4. Man as the microcosm.—From the macrocosm we pass to the microcosm, man, considering him at present simply as a natural object. He combines in himself the powers which we have already en- countered, éxrixy, purex}, Yuxix4, and adds to these
Aoyex and diavoyrixy. It is accordingly from the study of man that we derive our knowledge of God; for the higher principle in man corresponds with the supreme Mind in the cosmos. Man, then, is a duad, composed of body and soul. The body is made out of the same four elements as the rest of the material world. Soul is distinguished by the possession of alc@no.s, which, being an eiceots, introduces things to the mind through the five channels of sensation, which are signified by the creation of animals on the fifth day; of pavracta, which is an impression (rvwors) left in the soul by what the senses have communicated ; and impulse (6puy), which has the two forms of desire and aversion. The human soul, however, is twofold, and, in addition to the lower part which it shares with the animals, has the higher principle of reason. The lower part of the soul, the vital principle, consists of blood, or, more properly, of air which is mixed with blood, and carried by it to every part of the body. Like the sphere of the planets, it has seven parts or natures. These are the five senses, speech, and the faculty of repro- duction. Being material, it is mortal. The higher principle is regularly spoken of as voids. The pos- session of vods in a qualified sense is indeed some- times extended to the lower animals; but this vacillation in the use of language does not neces- sarily indicate any contradiction in Philo’s thought. The rational principle, in its highest sense, was distinctive of man, and in him it was the sover- eign part (76 jyeuovexév). Several able interpreters believe that Philo derived the substance of the rational soul from the ether, and to that extent was a materialist, although he sometimes wavers. A remarkable passage seems decisive. He alleges that we cannot know the substance (ovcla) of mind, and nevertheless asserts parenthetically, as though this one point were certain, dA ot cua, dodparov dé Nexréov (de Sommn. i. 6 [i. 625]). To resolve his doubts he appeals to the statement of Moses, ‘God breathed into his face a spirit of life,’ mean- ing by spirit ‘not air in motion, but a certain stamp and character of Divine power’ (Quod det. pot. ims. 22, 23 [i. 207]). Accordingly, the sub- stance of the higher soul is ‘ Divine spirit’ (de Concup. 11 [ii. 356]), ‘derived from nothing at all that is originated, but from the Father and Sover- eign of the universe’ (de Mundi Op. 46 [i. 32)). It is accordingly ris uaxaplas picews exuaryelov 7 améoracua 7) dmravyaocua (2b. 51 [i. 35]). In one of the passages which are thought to contradict this view he is simply stating the opinions of others ; one or two more admit of an interpretation which is consistent with his more clearly expressed view ; and in the remainder the word ‘ethereal’ may readily be understood figuratively of a pure and heavenly origin. Philo is a rhetorical writer; and his highly wrought language must frequently be interpreted by reference to his more careful and exact statements. The immaterial soul was by its nature incapable of division, and accordingly cor- responded with the unbroken sphere of the fixed stars, and so completed the analogy between the microcosmos and the macrocosmos. It belonged to the tribe of souls who peopled the air. These fell into two divisions: some, endowed with a more Divine constitution, living close to the ether; others descending into mortal bodies. The former were called by Moses angels, as bearing messages between God and man. The desire of the latter to descend into bodies is not clearly explained, and seems to imply an original moral distinction among souls. The souls of the wise, indeed, may have come to increase their experience and wisdom ; but others abandoned wisdom, and were swept away by the earthly torrent. In either case, however, the soul was intrinsically immortal.
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202 PHILO
PHILO
We must now view the soul in its temporary connexion with the body. Its seat is the heart or brain, more probably the brain, which is so closely connected with the senses. There it acts as a ‘god’ of the irrational part (Leg. All. i. 13 [i. 51)), through which, though itself capable of sever- ance, it is wholly diffused. This diffusion is effected by means of the ductile powers, which, without rupture, not only pervade the body but extend far beyond it, reaching even to God Him- self. The analogy for this extension of an in- separable monad confined to one small portion of space is found in the sun, which, without leaving its place, sends its rays into every part of the cosmos (de Som. 1. 14 [i. 632]). These powers, how- ever, are not dependent on the soul that has them, but are in their nature imperishable, so that the individual mind only has its share of those spiritual essences which belong equally to countless others. Beyond the division into rational and irrational, Philo does not venture on any systematic classi- fication, though numerous powers are casually alluded to. We must confine our attention to the most important. Man alone, upon earth, has been endowed with freedom and the power of voluntary choice between good and evil, and is therefore justly subject to praise and blame (the most important passage is Quod Deus immut. 10 [i. 279f.]). He alone is capable of sin, for higher beings are above the reach of temptations, and the animals, being subject to necessity, are below it. It is not inconsistent with the power of choice between alternatives that God is represented as the sole originating Cause; but one fragment pushes this so far as to be inconsistent with the general doctrine, the writer’s mind being for the time overwhelmed by his sense of the nothingness of the creature (see J. Rendel Harris, Fragments of Philo Judeus, p. 8). The logos is another faculty which raises man above the brute. Here Philo, except in his scriptural allegories, simply follows the Greek philosophers. The logos is two- fold: 6 évdudBeros, 6 kara didvoray Adbyos, by virtue of which we are rational ; and 6 rpodopixés, or 6 ard Tpopopay, OY 0 yeywras Ad-yos, whereby we are able to converse. The latter is the interpreter (épunvevs) of the mind, and therefore ought to be cultivated, so as to do justice to the thought. The virtues of the double logos were symbolized by the Urim and Thummim (d7Awors and dAjHea) on the breastplate of the high priest. The sources of knowledge are sensible perception and reason. The former brings the mind into connexion with the material world, and is the starting-point of all our knowledge ; for the intuitive apprehension of the intelligible cosmos arises only on occasion of some sensible experi- ence, as space is apprehended from the perception of bodies at rest, and time from perceiving bodies in motion. Nevertheless notimena shine by their own light, and in their higher forms reveal them- selves only to the pure. Knowledge, however, which depended simply on the natural faculties, was insecure. As a rule, things were known only by comparison with their opposites, and that which required something else to support it could not be depended on. The formula of scepticism, that it is safest to suspend one’s judgment (éréyew), is advocated in a long passage, in which the érrors of the senses and the conflicting views of men are dwelt upon (de Lbriet. 41-49 [i. 383-388)). Through the varying opinions of the philosophers, there- fore, Philo tool for his unerring guide the laws and customs divinely communicated to the Jews,