In Mt 23" our Lord condemns the scribes and Pharisees for dpirayri and aKpacrla, and if with Grotius (see Commentaries) we could explain the latter of sensual indulgence we would have exact opposites of righteousness and temperance as here used by St. Paul (cf. Jos, Ant. VIII. vii. 5 for this meaning of dKpaala). The context, however, is more in favour of taking dKpa<ria as meaning over- indulgence in eating and drinking.
In Tit P we have righteousness (among other virtues) joined with temperance as virtues neces- sary for a bishop or presbyter (SIkoiox . . . iyKpar^). Here ■ temperate' ought naturally to be taken in its ordinary meaning as control of bodily desires. It is not so comprehensive as auKppuv, a term which implies rational balance as well as moral self- control. The one (awrppuv) is a genus of which the other (iyKparr)^) is a specie.s. It is impossible, there- fore, to arrange the terms of these Pauline cata-
logues genetically. The arrangement is often a nuitter of rhythm, not of moral nexus (see 2 Co G°"'), and therefore it is pedantic to see any immanent ethical connexion between the members of these lists.
To Tit 2" we owe the tripartite division of duties into duties to oneself (au<t>p6vws), duties to others (SiKaiws), and duties to God (eiW;3u)s)— 'sobrie erga nos, juste erga nroximum, pie erga Deum ' (Bernard, quoted by Alford, in lor,.). Our virtue of temperance would fall uiuler the lir.st of these as a species under a genus, but it is questionable if this division was in the writer's mind. ' 1uiipp6vus can with as little propriety be referred inerelj' to one's self as SiKofus merely to others, and by ewf/Siis is also denoted the whole s]>lierc of the Christian life ' (A. Wiesinger, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1851, in lor,.). Lucian has the same virtues together and calls them the pure world of the soul (see Alford, in loc). The fact that in the Pastoral Epistles we have so many lists of virtues — similar yet never identical — is a proof that the Apostle did not write with a fixed system of ethics in the background of his mind.
In 2 P !'•* there appears on the other hand an inner psychological connexion between the various virtues mentioned. These are not thrown together at haphazard ; there is a distinct mural progress, an advance like the Stoic irpoKOTrri from a lower to a higher stage. Faith furnishes moral energy (dperi;), it knowledge, and it in turn eyKpdTaa, till we are led up to love. Here undoubtedly its place in the list throws light on its meaning. It springs out of faith, which supplies the moral energy for and the practical acquaintance with the conduct that ought to be pursued and avoided. It is the mastery of self over its own internal ho.stile forces, just as i/trop.oi'i], 'endurance,' is mastery of the self in face of outward enemies. Temper.ance and endurance are indeed closely akin. When the struggle is against one's own lusts, the necessary virtue is temperance ; when it is against hostile forces from without, then endurance — a military word— is the virtue required. The placing of knowledge and energy before it in the list shows that temperance needs both strength and insight as elements, Tlie Christian Church, however, has never looked on this list in 2 Peter as an infallible norm. In Hernias iyKpdreia is made directly the daughter of faith — virtue and knowledge are omitted — and opposed to aKpacrla ( Vis. Ill, viii. 7, Sim. IX, xv, 2), Tlie fact is that the general literature of the period is full of such lists, .and this one in 2 Pet. can be paralleled in parts from inscriptions (see Deissmann, Licht vom Osten, Tiibingen, 1908, p. 239, Eng, tr, , Light from the Ancient East, London, 1911, p. 322). We have a literary parallel in the Tabula of Cebes (xx. 3), and E. von Dobscliiitz quotes from lamblichus, de vita Pytluig., the vices that spring out of aKpaala — ' lawless marriages and corruptions and drunkennesses, and unnatural pleasures and certain violent lusts.' For a discus- sion of the origin of these catalogues of vices (aarafidaeis) and virtues (dxa/Sdo-fis) the reader is referred to his excursus in Christian Life in the Primitive Church, p. 400 ft'.
Before leaving this division of the subject the question which is raised by C. Bigg (ICC, ' St. Peter and St. Jude,' Edinburgh, 1901, ire /oc.) has to be faced. He considers that St, Peter regards temperance and the other virtues (except faith) as acquired by native moral etlort working <m the Divinely given deposit of faith, whereas St. Paul overlooks the human eflbrt. Virtue was to St. Paul the result of Divine grace, not of ethical endeavour, to use Aristotle's distinction (Eth. Nic. i. 9), whereas to St. Peter the 'flame' was from God, but the oil to feed the flame came from man's own
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zeal and fidelity (Bigg, p. 257, quoting Bengel on 2 1' I*). The fact is, however, that St. Paul never forgets moral effort. Whether virtue is obtained 0i'(jei or Idei or StSaxv (Arist. Ftk. X. ix. 6 ; cf. 0i'«reus, fiaO-^aeai, dffKi^aeuis [Diog. Laert. v. 18]) was not consciously before his mind or before the mind of the writer of 2 Peter, but in liis writings lie acknowledges each mode. He writes in one place of the Gentiles doing good by nature (Ho 2"). He compares the Christian life with the athletic and the military. Moral growth is expressed by him as the gradual acquisition of virtues, as the Roman soldier puts on his armour piece by piece. The question as to the distinction between the work of God and tlie work of man in the Christian soul is not regarded in the NT in this antagonistic fashion. Both are recognized and emphasized without any feeling of opposition. To read into the NT our later synergistic difficulties is an anachronism.