conf. Ling. 27 [i. 425]). He is equally independent of time, which belongs only to the phenomenal world. Every thing being thus present to His view, He is omniscient, and no man can hide himself from Him. As sole efficient Cause, He is omnipotent. He is also perfect, that is, complete in Himself, so that nothing could add to the fulness from which all things come ; and, regarded as pure Being, He is out of all relation (ro yap bv, 9 bv éorwv, ovxt Tay mpés TL), but some of His powers are, as it were, relative (doavel mpés 71); a phrase which implies that, though they are de- scribed by relative terms, their character is not altered by the relation, but they impart all and re- ceive nothing,(see de Mut. Nom. 4 [i. 582]). Philo habitually teaches that God has no participation in evil, and is the source only of good. With him are of @noaupol pbvwr ayabGy (de Fuga et Invent. 15 [i. 557]). In one passage, however, this is verbally contradicted, elol yap domrep dyabGy otrw Kal Kaxay mapa 7H Oew Onoavpot (Leg. All. iil. 34 [i. 108]). This may illustrate the kind of inconsistency into which Philo is betrayed by his allegorical interpre-
tation of different passages; but here the contra- diction is relieved by the consideration that in one passage he is dealing with moral evil, and in the other with Divine punishments. When we add that God enjoys perfect blessedness and uninter- rupted peace, we have completed this preliminary survey of His attributes.
And now a profound question arises which philosophy was bold enough to answer. Why did a Being so perfect, and in need of nothing, create the universe? Because He was good and munifi- cent, and did not grudge to matter a share of His own best nature; and in thus bestowing His favours He acted from His own sole initiative, ovdevi 6é TapakrAjnTw—rls yap Hv erepos ;—udvw 6 adT@e xpnod- pevos (de Mundi Op. 5, 6 [i. 5]). From the same source springs His providential care, with which He pours forth the abundant riches of His favours, biessing the imperfect, and pitying the unworthy. But His mercies are measured out in due propor- tion, for not even the whole world could contain them in their purity. Every doctrine of Providence, however, is required to account for the existence of pain and of moral evil. The questions thus suggested are discussed by Philo in his treatise on Providence, where he gives the usual philoso- phical answers, on which it is unnecessary to linger. We must pass to the more characteristic problem, How are we to reconcile the absolute simplicity and unity of God with His manifold activity in the world of phenomena?
6. The doctrine of the Divine powers.—(a) Their existence and character.— When we survey this world and observe the mutual relation of its several parts, we are driven to the conviction that it is one system, and therefore that it is held together by a pervasive and enduring power. But this power is manifested in a vast variety of objects, which embody distinct ideas or rational forms; and nothing but the presence of a compel- ling force can prevent them from sinking back into amorphous matter. Weare therefore constrained in thought to recognize a multitude of powers, such as habitual, vital, rational. God being the only efficient Cause, these powers must be Divine, and so constitute the link between God and matter. They belong therefore to the Divine essence, and, as that essence is unknown, the powers too hide their essence, and reveal only their etfects. They are uncircumscribed, timeless, and unbegotten, holy and unerring as God Himself, and consequently they are only partially exercised in creation. From this brief description it is apparent that they corre- spond with the Platonic ideas, and accordingly Philo adopts this part of Platonic philosophy. The principal passage bearing on this subject may be quoted. God is represented as replying thus to Moses: ‘As, among you, seals, whenever wax or any similar material is applied to them, make innumerable impressions, not suffering the loss of any part, but remaining as they were, such you must suppose the powers around Me to be, apply- ing qualities to things without quality, and forms to the formless, while they experience no change or diminution in their eternal nature. But some among you call them very appropriately ideas, since they give ideal form to each thing, arranging the unarranged, and communicating determinate limits and definition and shape to the indeterminate and indefinite and shapeless, and, in a word, alter- ing the worse into the better’ (de Monarch. 1. 6 [1 218 f.]). The function of these powers or ideas in the work of creation is described in the following passage: ‘For God, as being God, anticipating that there could never be a beautiful imitation without a beautiful pattern, or any perceptible thing faultless which was not modelled in con- formity with an archetypal and intelligible idea,